Dist. 26, Art. 2, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-a2-q5
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### Question V. *Whether hope is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul.*

Fifthly, hope is inquired into by comparison to its subject, and the question is whether hope is in the cognitive or the affective part of the soul. And that it is in the cognitive part is shown:

1. First, by that which is said in 1 Timothy 1 on the text: *The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart and a good conscience*; the Gloss: *from a good conscience*, that is, from hope: if therefore hope is conscience, and conscience holds itself on the side of the cognitive, it seems that hope likewise does.

2. Likewise, Bernard in a certain homily on the Canticle: «To the reason God-to-come is fullness of light, to the will multitude of peace, and to the memory the continuation of eternity»: but the continuation of eternity is the dowry corresponding to the expectation of hope itself: therefore if that regards the memory, it seems that the expectation of hope in this life has its being in the memory. But this is a cognitive power: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine, defining hope, in the book *On the City of God* says that «hope is a virtue by which one presumes that he will attain to that which he believes». From this definition it seems that to hope is nothing other than firmly to believe that one will attain to some arduous and excellent thing; but both to believe and firmly to believe belongs to the cognitive power: therefore to hope pertains to the cognitive power. But «whose the act is, his also is the habit»: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, the image of creation is reformed by the image of re-creation, which consists in grace and the three theological virtues: therefore if the reforming virtues are in the powers which they reform, it is necessary that the theological virtues be in those powers in which the integrity of the image is regarded. If therefore those powers are intelligence, memory, and will, and charity regards the will, faith the intelligence; it seems therefore that hope regards the memory: therefore it is in the cognitive power.

5. Likewise, *certitude* regards the cognitive power: therefore since «hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude», hope is in the cognitive power as in its subject.

**On the contrary:** 1. Four kinds of affection are distinguished by the Saints and by the philosophers, namely *joy* and *sorrow*, *hope* and *fear*: therefore if every affection and habit regulative of affection is in the affective power, since hope either names an affection, or a habit directive of affection; it seems therefore generally that hope is in the affective power.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the same power to *hope* whose it is also to *fear*; but to *fear* belongs only to the affective power: therefore neither does to *hope*. But «whose the act is, his also is the habit»: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, «opposites are by nature brought about about the same faculty»; but hope and despair are opposites: if therefore despair is in the affective power, it seems likewise that hope too is.

4. Likewise, just as it happens that the rational and the concupiscible power may be deflected and directed, so too the irascible: therefore just as there is some theological virtue in the rational and some in the concupiscible, so some ought to be in the irascible; but this is none other than hope: therefore hope is in the irascible: therefore hope is in the affective power.

5. Likewise, the object of hope is great and arduous, as was shown above; but the arduous is the object of the irascible power: therefore if the object of the habit and of the underlying power, in which the habit is, is the same, hope is in the irascible power; and this is affective: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Hope is in the affective power of the soul, and indeed in the irascible part.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt hope is in the affective power; for it is in the irascible itself, which is a part of the affective power. For it belongs to the irascible power not only to detest the evils of fault and to endure the evils of punishment, but also to attack terrible things and to raise itself up to great and arduous things. And therefore not only

do we place in it anger and patience, but also fortitude and hope: fortitude, I say, insofar as it is engaged about the things that are toward the end; hope, insofar as it raises itself up to the excellence of the end itself.

This, moreover, can be quite clearly gathered, both from the side of the underlying affection, and from the side of the adjoined condition, and from the side of the dowry to follow. From the side of the underlying affection: because, since there are four affections, namely joy and sorrow, hope and fear, just as joy and sorrow are about the same power, so too are hope and fear. Since therefore it is plain that fear belongs to the irascible power itself, there is no doubt that the affection of hope pertains to the irascible power, and through this the habit of the virtue of hope directing that affection. — From the side likewise of the annexed condition and property the same can be quite clearly seen. For it belongs to hope to *stabilize* and in a certain way to *make secure* concerning the attainment of future beatitude; but *stabilization* and *confirmation* pertain to the irascible power. For just as the rational is related to clarity, and the concupiscible to pleasure; so too the irascible to security. Since therefore making-secure is a condition accompanying hope itself, it is undoubtedly true that the virtue of hope pertains to the irascible. — From the side of the *future dowry* the same can be had. For just as vision follows upon faith, so perfect holding follows upon hope. But firmly to hold belongs to that power whose it is to defend the habit; and there is no doubt that this is the irascible power. — And therefore it must be granted that the habit of hope is in the irascible power, and through this in the affective virtue of the soul, as the arguments conclude which are for this side.

1. To that which is first objected, that hope is called conscience; it must be said that in that process there is a fallacy by equivocation: because conscience can name hope itself, and can name the light directive toward acting well; and in this latter way it pertains to the cognitive power, in the other way not: therefore it does not follow that the virtue of hope is in the cognitive power of the soul. Besides, there is another defect there: because by the name of conscience hope is understood, not because hope is conscience, but because hope is a certain expectation, arising from grace and merits; but merits cannot exist except where there is a good conscience.

2. To that which is objected, that God-to-come is the continuation of eternity for the memory; it must be said that that word of Bernard is to be understood mediately and not primarily. For the continuation of eternity regards that virtue whose it is perpetually to hold; and this belongs to the irascible power, whose it is in the present to expect: and therefore from this it does not follow that hope is primarily in the memorative power, but that it regards it in some way, either principally or consequently.

3. To that which is objected, that to hope is nothing other than firmly to believe that one will have something; it must be said that hope is spoken of both broadly and properly. Taking hope broadly, it thus says a credulity in some way confirmed with respect to some good to be attained either by oneself or by another; just as, when one sees another of good disposition, he says that he hopes him to be a good man in the future; there to hope is the same as probably to believe; and thus it is taken broadly and improperly and can well pertain to the cognitive virtue. — In another way to hope, according as it is said properly, is the same as to *trust* and from that trust with a certain security to *tend* toward having that which is hoped for; and in this way it pertains to the affective virtue. And these two, namely that trust and the secure tending, Augustine comprehends under the word *presuming*, which, although it follows the credulity of cognition, nevertheless holds itself on the side of affection. And therefore from that argument it cannot be concluded that the cognitive power is the subject of hope.

4. To that which is objected, that the image of re-creation corresponds to the image of creation; it must be said that it is true that it corresponds; nevertheless the image of creation holds itself more on the side of the cognitive, whereas the image of re-creation holds itself more on the side of the affective, according as Augustine says, that «the image is in the power of knowing, and the likeness in the power of loving». And because the image of re-creation holds itself more on the side of the affective, therefore two virtues are in the affective part totally and principally, namely hope and charity. And the virtue of hope, by reforming the irascible power, which is the affective power,

consequently reforms the memory itself, which communicates with it in act, namely in the act of holding. And therefore it is not necessary that hope be placed in the memory as in its proper subject. But these things have been more plainly determined in the second book, distinction sixteen.

5. To that which is objected last concerning certitude, the response is clear from the things which have been said above, because the certitude of hope does not pertain to the cognitive power, but rather to the affective power, which certitude is a certain making-secure holding itself on the side of the irascible power. — It is clear therefore what is the subject of hope as regards the power of the soul.

Furthermore there could also be here an inquiry concerning the subject of hope as regards substance, and about this many things doubtful could be inquired. First it is asked whether hope is in the good Angels. — Second, whether it is in the blessed souls. — Third, whether it is in any way in the evil angels. — Fourth, whether it was in those who were in limbo. — Fifth, whether it is in those who are in purgatory. — Sixth and last it is asked whether it was in Christ. — But since all these questions for the most part depend on that question by which it is said concerning the emptying-out of hope, and, that having been seen, the rest are easy; therefore these questions are for the present omitted, because some of them will be determined below, some of them are touched on in the text, that so superfluity, which is the enemy of the memory, may be avoided.