Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether hope takes its rise from good merits.*

Secondly it is asked about hope by comparison to the use of merit, and the question is whether hope takes its rise from good merits. And that it does, it seems.

1. To the Romans, chapter five: *Tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope:* therefore if merit consists in trial itself, it seems that hope takes its rise from merits.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of the Master, which is set down in the text: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from grace and merits ».

3. Likewise, no one has the virtue of hope, except one who in hoping follows the dictate of faith; but faith says that no adult can be saved without merits: therefore no one rightly hopes for beatitude, except one for whom merits are at hand: therefore it seems that hope proceeds from merits.

4. Likewise, just as despair stands to demerits, so hope stands to good merits; but despair so stands to demerits that no one despairs except on account of some fault committed — for it is a bad conscience which leads into despair — therefore it seems that hope likewise takes its rise from good merits.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine: « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, which God works in us without us »: therefore if hope is a virtue, as was shown in what precedes, God works it in us without us: therefore it does not take its rise from our merits.

2. Likewise, nothing which is a principle of merits takes its rise from merits; but hope is a principle of merits; for no one can merit before God except one who hopes: therefore hope does not take its rise from merits.

3. Likewise, all the virtues are infused together: therefore if any virtue precedes merits, it is necessary that all precede; and if any follows after, it is necessary that all follow after: therefore either hope does not proceed from merits, or the rest of the virtues proceed from merits. But it is impossible that the rest of the virtues arise from merits: therefore it is impossible that hope itself arise from merits.

4. Likewise, the more perfect one is, the more humble he is, and the more humble he is, the less he presumes or trusts in his own merits: therefore if perfect hope is joined with perfect humility, it seems that neither hope nor its use arises from the regard of merits.

### Conclusion.

> Hope, insofar as it is a habit, does not arise from merits; insofar as it is the terminus or object of itself, it takes its rise from preceding merits; insofar as it names an act, or a state, it arises from the regard of merits.

**I respond:** It must be said that hope sometimes names the habit of virtue, sometimes names an act, sometimes names a state, sometimes a terminus or object. — But according as hope names the habit of virtue, thus it does not take its rise from merits, but rather merits take their rise from it. — But according as it names an act, thus it has to arise from the regard of merits; for no one rightly hopes for eternal beatitude except one who has served God, or proposes to serve God. — But according as it names a state, thus it takes its rise from preceding and concomitant merits; and in this way is taken the text to the Romans, chapter five: *Tribulation works patience, patience trial, trial hope;* the Gloss, that is « the certitude of hope », to which certitude, namely, one arrives through good merits, and especially through the toleration and endurance of tribulations. — But according as hope names the very thing hoped for, thus it takes its rise from preceding merits.

And thus it is clear that hope, according to the first acceptation, simply precedes merits as a principle of merits; according to the last acceptation, it simply follows after as a reward of merits; according to the two middle ones, it stands in a middle way, because in a certain way it precedes, in a certain way it follows. For hope, as it names the motion of hope, proceeds from the regard of merits and according to truth is a principle of the merits that follow. But as hope is called a certain certitude and state, thus according to truth it takes its rise from merits, and is nonetheless a help toward meriting more perfectly. For that certitude of hope rises up from the suffering of tribulations and vehemently confirms and comforts the soul, so that it does not withdraw from the endurance of tribulations. — And from these things the answer to the proposed question is clear; the answer to the objections is no less clear, because hope is in a certain way of accepting it from merits, and in a certain way a principle of merits; and according to this the reasonings run to the opposite sides, and both by diverse ways prove and conclude the truth, except for the two last reasonings, adduced to either part.

For to that which is objected concerning despair, it can be answered that it is not alike, for the reason that, since despair names the depth of sin, no one is plunged there except as he is disposed by some preceding fault; but hope does not so name the perfection of merit according to its general acceptation. Therefore it is not necessary that it proceed from merits, as it names the virtue itself, or its act, as despair does, which, being a vice plunging into the deep, presupposes another sin. — Moreover, for another reason it is not alike, because we, and those things which are in us and from us, are the principles of our vices; but it is not so concerning goods, because *every best gift and every perfect gift is from above*; therefore it is not so necessary that hope arise from our merit, as despair arises from vice.

To that likewise which is last objected from the other side, that the humble man does not regard merits; it must be said that to regard merits happens in two ways: either by attributing them to oneself, or by attributing them to the divine grace. But to regard merits by attributing them to oneself, this belongs to pride and vanity; and thus the proud regard them, who say: *Our hand is exalted, and not the Lord has done all these things*. Against whom it is said in Deuteronomy nine: *Say not in your heart: For my justice the Lord has brought me in, that I might possess this land.* But to regard merits by referring them to the divine grace, this belongs to humility and to truth; and in this way the motion of hope has to arise from the regard of merits; in which way Paul regarded his merits, in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen: *I have labored more abundantly than all; yet not I, but the grace of God with me.* — But the other things which are objected are sufficiently manifest.

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