Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On charity itself as to disposition.*
### Question I. *Whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues.*

Concerning the first of the four [questions] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues, or one common and general to all the virtues. And that it is a disposition common to all is shown:

1. And first by the authority of the Apostle in First Corinthians chapter thirteen, where the Apostle says: *"Charity is patient, is kind"* etc., and there he enumerates fifteen works of the virtues; but whatever has in itself the acts of all the virtues is common and universal to all the virtues; but the disposition of charity is of this kind, according to what is contained in the preceding authority: therefore it is common to all the virtues.

2. Likewise, Jerome: "To embrace briefly every definition of virtue, virtue is charity, by which everything that is to be loved is loved": therefore since the definition and the thing defined are of equal scope, and virtue is general to all the virtues, it seems likewise that charity also is.

3. Likewise, Augustine in *On the City of God* and Bernard in *On Loving God* say that "virtue is nothing other than the order of love, or ordered love"; therefore since ordered love is nothing other than charity, and every virtue is nothing other than ordered love; every virtue is charity: therefore charity is not distinct from the other virtues.

4. Likewise, as the precept of charity stands to the other precepts, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions of the virtues; but the precept of charity comprehends all the other precepts, as is said in Romans chapter thirteen: *"He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law"*: therefore it seems that the disposition of charity contains in itself the dispositions of all the virtues, and is not distinct from the others.

5. Likewise, as the object of charity stands to the objects of the other virtues, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions; but the object of charity is the good under the aspect of good without qualification: if therefore this is common to the objects of all the other virtues, it seems that the disposition of charity is common to all the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, he who has the love of charity on the way has everything that is necessary for *merit*, because Augustine says: "Hold to charity, and do whatever you will"; likewise, he who has the dowry of fruition corresponding to charity has in the fatherland the most sufficient *reward*: "For to enjoy, according to what Augustine says, is to cleave by love": therefore if inchoate charity suffices for *merit*, and consummated charity suffices for *reward*; it seems that, charity being had, either the remaining virtues are superfluous, or charity itself does not differ from the dispositions of the other virtues. But it is established that the other virtues are not superfluous: it remains, therefore, that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues.

**On the contrary:** 1. First Corinthians chapter thirteen: *"Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."* That which is rightly enumerated with and set above the other dispositions of the virtues is distinguished from the other virtues; but charity is enumerated with and set above the other virtues: therefore it is distinguished from them.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *object*: for, just as *faith* regards God under the aspect of the true, and *hope* under the aspect of the arduous, so *charity* under the aspect of the good: if therefore the good under the aspect of good and the true under the aspect of the true express diverse aspects of moving; and according to the diversity of the aspect of moving there is a distinction in the dispositions and acts: it seems therefore that charity differs from the other theological virtues: therefore much more strongly from the others, namely the cardinal ones.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *proper act*: for it is established that to love and to believe and to hope are diverse acts, speaking formally: if therefore in accordance with the diversity of the principal acts there must be a diversity of dispositions; it seems that it is necessary to posit that the disposition of charity differs from the dispositions of the other virtues.

4. Likewise, in accordance with the diversity of *subjects* there is a diversity of properties; but just as faith is in the rational [power] and hope in the irascible, so charity and love is in the concupiscible: if therefore the concupiscible power is distinct from the other powers, it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinct from the other dispositions.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown *by comparison to its opposite*: for the vice directly opposed to charity is distinguished from the other vices, as hatred [is distinguished] from unbelief and despair: if therefore the distinction of evils and vices is by reason of the goods to which they are opposed, since they are privations; it seems that if the vice opposed to charity is distinguished from the other vices, likewise also the disposition of charity [is distinguished] from the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, this same thing is shown *by comparison to the reward*: for whenever some things are so disposed that when one is perfected, the others are emptied out, it is necessary that those dispositions differ essentially; but the disposition of charity in the fatherland is perfected and consummated, while the dispositions of faith and hope are emptied out, as the Master says, and as was held in the preceding distinction: therefore it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinguished from the dispositions of the other virtues.

> ### Conclusion.
> Charity is a disposition of virtue distinct from the other virtues.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is found a threefold manner of speaking.

For some wished to say that the disposition of charity is undistinguished from the other virtues, on account of the essential unity of the dispositions themselves. For they said that the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one another by essence but only by relation to acts. And this same thing they said of the powers of the soul. And that they are one by essence among themselves, this they strive to prove on account of the mutual denomination of the dispositions themselves. For since disparate forms can in no way denominate themselves; and one virtue denominates another, as justice is prudent, and prudence is just, faith loves, and charity believes: it is therefore impossible that the dispositions of the virtues differ essentially among themselves. From this same reasoning they wished to conclude that they do not differ from charity, since the acts of, as it were, all the virtues are attributed to charity, as the Apostle says in First Corinthians chapter thirteen. And this same thing they say Augustine held in the book *On the Morals of the Church*, where he so defines virtue: "I would affirm that virtue is nothing at all except the highest love of God. For that which is called fourfold virtue is so called, as far as I understand, from a certain varied affection of love itself."

But however much the authorities might suggest this, nevertheless to posit that all the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one another except by relation alone does not seem consonant with reason nor even with the common teaching. For that there is diversity in the powers of the soul and in their dispositions, the very diversity of acts and objects makes manifest. And therefore, when one virtue denominates another, or the act of one is attributed to another, this is not to be understood to come about on account of a total indifference of the dispositions themselves, but on account of the mutual circumincession and concomitance; just as we say of the powers of the soul that they circumincede one another, and mutually reflect upon one another, not because they are altogether the same, but because, since they are in the same [soul] and can be reflected upon that in which they are — because the soul understands itself and loves itself — consequently they are also reflected upon one another in turn. And therefore, since reflection comes about not only on account of the total indivision of agreement, but also on account of the circumincession of concomitance; therefore we are not compelled to posit either that the powers of the soul or that the dispositions, according to that which they are, do not differ from one another. — Nor does Augustine in the book *On the Morals of the Church* wish to say that, but he wishes to reduce all the other virtues to charity as to a foundation, without which the other virtues are not true virtues, because they do not lead through to true beatitude.

There is also here another manner of speaking, namely that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues on account of the generality of charity itself. For some wished to say that the concupiscible power itself is diffused through all the other powers, for this reason, that all the powers of the soul seek their objects. Hence love is found in all the powers, as they say, and ordered love in all the virtues; and because charity is nothing other than the order of love: hence it is that they wished to say that charity, on account of its generality, is not distinguished from the other virtues.

But neither does that seem reasonable in every respect, nor fittingly said, since the Apostle distinguishes it from the others. Nor is the reason which they assign very effective, for this reason, that the concupiscible is a power so distinct in itself, according as [is] the rational and the irascible: hence the fact that the act of the concupiscible concurs with the act of the other powers, this is not on account of identity and indivision in being, but on account of simultaneity and order in moving. Hence also something is wont to be called general or universal in two ways: either on account of community in *predicating*, or on account of community in *causing*; just as the sun is called a universal cause, not because it is predicated of the other lower causes, but because it aids and moves the others. And therefore, just as it is possible that something have the character of a general mover with respect to others, and yet in itself be one and distinct from them in natural causes; so it happens to be found in the powers and forces of the soul. And therefore, although the will

commands the other powers of the soul, and charity the other virtues, it is not necessary on account of this to posit that it is not distinguished from them.

But the third manner of speaking, which is common and customary and sufficiently consonant with reason and with the authorities, is that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues, as the Apostle himself suggests. — And its distinction from the other dispositions can be gathered from its manifold comparison, as was demonstrated in the opposing arguments, namely first from comparison to the *object*, which under the aspect of moving is distinguished from the others; second by comparison to the *act*, which differs from the acts of the others; third by comparison to its proper *subject*; fourth by comparison *to the opposite*, which is determinately opposed to it, so that [it is] not [opposed] to the dispositions of the other virtues; fifth by comparison to the *reward*, in which it is perfected, while the dispositions of hope and faith are emptied out; sixth and last by comparison to its *principle*, which it represents. For the *image of recreation* consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the *image of creation* [consists] in the three powers and the unity of substance. If therefore the powers themselves, in order that they may rightly be an image, are discerned from one another, and one is not predicated of the other; if in the three theological virtues there is found likewise the character of a certain image: it is fitting to posit that they are distinct from one another. — It must therefore be conceded that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues; and the reasons which show this are also to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary side concerning the authority of the Apostle, the response is clear from what has already been said: since the acts of the other virtues are attributed to charity itself not as to one *eliciting*, but as to one *commanding* and as to the *first* mover, not as to an *immediate* mover. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues, because it does not have generality with respect to them in *predicating*, but only in *moving*.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Jerome, that virtue is nothing other than charity; it must be said that that predication is a *causal* predication. For all the virtues can be defined by charity for this reason, that the love of charity gives them the character of meriting; which being taken away, virtue is not, properly speaking, to be said to be in the soul.

3. To that which is objected through the authority of Augustine, it must be said likewise that those notifications and the like are given *through a cause*. — And if you ask, through what genus of cause; it can be answered that charity with respect to the others in moving has in a certain manner the character of an *efficient* [cause], in a certain manner of a *formal* [cause], in a certain manner of a *final* [cause]. For the love of charity *commands* the other virtues, that they go out into their acts, and by commanding *informs* [them] and makes them meritorious, and by informing *joins* [them] to the end and quiets [them] in it, while it makes us cleave to God and enjoy him; and therefore gratuitous virtue is rightly to be defined by the love of charity. — It could also be said otherwise, that the love which falls in the definition of virtue generally is not the love of *charity*, which is one of the theological virtues, but is a love common and general to all the other virtues. And therefore in that process there is the sophism of the *consequent*, from the superior to the inferior by affirming.

4. To that which is objected, that the precept of charity comprehends all the precepts; it must be said that it does not comprehend them through a total *identity*, but through a certain *reduction*; for all the precepts are reduced to it and consummated in it; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the disposition of charity is common to the others except only through *radication*, according as Gregory says, that the precepts are many through diversity of work and one in the root of love, "because whatever is commanded is rooted in charity alone." This, however, is not because it belongs to charity alone to carry out the enjoined precepts, but because the other virtues without charity do not carry out the divine precepts according to the divine acceptation.

5. To that which is objected, that the object of charity is common to the objects of the other virtues; it must be answered *by interemption*, because the object of charity is not just any good, but the highest good and the good under the aspect of good; and so the object of charity is distinguished *according to substance* from the objects of the cardinal virtues, which have a created object; but from the object of the other

theological virtues it is not distinguished *according to substance*, but *according to the aspect of moving*, which aspect of moving indeed makes the diversity in the act and disposition and power of the substance moved, as is clear: for, although the true and the good are one and the same, nevertheless cognition and affection, and the cognitive and affective power, and the disposition of knowledge and of virtue have a difference among one another.

6. To that which is objected, that charity suffices for reward and merit; it must be said that charity is said to suffice for merit and for reward on account of the connection of the other virtues and dowries. For he who has charity has the other virtues, and he who has the dowry corresponding to it has the other dowries, and thus sufficiency in merit and reward, not by reason of charity alone, but by reason of the other annexed virtues. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the other virtues are superfluous, or that charity alone is a virtue not distinct from the others, for this reason, that it does not have sufficiency by itself alone, but as it is joined with the others. And through this it is clear that no one can sufficiently merit unless he hope and believe; but no one can ever be made ready and enabled to believe and to hope except by the mediation of faith and hope; likewise it is to be understood concerning the dowries of reward.