Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species.*

Secondly it is asked whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species. And that it is multiplied according to species, it seems:

1. *First*, from its *objects*: since with respect to diverse things-willed and objects the acts of will are diverse; for as Augustine holds, acts of will are diversified according to the things willed; but charity is the love of God and of neighbor: if therefore God and neighbor are separated by an infinite distance, the habit regulating the mind to loving God and to loving neighbor must of necessity be one and another.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *precepts*: for where there are diverse precepts, there are diverse habits fitting the soul to fulfill those precepts, especially since by the precepts themselves the works of the virtues are commanded: if therefore concerning the act of charity there stand two commandments, it seems that the virtue of charity is not one.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the *modes of loving*: for the mode of loving God is one thing, and of loving neighbor another — for each one ought to love God more than himself and *with his whole heart*, but his neighbor as himself and in part — if therefore the habit of virtue is given for modifying the act, since
the mode is one and another on this side and on that, the habit too will be one and another on this side and on that.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown from a *parallel*: for wisdom, which is about eternal things, is one habit and one gift, and knowledge, which is about temporal things, is another: and likewise *latria*, which is the worship of God, is one virtue, and *dulia*, which is the honor of neighbor, is another: therefore by parallel reasoning the virtue by which the neighbor is loved, and that by which God is loved, will be one and another.

5. Likewise, the active life differs from the contemplative more than the operations of the same life differ from one another: therefore likewise the virtue which directs a man to the contemplative life differs from that which directs to the active life more than two virtues which direct to the contemplative life. But charity, insofar as it is the love of God, directs to the contemplative life, and insofar as it is the love of neighbor, to the active life: since therefore charity, insofar as it is the love of God, differs from faith, although each of these is a virtue directing to the contemplative life; it seems much more strongly that the love of God and of neighbor are distinguished from one another.

6. Likewise, the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence are diverse species of love; but charity loves God with the love of concupiscence, because it makes God desired and sought after, but the neighbor with the love of friendship: if therefore those are diverse affections and diverse acts of love, it seems that the virtue of charity is multiplied according to species.

**On the contrary:** 1. As there is one supreme Truth, so there is one supreme Goodness; and as faith wholly assents to the supreme Truth and on account of it believes whatever it believes, so charity wholly adheres to the supreme Goodness and on account of it loves whatever it loves: therefore as faith is one virtue and one habit with respect to things to be believed, so also is charity with respect to things to be loved.

2. Likewise, as the rational [power] stands to the true, and the irascible to the arduous, so the concupiscible stands to the good; and as the other two powers have unity in themselves, so too the concupiscible itself; but the rational in believing the true is perfected only by one virtue, and likewise the irascible in awaiting the arduous: therefore likewise it seems that the concupiscible in loving the good has only one single virtue. But this is charity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more unitive a thing is, the more it has unity in itself; but the virtue of charity among the other virtues is preeminently unitive, since it is the *bond of perfection*, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians: therefore it seems that charity among the other virtues holds unity: therefore it is not to be subdivided into other species.

4. Likewise, in every genus in which it happens to find an order of movers, there must of necessity be a stopping-point in one; but charity commands all the virtues of the soul and moves them all, both theological and cardinal: therefore it is necessary that it have unity: it is not therefore multiplied according to species.

> **Conclusion.** The habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although it is multiplied according to number.

**I respond:** It must be said that the habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although according to number it is multiplied in diverse [subjects]. — For in diverse souls there are several charities, since habits and accidents are numbered according to their subjects. But in all in whom it exists, charity is one according to species, on account of this, that the unity of the habit comes from the unity of the object and of the principal act; and this indeed is to be found in charity, if one is willing to attend diligently. — For the act of charity is to love, and to love is the same as to will the good. When therefore charity loves someone, it wishes the good for him whom it loves; but this good which charity wishes is one only, namely the eternal good and the supreme good. But this supreme good a man sometimes through charity wishes to God, sometimes to himself, sometimes to his neighbor. Insofar as he wishes it to God himself, he is said to love God, because he wills that God himself be the supreme good and that he have every good by essence. Insofar as he wishes it to his neighbor, he is so said to love his neighbor, because he wills that he have that good through grace and glory. Insofar as he wishes it to himself, he is so said to love himself. — Generally, therefore, in the act of love of charity itself the good wished is one, although there be many to whom that good is wished; and that is the principal object of the very habit of loving, since it is wished for its own sake by charity, so that it has the character of the object that principally moves and of the end that brings rest. And because that is one only, whether it be compared to itself, or compared to him who has charity, or compared to his neighbor; hence it is that the habit of charity is one. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the objects are diverse; the answer is now clear: for although charity loves the neighbor, yet the neighbor is not the principal object, but is that to which the principal object of charity is compared. For because the neighbor is the image of God and capable of God himself; therefore the virtue of charity, which desires that the supreme Good be had by everyone who can have it and enjoy it, seeks that the supreme Good be had by the neighbor, just as also by him in whom it is; and this is nothing other than to love the neighbor by the affection of charity. And if you object that charity does not only bring it about that a man wills for his neighbor the good which is God, but also every other good: it must be said that this is not principally and elicitively, but as it were consequently and imperatively; and this will be shown below more openly, when it shall be treated of those things which are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that there are two precepts of charity; it must be said that those two precepts are not diverse formally, but only materially, because « one of them is contained in the other », as the Master says in the text: and on account of this it does not follow that the habit of charity is diversified according to form.

3. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of modes, it must be said that the diversity of those modes is from the diversity of the comparisons of that supreme Good, which can be loved or wished for itself, and can be wished for the creature, which is born to be beatified in it: hence the diversity of those modes does not come from the diversity of the principal object, but from the varied comparison of it. And therefore it does not follow that there is diversity in the modifying virtue, because diversity of the comparison of the object does not suffice to make the habit be diversified.

4. To that which is objected concerning wisdom and knowledge, latria and dulia; it must be said that it is not the same case: for wisdom deals with eternal things according to eternal accounts, and knowledge with temporal things according to temporal accounts; and therefore they have diverse accounts, according to which they are directed and in their acts regulated. But charity has one single moving account, namely the supreme Goodness itself, which, since it is supremely lovable, both as it is in itself and as it is participated by the creature, in both ways charity loves it, and thus has one motive account; and therefore it ought not to be diversified as wisdom and knowledge are. — In the same manner it must be said of latria and of dulia, as was shown in what preceded, in the ninth distinction.

5. To that which is objected concerning the difference of the contemplative and the active, it must be said that the contemplative and the active life name a state or exercise of virtue; but diversity of state or of exercise does not induce diversity in the habit, but [only] diversity of the principal object. Hence the same virtues according to diverse states and diverse exercise direct a man in either life, just as faith directs a man in contemplation and in operation. On account of this it does not follow that charity, because it directs and fits one to the active and to the contemplative life, is a twofold virtue.

6. To that which is last objected concerning the love of friendship and of concupiscence, it must be said that, as was said in what preceded concerning the act of confidence and of expectation, that one has to arise from the other, and one in some way includes the other; so the love of friendship in some way includes the love of concupiscence. For he who is a friend to another wishes him some good: and while he wishes him that good, he also makes the good itself wished for to be desired and makes him cling to it. Hence as hope rests upon the supreme Immensity or Power, so charity adheres and makes one adhere to the supreme Goodness; and this is its first and only act, from which arises and in which is included the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship. And therefore, as hope is not diversified on account of the act of confidence and of expectation, so neither is charity on account of the act of friendship and of concupiscence. — But that to adhere to God is the principal act of charity, Augustine says quite expressly in the book *On the Morals of the Church*, and the Apostle in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the sixth [chapter]: *He who adheres to God is one spirit*; and Dionysius in *On the Divine Names*: « Love, whether divine, or natural, or intellectual, we call a certain unitive power ». And because that good is one, to which charity principally unites; hence it is that the habit of charity has unity, as was shown before.