Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a2-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether hope is toward the good under the formal character of the good.*

Fourth, there is inquiry concerning hope itself by comparison to its object, and the question is whether hope is toward the good under the formal character of the good. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. *First*, by reason of virtue in general: because, just as knowledge is with respect to the true, so virtue is with respect to the good; but all knowledge is toward the true under the formal character of the true: therefore all virtue is toward the good under the formal character of the good: if then hope is a virtue, therefore it is toward the good under the formal character of the good.

2. *Likewise*, this same thing seems to follow by a more proper reason, which is taken from the property of a theological virtue: for a theological virtue has the same thing for its object and for its end; but « the good and the end are the same »: therefore since hope is a theological virtue, and the good under the formal character of the good is its end, therefore the good under the formal character of the good will be its object.

3. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown further by a more special reason, by comparison to the other kinds of affections: because, as joy stands with respect to the present, so hope stands with respect to the future; but joy is concerning the present good under the formal character of the good: therefore hope is concerning the future good under the formal character of the good.

4. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown by a yet more special reason, by comparison to another species of virtue: because, as Augustine says, faith differs from hope in this, that faith is with respect to good and evil, hope is with respect to good alone. For if faith could be at once of good and of evil, on the ground that it did not regard the good under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the true; hope, however, determines the good for itself, in such a way that it is in no way toward its opposite: it seems therefore that hope itself is toward the good under the formal character of the good.

5. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown by a more proper reason, through the definition of hope itself: « For hope is the expectation of future beatitude »: if then beatitude names the good under the formal character of the good, it seems therefore that the good under the formal character of the good is the object of hope itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. The theological virtues are distinguished through their objects, insofar as they have a proper formal character; but charity is toward the good under the formal character of the good: therefore if hope is distinguished from charity, the good under the formal character of the good will not be the object of hope.

2. *Likewise*, with the formal character of good and evil set aside, it still happens that one fears, just as in the fatherland we shall fear God, not indeed under the formal character of evil nor under the formal character of the good, since under that formal character we shall love — for the good under the formal character of the good generates love rather than fear — if then it happens that one fears with the formal character of good and evil set aside, therefore it also happens that one hopes: therefore the object of hope is not the good under the formal character of the good, nor evil under the formal character of evil.

3. *Likewise*, no one fears an evil that is subject to his own power; but whoever fears an evil, fears it under the formal character of what is surpassing: if then hope is toward the good in the way that fear is toward evil; it seems that hope is not toward the good under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the arduous.

4. *Likewise*, just as a man naturally desires to be illumined and to be delighted, so also he naturally desires to be glorified, and I say this according to the highest part of the soul itself: therefore just as there is to be found in us certain virtues perfecting and directing the soul itself with respect to the illuminating true and with respect to the delighting good, namely faith and charity; so there will be one with respect to the arduous and the surpassing; but this is not to be assigned to anything except hope: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, although all gratuitous virtues in a certain manner elevate the mind, and the theological virtues do this most of all; nevertheless the elevation and erecting of the spirit itself most properly belongs to hope itself: therefore if the virtue of hope consists most of all in erecting and elevating the spirit itself, since our spirit is great and is not born to raise itself except to great and arduous things; it seems therefore that the object of hope, as to the efficacy of moving, holds the formal character of the arduous: therefore the object of hope is not the good under the formal character of the good.

> ### Conclusion.
> The object of hope is the good under the formal character of the great and the arduous, or also the good under the formal character of the glorious and the eternal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that some have wished to say that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the future. For they said that all the affections of the soul are either with respect to the good, or with respect to evil; and just as joy is with respect to the present good, while sorrow, which is the affection opposed to it, is with respect to present evil; so hope is with respect to the future good, and fear with respect to future evil. Now what moved them to posit this was that they held there to be only a twofold object toward which the soul tends: one, namely, the true, toward which the intellect tends, the other, namely, the good, toward which the affect tends; and therefore, since hope is not toward the true under the formal character of the true, they wished to say that it is toward the good under the formal character of the good. In this, however, it differs from charity: because charity is toward the good under the formal character of the good simply, without considering the present or the future; and because the good under the formal character of the good is to be loved, therefore the act of charity itself is to love. Hope, however, is toward the good not only under the formal character of the good, but also under the formal character of the future; and because the future good, insofar as it is future, is to be expected, therefore the act of hope itself is to expect; and because to expect and to love are diverse acts: hence it is that hope and charity are diverse virtues, not principally by reason of a diversity of objects, but by reason of the diversity of their proper acts.

But although this manner of speaking may seem to have something of probability, nevertheless to one considering it more inwardly it does not satisfy the difficulty nor accord with the truth. For what is said, that there is no other moving object of the powers of the soul than the true under the formal character of the true and the good under the formal character of the good, simply does not hold true,

because, as was touched upon in the opposing arguments, just as the rational tends toward the true, and the concupiscible toward the good, so also our irascible tends toward the arduous and the great. — *Again*, what it says, that the good under the formal character of the future good is the motive of a different affection than the good under the formal character of the good; does not hold true, on the ground that the good under the formal character of the future is desired, and desire is not hope, but rather a certain differentiation of love, and to desire belongs to charity itself. — *Furthermore*, what it says, that fear is with respect to evil under the formal character of evil; does not hold true; for it happens that one fears, as was shown in the opposing arguments, with the formal character of evil abstracted; just as God will be feared in the fatherland. — *Moreover*, if at any time an evil is feared, it is not feared except because it is surpassing; if then the affection which is fear regards in its object the surpassing more than the malice under the formal character of the motive: it remains likewise that the affection corresponding to it, namely hope, does too.

The object of hope is therefore the good indeed, but not under the formal character of the good, but rather under the formal character of the arduous or the great. — And this can be made manifest thus. For hope has a twofold act, of which one is the principle and origin of the other; for hope makes one confident, and by making one confident it makes one expect. But no one who is rightly confident is confident and relies except on him who can neither fail him nor wishes to; and such a one is none but he who is most powerful in might and most munificent in liberality; and one does not have this unless he have excellence of might and of bounty. But when someone has placed his whole trust in him who is of most excellent might and liberality; he expects to obtain great things from him. Since therefore hope has a great and arduous object in being confident; hence it is that it has for its object the great and arduous in expecting. And hence it is that the Lord himself, in whom we hope, promises us great things for the consolation of our hope, according to what he says to Abraham, Genesis the fifteenth: *Fear not, Abraham, I am thy protector and thy reward exceeding great*; as if to say: I am the protector, in whom thou oughtest to be confident, and thy reward is great, which thou oughtest to expect.

It must therefore be granted that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the great or the arduous. — And because the glorious names the great by loftiness, the eternal names the great by lastingness, the former intensively, the latter extensively; therefore it can also be granted that the object of hope is the good under the formal character of the glorious and under the formal character of the eternal, that is, under the formal character of the surpassing and the unfailing, since these two concur toward the perfect formal character of the magnitude of the good itself. — Therefore the arguments which are for this side are to be granted.

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that as knowledge stands to the true, so virtue stands to the good: it must be said that this is not entirely similar: because the cognitive power has an object of only one formal character, namely the true; but the affective power, since it is doubled into two forces, namely the concupiscible and the irascible, has an object of a twofold formal character, namely the good, which it desires, and the arduous, toward which it raises itself.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a theological virtue has the same thing for its object and for its end; it must be said that if this be understood of identity as to substance, thus it is true, because God himself is the end and object of them. But if we speak as to the formal character of moving, thus it does not hold true except in the one virtue which is charity; for it alone has the good under the formal character of the good both for object and for end; therefore it holds the primacy among the other virtues, as will be made manifest below. In faith, however, and in hope it does not hold true; and since in that formal character it proceeds from identity according to substance to identity according to formal character: therefore in that process there is sin according to accident.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that hope stands with respect to the future as joy stands with respect to the present: it must be said that the likeness is good as to the difference of futurity and presentness, but as to the formal character of the moving good there is no likeness. For the good under the formal character of the good, when it is present, delights and refreshes the concupiscible itself; but under this formal character it does not elevate and erect, but rather under the formal character of the surpassing. For the delight which is in joy regards fittingness; but the erecting which is in hope regards excellence.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that hope is with respect to the good alone, therefore it has the good for its object under the formal character of the good; it must be said that this does not follow, on the ground that this is not the only formal character on account of which something tends solely toward the good, because its motive is the good under the formal character of the good, but also on account of this, that that which is its motive always has a good underlying it. And in this way it must be understood to hold in hope. For that arduous and surpassing thing, for the attaining of which the soul is raised up, cannot be other than a good.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that hope is the expectation of future beatitude; it must be said that hope does not expect beatitude except insofar as it holds the formal character of the great and the arduous, that is, the formal character of the surpassing and the unfailing. And because beatitude implies these two from its first formal character; hence it is that hope is more to be defined by beatitude than another virtue: whence in that formal character there is sin according to accident. For although beatitude has the formal character of the good, nevertheless it does not fall principally under the expectation of hope under that formal character, but insofar as it has the formal character of the arduous.