Dist. 26, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/26/q/bon-sent-III-d26-dubia
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which he sets down, when he says: *Hope is a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for.* For if the eternal good is one only, it seems that he speaks wrongly in the plural: *by which eternal goods are hoped for.* — Likewise, no eternal thing is temporal; but everything future is temporal: therefore since through hope future goods are awaited, as is said in the other definition; it seems that through it eternal goods are not awaited.

On account of this it is asked what is the difference between those two members, namely between *spiritual* goods and *eternal* ones.

**I respond:** It must be said that hope is here defined through comparison to its proper object. But the object of hope itself is the eternal and glorious good. And this is twofold, namely created and uncreated; and hope is with respect to each, principally however with respect to the uncreated Good. — And according to this the aforesaid definition can be understood in two ways; and if it is understood of the uncreated Good, then hope is said to await eternal goods, which indeed, as far as they are in themselves, lack beginning and end. But if it is understood of the created good, then it is said to await eternal goods, that is, perpetual ones. — Yet in either way it is said in the plural to await eternal goods, not because the supreme goods are many, but because the eternal good, which is the immense Goodness itself, excels all goods by its eminence; and the perpetual good, which is created beatitude, comprehends all goods by equivalence. And therefore he said *eternal* in the plural, not on account of a multitude of eternity, but on account of the all-encompassing fullness of the good awaited.

But to that which is objected, that there is an awaiting of a future good; it must be said that nothing prevents some good from being eternal *in itself*, and being had temporally by someone *as a reward*; and thus it is in the recompense which is awaited through hope, which is eternal in itself, and yet is future to the one awaiting it, who has not yet attained to it.

To that which is asked, what difference there is between those two members; it must be said that the first member is explained by the second, because there *and* is set for *that is*, so that the sense is: *spiritual*, that is, *eternal*. — Or it can be said that by this difference *spiritual* hope is distinguished from natural affection; but by this, that it is called *eternal*, it is distinguished from the cardinal virtue, and the proper account of hope is touched on, which is toward the good under the account of the eternal. — Or it can be said that by this, that it is called *spiritual*, the general object is touched on, which has the character of the material, according as it is wont to be said that one hope is of *pardon*, another of *grace*, another of *glory*. But by this, that it is called *eternal*, the proper and formal or motive object is touched on.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about the other definition which he sets down there: *Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, proceeding from grace and merits*; because, according as the Philosopher says, «he errs who defines that which is in motion through that which is at rest, and conversely»; but to await is to be at rest, to hope is in some way to tend toward the thing hoped for: therefore it is badly defined through expectation. — Likewise, «every notification ought to be given through what is proper»; but *beatitude* and *grace* and *merits* are common to the other virtues: therefore hope is unsuitably defined through them.

In connection with this it is asked: since «of one thing there is one being, and so one definition», how does the aforesaid notification differ from the other notifications which are wont to be assigned of hope?

**I respond:** It must be said that hope is a name of an affection and is a name of a virtue. According as it is a name of an affection, thus it is defined by the Philosopher: «Hope is a surmise of a future good». — But according as it is a name of a virtue and names a habit, thus it must be defined and notified through its act. And that act can be compared in three ways: either to the object *only*, and thus there is that definition of the Master: «hope is a virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for»; or to the object and the principle, and thus there is that of Haymo: «Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from grace and merits»; or to the object and the *preambular habit*, and thus there is that of Augustine in *On the City of God*: «Hope is a virtue by which one presumes that he will attain to that which he believes».

Otherwise too a distinction can be assigned among those notifications, that the first is *formal*, given through genus and differences; the second *causal*, given through act and cause; the third indeed *partly causal, partly formal*, because it is given through the genus of hope and another preambular virtue, namely faith, which is touched on in the word of believing.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that expectation is rest; it must be said that although it is a bodily rest, yet it is a certain solicitude of the mind. For he who awaits a coming desires the thing awaited; but expectation, according as it is set down in the definition of hope, is not a bodily expectation, but rather a mental one, which is a certain longing and stretching-forth with respect to the end to be attained.

To that which is objected, that this notification is given through common things; it must be said that those common things, according as they are set down in this notification, are appropriated. For *beatitude* is appropriated to hope by reason of the ultimate endowment, which indeed is a perfect possessing, corresponding to hope itself, and by that account by which under the name of beatitude we understand an excelling and unfailing good. Likewise *grace* and *merits* are appropriated to it, inasmuch as they are joined together. For grace regards God's kindness and mercy; but merits regard God's equity and justice. But since it belongs properly to the virtue of hope to regard both, that it may free from desperation and presumption, which look to only one or the other; therefore it properly belongs to hope, that it is called «coming from grace and merits»: merits, I say, preceding either in purpose, or in root, or in use, as in the preceding [discussions] was shown.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *And just as faith, so also hope is concerning invisible things.* For it seems to be false to say so, because, if faith and hope share in the object: therefore they are the same virtue. — Likewise, in temporal things one can hope for money which he sees just as well as money which he does not see: therefore by parity of reasoning also in spiritual things: therefore hope ought not to be said to be concerning invisible things. — Likewise, hope regards the *affect* itself, but the *visible* and the *invisible* regard the intellect: therefore if the object and the habit regard the same power, hope is badly said to be concerning invisible things.

**I respond:** It must be said that in eternal goods to see perfectly is to have, as Augustine says; on account of which it is said in the seventeenth chapter of John: *This is eternal life, that they know you the true God* etc. Therefore with respect to those same spiritual goods not-seeing and not-having accompany each other mutually. Since therefore hope is concerning things not had — because no one hopes for that which he has, but that which is to be had — and with respect to eternal goods what is not had is not seen; hence it is that the Master says that just as faith is concerning invisible things, so also hope. In this, however, there is a difference, that faith is concerning invisible things, according as they are invisible; but hope is concerning invisible things, according as they are not had, but are to be had. — And through this the response to the objections is clear.

For to that which is first objected, that they share in the object; it must be said that they do not regard that object under the same account, but under one and another.

To that which is objected, that in temporal things one can well hope for what he sees, so also in spiritual things; it must be said that it is not alike, because to see bodily things is not to have them; but to see eternal goods is to possess them.

To that which is objected, that the *invisible* regards the intellect; it must be said that it is true under the account of the invisible; nevertheless it can regard the affect under the account of what is not had.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Hope is only of good things, nor except of future things and of things pertaining to him who hopes.* For against this it is objected first by reason of the *first member*: because the poet says:

> *If I could hope for so great a grief as this:*

therefore hope is of *evil* things. — Likewise, just as someone awaits his own exaltation, so he awaits the confusion of his adversary: therefore just as he awaits his own good, so he can await another's evil.

Likewise, it is objected against the *second* member, which says *only of future things*: because beatitude is future, nor to be had by one foreknown [to damnation]: therefore if hope is only of future things, no one foreknown has hope.

Likewise, it is objected against the *third* member, which says *of things pertaining to him*: because in the last chapter of Luke it is said: *But we were hoping that he would be the one to redeem Israel*: therefore it happens that one hopes for a common good: therefore hope is not only with respect to one's own good. — Likewise, Augustine says that «no one is to be despaired of, while he is on the way»; but of whom it happens to despair, [of him] also to hope: therefore it seems that one hopes concerning another. — Likewise, since faith and charity can be not only of one's own goods, but also of common goods, why is this not similarly to be found concerning hope?

**I respond:** It must be said that hope is with respect to the *future*, with respect to a *future good* and with respect to a *future good of one's own*, according as it is taken properly for the virtue itself. It is with respect to the *future*, inasmuch as it is distinguished from *joy* and *grief* and agrees with *fear*, because those two affections are with respect to present things, but these two with respect to future things. — It is with respect to the *good*, inasmuch as it is distinguished from *fear*, because fear is with respect to the unfitting, hope with respect to the fitting. — It is with respect to *one's own good*, inasmuch as it is distinguished not only from the other affects, but also inasmuch as it is distinguished from the other virtues, as from the belief of faith; for hope itself proceeds from grace and merits. And since merit does not give assurance of beatitude except to him who merits, because to each one it will be rendered according to his merits; hence it is that through the virtue of hope no one hopes except for himself. And according to this it is clear that that difference which Augustine assigns between faith and hope is rightly and suitably assigned; for hope is taken properly for the virtue itself. — But if hope is taken commonly for the surmise itself, thus it can be not only of *good*, but also of *evil*; and thus the poet takes it.

And through this the response to the first objection is clear: for that is an extended and improper way of taking hope itself. But if hope is said less commonly of any expectation whatever of a good, thus there can be an expectation not only of one's own good, but also of a common one. And thus it is taken in the last chapter of Luke and also by Augustine. — And through this the response to those two authorities is clear. — But according as it is taken properly for hope itself, which is «an expectation coming from grace and merits»; thus it is only with respect to one's own good, because no one is rendered secure of salvation except through his own merits; therefore it is not alike concerning faith and charity. — And through this the response to the last objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that if hope is only of future things, thus one foreknown does not have hope; it must be said that the *future* is said in two ways: either as to the *event*, or as to the *order*. As to the event, that is called *future* which comes to pass; as to the order, that is called *future* which is ordered to coming to pass; or the *future* signifies the event simply, not with respect to expectation. And in this last way hope is said to be of future things; but he objects according as it is taken in the first way, and therefore it is invalid.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *To some it seems not unlearnedly that faith and hope were not in Christ, as they are not in the Saints already beatified or in the Angels.* It is objected against the *first*, because in the Psalm: *In you, O Lord, have I hoped* etc.; it is said in the Gloss: «This is said in the person of Christ»: therefore Christ had hope. — Likewise, this seems [so] by reason: because Christ was at once *wayfarer* and *comprehensor*; and inasmuch as wayfarer the *robe of the body* was lacking to him: if therefore Christ was perfectly a wayfarer, as also a perfect comprehensor; it seems that he ought to have had all the gifts of graces and all the virtues which regard the state of the way.

Likewise, it is objected against the *second* concerning the Saints already beatified, because it is said in the sixth chapter of the Apocalypse that it was said to them that they should await *yet a little time*: therefore if hope is an expectation, it seems etc. — Likewise, the holy souls in their fatherland await the glorification of their bodies, which is a certain part of beatitude: For having resumed their bodies they will contemplate more perfectly; since, as Augustine says, «souls are held back by the desire for their bodies, lest they be wholly borne into the highest heaven».

Likewise, it is objected against the *third*, because it seems that the Angels have hope; for it is said in the first chapter of the first letter of Peter: *On whom the Angels desire to look*; but desire is with respect to what is not had: therefore if there can be hope concerning the same thing as desire; it seems therefore that the Angels hope. — Likewise, there will accrue to the Angels a certain glory and adornment from our glorification and beatitude: if therefore they await this and do not yet have it, it seems that they have hope.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says, neither Christ nor the blessed souls nor the holy Angels, properly speaking, have hope. And the reason for this is that hope is the expectation of a substantial reward; but all these aforesaid have the substantial reward; and therefore they lack hope properly so called. — There is also another reason, because hope has faith annexed to it; but faith is enigmatic cognition. And because the clarity of the divine vision takes away every enigma, consequently it evacuates faith, and by evacuating faith it evacuates hope itself. And for this twofold reason, as the Master intimates in the text, it is suitably said that neither Christ nor the Saints nor the blessed Angels have hope.

But to the reasons for the opposite it is answered easily, for the reason that, although hope *properly so called*, according as it is the expectation of a substantial reward, is not posited in them, yet, taking hope broadly for any expectation whatever, namely of the second robe and of some accidental joy, it can be posited in Christ and in the Angels and in the blessed souls. — But why hope-the-virtue is not with respect to an *accidental* reward, but a *substantial* one; and why also in the Saints it is evacuated: this will be better made manifest below, when treatment is made of the evacuation of the virtues.

Yet to that which is objected concerning desire, it must be said that it is not alike concerning *desire* and *hope*: because hope is with respect to *what is not had*, but desire can be with respect to *what is had*, that it may be continued and weariness be removed; and thus it is in the Angels. — Likewise to that which is objected concerning the authority of the Psalm, it is wont

to be said that this is said of Christ by reason of his members. The other things are clear enough.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *But concerning the ancient Fathers, who were held in the lower regions, it can be said that they had faith and hope.* But on the contrary: hope is commensurate with the state of the way; but they were not in the state of the way: therefore they did not have hope. — Likewise, hope is given to man for this, that he may merit: therefore if they were outside the state of meriting, it does not seem that they had hope.

In connection with this it is asked concerning the souls which are in purgatory, whether they have hope. And that they do, it seems, because they do not yet have the open vision through the species: therefore hope is not evacuated in them. — But against this is that they are certain that they cannot be damned: therefore it seems that they have no need of the support of hope.

In connection with this it is asked whether the demons in any way have hope. And that they do, it seems, because it is said in the fortieth chapter of Job concerning Behemoth: *Behold, his hope shall be frustrated*: therefore he has hope. But on the contrary: they know that their sin is irremediable, therefore they despair: therefore they do not have hope. And Augustine says of the devil, that «to the heaping-up of his damnation he despaired».

**I respond:** It must be said that since hope is taken away only through a subsequent reward and through a contrary habit; and the Saints in limbo and the souls in purgatory had neither attained the reward nor fallen into a contrary habit or into a defect: hence it is that they had hope, as Bede says, and is held in the fourth book, distinction one, that «the Fathers in limbo awaited with happy hope the entrance of the heavenly gate». — But the demons and the other damned, who have the contrary habit of hope, namely desperation, cannot have hope. Likewise the holy Blessed have attained the reward, through which hope is evacuated, as below it will be made manifest.

But to that which is objected, that hope is commensurate with the state of the way and is given for meriting; it must be said that the holy Fathers were in some way on the way and had not yet arrived at the fatherland. Furthermore, merit does not regard hope universally, but according to the state.

To that which is objected, that in purgatory they are certain that they cannot be damned; it must be said that this is not on account of the attainment of glory, but on account of the confirmation of free choice, which is outside the state of meriting and demeriting; and that confirmation does not evacuate hope, although it places [the soul] outside the state of changeableness of free choice itself, and therefore of demerit.

To that which is objected concerning Behemoth, it must be said that hope is taken there improperly for the expectation of a delay of judgment, in which he will be punished more sharply than now; or also for the expectation of the divine judgment being continued longer over sinners, in both of which the devil will be frustrated on the day of judgment, and he will be judged sooner than he would wish. — And from these things are clear those doubts which above were asked concerning the subject of hope.