Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning hope by comparison to the habit of charity, and the question is whether hope precedes charity in the order of nature, or the reverse; and we speak here of the habits in comparison to acts. And that hope precedes, it seems.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter one: *Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob*; the Gloss, that is, « faith generates hope, hope generates charity »: therefore if that which generates is, according to the order of nature, prior to what is generated, it is necessary that hope precede charity.

2. Likewise, the construction of the spiritual edifice is similar to a material building; but in a material building not only does the foundation precede the completion of the building, but also the wall, according to right order, precedes the roof itself: if therefore faith is likened to the sustaining foundation, and hope to the rising wall, and charity to the consummating roof; it seems that hope precedes charity itself.

3. Likewise, according to the natural order the imperfect precedes the perfect, not the reverse; but charity is greater and more perfect than faith and hope, according to what is said in the first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen: *But the greater of these is charity*: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one can love a good for its own sake and above all things, to which he does not hope that he is able to attain: if therefore charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, the act of charity follows the act of hope: therefore charity follows hope itself.

**On the contrary** it is objected: 1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from merits preceding hope itself, which charity precedes by nature »: therefore according to the natural order charity is before hope.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fourteenth book of the *City of God* says that every affection arises from love, therefore every right affection from a right love: since therefore charity directs the very love of the will, while the virtue of hope directs one of the four affections; it seems that hope is posterior to charity.

3. Likewise, no one hopes except for what he loves — for what one does not desire he in no way hopes — therefore the rightness of love precedes the rightness of expectation; but charity directs in loving, while hope directs in expecting: therefore charity is before hope.

4. Likewise, fear and hope are two affections running as it were together — whence in the Gloss, on Deuteronomy chapter twenty-four, they are said to be « two millstones »; but every fear proceeds from love: therefore also every

hope: therefore gratuitous hope proceeds from gratuitous love: therefore according to the natural order charity precedes hope.

5. Likewise, « by however much something is more common, by so much is it prior »; but everything to be hoped for is to be loved, and the converse does not hold: therefore the act of love is more common than the act of hope: and if more common, then prior.

6. Likewise, that is the order of one virtue to another which is the order of one dowry to another; but perfect holding, which is the dowry corresponding to hope, follows perfect love, which is the dowry corresponding to charity: therefore it seems that on the way charity precedes hope according to the natural order.

### Conclusion.

> *The act of hope, according to the order of nature, precedes the act of charity; whence also the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity, although, considered in itself together with the habit of charity, it has simultaneity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of comparing the habit of hope to the habit of charity: either by reason of the habits considered *in themselves*, or by reason of the habits compared *to acts*. If we speak of the habits themselves, considered *in themselves*, then they have no order, but simultaneity. For all the gratuitous virtues are infused together, according to what will be shown below. — But if we speak of the habits themselves in comparison *to acts*, then one has an order to the other, because the act of one prepares and disposes to the act of the other, and by preparing and disposing it is in a certain way its principle and origin; and by reason of such preparation and origin there is order there. Since therefore the act of hope prepares and disposes to the act of charity as to a perfection and to the completion of the spiritual edifice — for no one loves any good for its own sake and above all things, unless he hopes that he will attain to that good — hence it is that according to the order of nature the act of hope precedes the act of charity; and hence it is that the habit of hope, in comparison to such an act, is prior to charity. — Whence the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Master, that charity precedes hope by nature; it must be said that hope is taken there either for the thing hoped for, or for the very state of hope, not however for its first act, or habit. — It could also be said that the Master says this according to his own opinion, by which he believed that charity is not a created habit, but the Holy Spirit, who is the principle of all other goods. Whence, because in this opinion the Master is commonly not upheld, and that is his own word, that authority has no force.

2. To that which is objected, that love is the principle of all the affections; it must be said that this is true of love according to the imperfect state; but just as love according to the imperfection of its state is the principle of all the affections, so according to its perfection it is the final term and completion of all the affections. Whence all the affections of the soul are ordered to this, that God be loved perfectly; charity, however, does not name just any love, but the chief love. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity, according to the natural order, precedes hope itself.

3. To that which is objected, that no one hopes except for what he loves; it must be said that this is true; yet nevertheless from this it does not follow that hope follows charity, for the reason that charity adds such a circumstance upon love as necessarily follows upon the act of hoping and its rightness, as was touched on before. For since the motion of the love of charity is twofold, namely the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship; charity by the love of concupiscence desires God above all things, and by the love of friendship it likewise loves God for his own sake and above all things. Whence it desires God more than any other good, and wishes good to God more than one having charity would wish it for himself. But the love of concupiscence cannot be so intense except by a preceding expectation. Likewise neither can the love of friendship be so elevated, unless confidence precede it. For no one wills good to another more than to himself, unless he confide in him totally; nor does anyone desire any good above all things, except he who presumes that he will at some time attain to it.

4. To that which is objected, that fear follows love, therefore so does hope likewise; it must be answered, as has been said, that although this affection

precedes that one, yet this *habit* in comparison to its act does not precede it, on account of the chief perfection which charity sets about the act of loving. — *Moreover*, when it is said that fear follows upon love: this is not understood of *any* love, but of *self-love*. For one fears punishment because he loves himself; charity, however, does not principally name self-love, but the love of God. And therefore it does not follow that the act of charity precedes the act of fear; nor from this can it be concluded that it likewise precedes the act of hope.

5. To that which is objected, that « that is prior from which the consequence is not converted »; it must be said that this holds true in those things which *essentially* follow upon one another; but in those which *accompany* one another, it does not hold true. And this is plain, because it follows, if there is snow, that it is white; but it is not converted, yet the whiteness of snow does not precede the very substance of the snow. Since therefore *to hope* and *to love* are acts accompanying one another; therefore, although the act of loving extends to lovable things, it is not necessary that it be prior in the order of nature. — *Moreover*, although *charity* is more general on the side of the *object*, yet *hope* is more general and extends to more on the side of the *subject*. For every wayfarer who has charity has hope; but it is not converted, because hope can be in a sinner; and therefore the act of hope in its origin precedes the act of charity in respect of the *subject*, from which both acts take their origin. And so the argument has no force.

6. To that which is objected concerning the dowries, that perfect holding follows perfect love; it must be said that this is not alike in every respect, on account of this, that the *dowries* in the fatherland will be of equal perfection; but on the way *charity* is of greater perfection and dignity, as far as pertains to the nature of the virtue, than hope itself is; and therefore it is not necessary that, if on the way *expectation* precedes the chief love, on this account in the fatherland *holding* should precede perfect love. For although the virtues are equal as to the ground of meriting, yet the act of love is more perfect than that of expectation: but in glory *to love perfectly* is not of greater dignity than *to have perfectly* and *to hold perfectly*. Whence although on the way the act of the irascible precedes the act of the concupiscible, yet it is not necessary that it be so in the fatherland, where there is perfect reformation, nay it can be the reverse. — There are also here other ways of responding, which for the sake of brevity are omitted for the present, on account of this, that they draw beyond this matter to the order and distinction of the dowries themselves.

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