Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On hope according to a relational consideration.*

Consequently hope is considered according to a relational consideration. And concerning this five things are asked. First it is asked about hope itself by comparison to the gift of fear. Second by comparison to the use of merit. Third it is asked about it by comparison to the habit of charity. Fourth it is asked about the same by comparison to its proper object. Fifth and last it is asked about it by comparison to its subject.

### Question I. *Whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and inquires about hope by comparison to the gift of fear, and the question is whether fear and hope are one and the same habit, or diverse. And that they are the same habit, it seems it can be shown:

1. First, through a likeness in natural things: since it is one and the same weight by which a body recedes from one differentiation of position and approaches another; but that is affection in spirits which weight is in bodies, as Augustine holds: therefore it is one and the same affective habit by which one recedes from evil and by which one tends toward good. But by fear everyone recedes from evil, by hope tends toward good: therefore fear and hope are one and the same habit.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in matters of teaching; for « of opposites there is the same discipline, as of the straight and the curved, of the healthy and the sick »: therefore if the habit of virtue is a kind of art, it seems that one and the same habit can order its possessor and direct him toward opposites: therefore if hope directs the soul in comparison to good, and fear in relation to evil; it seems that hope and fear are one directive habit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in moral matters; since the mean of two extremes is one; but between despair and presumption there is a mean, which is hope; and between these the mean is the same, which is fear: therefore hope and fear are one habit.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in the theological virtues; since faith, which is a theological virtue, is one and the same, whether through it good things are believed, or through it evil things are believed: therefore if hope and fear are generated from faith itself, and the begotten ought to be assimilated to its begetter; it seems therefore that just as faith is one habit of theological virtue, so also hope and fear are one directive habit of affection.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems through a likeness in actual sins. For just as through virtue a man turns away from evil and tends toward good, so through actual sin he is turned aside from the unchangeable good and converted to the changeable; but in sin there is one and the same act and one and the same fault, by which one is averted from God and converted to the changeable good: therefore it will be similarly on the side of virtue. If therefore through hope one tends toward good and through fear turns away from evil; it seems that hope and fear are one habit.

**On the contrary:** 1. According to the Saints and the philosophers four affections of the soul are accustomed to be numbered, namely joy and grief, hope and fear: if therefore there are truly four, it is necessary that hope and fear differ from one another, according as they are affections. But the habit of hope directs that affection which is called hope, and the habit of fear another: therefore it seems that they are diverse habits.

2. Likewise, just as affections concerning present evil and good stand to one another, so stand affections concerning future good and evil; but affections concerning present good and present evil are not only distinguished, but also formally opposed, as joy and grief: therefore since hope is of future good, fear of future evil; it seems that hope and fear are not only distinguished, but also opposed to one another.

3. Likewise, the habit of virtue differs more from the habits of gifts than the habits of virtues from one another; but the habit of fear is reckoned among the gifts, the habit of hope among the virtues, according as Gregory says in the *Morals*: therefore if hope differs from the other virtues, it seems much more strongly that it should differ from fear.

4. Likewise, whenever two habits so stand that one is done away with and the other not, those are formally distinguished; but the holy fear of the Lord remains forever and ever, hope however is done away with, according as the Master says in the text, and is had below: therefore hope and fear differ essentially.

5. Likewise, those whose effects are disparate from one another are themselves also disparate; but to be secure and to be fearful are opposed — hope renders one secure, fear renders one fearful — therefore hope and fear are formally distinguished.

### Conclusion.

> Hope and fear, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another.

**I respond:** It must be said that fear and hope, whether they name habits or name affections of the soul, have diversity from one another. For the diversity of habits is attended to according to the diversity of principal acts; since therefore hope consists in a certain confidence and uplifting, fear however in a certain flight and recoil: hence it is that fear and hope have diversity from one another by reason of their acts. But the diversity of their acts comes from the side of the object, insofar as it has the character of a motive. For when the soul apprehends something not yet present, but future, under the character of the fitting, it is enticed by the affection of hope, if there is the power of attaining it; but when it apprehends it under the character of the unfitting, it is affected by the affection of fear, if it can be overtaken by it. — And thus it is clear that hope differs from fear by reason of the difference found in its proper act and also in its object. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected through a likeness in natural things, that it is the same weight which makes a body recede from one of the opposites and approach the other: it must be said that it is not altogether alike in voluntary love and in natural weight: since natural motion, especially local, necessarily has two termini, namely the terminus *to which* and the terminus *from which*; nor can any body recede from the terminus *from which*, except by tending toward the terminus *to which*; whence for one and the same act those two extremes are required, so that one is in the character of principle, and the other in the character of terminus. And therefore in natural things there is one weight, by which a movable thing recedes from one place and draws near to another; but in voluntary things it is otherwise. For when there are two opposites, the soul can be affected about one, considering nothing of the other; for it can be affected about good, considering nothing of evil, and conversely about evil, considering nothing of good; and therefore it has to be moved about opposites by diverse affects and motions. And therefore it does not follow that there is a single affect or affective habit which directs in respect of opposites, as in natural things there is one weight.

2. To that which is objected, that in matters of teaching there is one knowledge of opposites; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason. The first reason indeed is that the will separates those things which are naturally joined; whence someone wills the antecedent, and yet would not will the consequent; but cognition does not separate those things which are naturally joined; whence he who knows the antecedent in a way knows also the consequent. Since therefore through consequence in itself opposite properties follow upon opposites, by which they come to be known — as if the white disperses, the black gathers — hence it is that there can be one cognitive habit of opposites, although there is not one affective habit. — There is also another dissimilarity, because the cognitive power can deal with each of the opposites by a like act and a like account; for it judges of the straight and the oblique by the account of the straight itself; but the affective is not so, rather if it desires one of the opposites, it spurns the other; if it loves one, it hates the other, properly speaking. And the reason of this is that the affective unites itself more to the thing-to-be-affected-by than the cognitive to the knowable — whence « love transforms the lover into the beloved » — and therefore it does not follow that, if there can be one cognition of opposites, according as they are opposite, on account of this there should be one affection of the opposites, or even one directive virtue of affection.

3. To that which is objected through a likeness in moral matters, that of two extremes there is one mean; it must be said that it is true that there is one *punctual* mean; but the mean taken broadly does not have truth: since between two extremes far distant there can be several means, so that one draws near to one extreme, and another to the other. And so it can be in fear and hope with respect to presumption and despair, because fear approaches more to the extreme of despair, but hope to the extreme of presumption. — It can also be said otherwise that this is understood of the mean which is constituted out of both extremes, as liberality between prodigality and avarice is said to be a mean. But hope and fear are not means of this kind, as is clear from what precedes. — It could also be answered by removal: because fear and hope are not means of the same extremes, but of diverse ones. For hope holds the middle between despair and presumption, but fear between rashness and timidity or pusillanimity; and so it is not necessary that fear and hope agree in a mean of virtue, or in a unity of affection.

4. To that which is objected through a likeness in faith, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that, although faith is of evils and of goods, nevertheless it is under a single account, namely under the account of the true. Moreover, it is a habit pertaining to cognition, which is not diversified on account of the contrariety of objects; but hope and fear are affective habits, which do not regard good and evil under one account, but hope regards under the account of the fitting, fear under the account of the unfitting: therefore it is not alike on this side and on that. If you object that the principiated ought to be assimilated to its principle; it must be said that that is true in univocal generation. But as for what is said, that faith generates hope and fear, this is not according to univocation, but this is through a certain disposition, by which we say that a cognitive habit generates an affect, because it prepares and disposes toward it.

5. To that which is objected through a likeness in conversion and aversion; it must be said that aversion and conversion in one mode name acts, in another mode name circumstances about an act. According as they name an act, thus they are diverse motions; for the affection of contempt, by which the soul is averted from one thing, is one thing, and the affection of appetite, by which it is converted to the other, another. But according as they name circumstances or relations about an act, thus they can be about one and the same act and about the same sin, because one and the same thing can at once and together be compared to diverse things and be referred to them by diverse relations. And so it is not alike with the affection of fear and of hope, because one power cannot at once and together, nor by one act, be affected about diverse and contrary things. Therefore it does not follow that, if aversion and conversion can be about one action and form, that likewise fear and hope should be about one and the same affection.