Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does. And that charity is altogether the same as grace, adding nothing beyond, seems [to be the case]:

1. From what Ambrose says: « Charity is the mother of all the virtues, because it informs them all, and without it there is no true virtue »; but to be the form of the gratuitous virtues, insofar as they are gratuitous, is proper to grace-making-pleasing [gratia gratum faciens] itself: therefore if this belongs to charity itself, it seems that it differs in nothing from grace.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity* says that « the most excellent among the gifts of God is charity »; but grace-making-pleasing is more excellent than grace freely given [gratia gratis data]: therefore it seems that, if charity is the most excellent among the rest of the gifts, then it is merely and purely grace-making-pleasing, having nothing beyond.

3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor, in the book *On the Betrothal-gift of the Bride*: « I know, my soul, that love is your life »; but to vivify the soul as to its moral being [esse moris] is proper to grace-making-pleasing itself: therefore it seems that charity is grace itself, merely and purely.

4. Likewise, to make pleasing and acceptable to God is properly proper to grace itself; but charity, by the very fact that it is charity, renders a man dear and acceptable to God and makes his work meritorious: therefore it seems that it has nothing else in itself by which it makes any addition over grace-making-pleasing, or by which it differs from grace.

5. Likewise, every habit of the virtues that adds something over grace-making-pleasing in some way remains together with fault and is not totally taken away by sin; but charity is altogether taken away by fault: therefore it adds nothing whatever over grace.

**On the contrary:**

1. Bernard, *On the Love of God*, chapter two: « The will grows into love, love into charity, and charity into wisdom »; and a little after: « For love is nothing else than a will vehement for the good; for of itself a good will is a simple affection ». If, then, vehement affection is of the essence of charity; and an affection of this kind is something other than grace: therefore the habit of charity adds something beyond.

2. Likewise, nothing general becomes special except through some addition; but grace is general and common to every virtue, whereas charity is a special virtue: therefore it is necessary that charity add something beyond grace.

3. Likewise, a habit that is continuously in its act is different from one that is not continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in the act of making-gracious, whereas charity is not continuously in its own act, which is to love: therefore charity and grace differ in some way: charity therefore has something in itself that is diverse from grace. Since, then, it is a gratuitous habit, it seems that it adds something over grace itself.

4. Likewise, the habits of the other virtues are given to the powers themselves for their expediting, beyond grace-making-pleasing; but the concupiscible power is as much in need of being expedited as the rational, since it is corrupted and infected: if, then, the virtue perfecting the rational power, such as faith, contains something of grace-freely-given; it seems by parity of reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, that charity adds something over grace-making-pleasing.

5. Likewise, every habit that by habituation and frequency renders a power more ready for its act without an increase of grace-making-pleasing contains something in itself beside grace-making-pleasing; but charity is of this kind, as is plain: therefore charity adds something over grace. The first [premise] is proved by this, that a habit is the more perfect the more it renders a power readier and more expedited for its act. If, then, the habit of charity can in some way advance while grace-making-pleasing does not advance, it is necessary to posit that it differs from it.

> ### Conclusion.
> Charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain habit by whose mediation the power of loving itself is made apt for its proper act; although the opposite opinion is not without probability.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

*Opinion I.* For some have wished to say that charity is altogether the same as grace by *essence*, differing by *relation* alone. For it is called grace inasmuch as it regards the whole soul, but charity inasmuch as it governs and directs the will. *Three reasons.* And this seems to be signified by the very *name* of charity, and the *Apostle* seems to hint at it, and *reason* to approve it. *First.* The name itself seems to signify it: because charity is called from *charis*, which among the Greeks is the same as grace. Hence, since this virtue has no other designation than from grace, it does not seem that it adds anything in reality. — *Second.* But the Apostle seems to imply it, when he sets it before and above the other virtues. For he would not do this unless it had more purely the character of the good. And he himself hints at this very thing, that the other virtues can be fruitless and receive an admixture of evil, but charity by no means; and therefore charity, according to the apostolic testimony, seems to be mere and pure grace-making-pleasing, since it is the purest and most excellent good. — *Third.* Reason also seems to approve it: because, since the will itself is the supreme [power] in the soul, on which depends all the rectitude of the lower powers, and which is immediately united to God himself; therefore it claims for itself the whole principle of rectitude; and hence it is that grace, which perfects the other powers of the soul, perfects the will in a more special way. And therefore, although it perfects the other powers together with the habit of grace-freely-given, it perfects the power of loving itself through itself; and according as it perfects that [power], so it is called charity. — And thus it seems quite reasonable to say that grace and charity are the same by *essence*, differing by *relation* alone. And by reason of that *relation* it is numbered with the other virtues and is distinguished from them and is in a certain way specified. — *To the arguments.* And by this the reasons to the opposite, which show that charity adds something over grace, seem rather easily to be turned aside. For they do not seem necessarily to conclude that it adds anything *absolute*. Hence, to turn aside all those incongruities, it seems sufficient to say that it adds only a *respect* [relation] to a determinate work.

*Opinion II.* There is also another manner of speaking, that charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain *habit* by whose mediation the power of loving itself becomes habituated to its proper act. *Two reasons.* And this indeed they say to be necessary, both on account of the *essential difference* which is between the other virtues and charity—a difference which cannot indeed exist through a diversity that is in grace-making-pleasing, since it is one, as was shown in the second book—and also on account of *the specialness and difficulty of its act*, with respect to which a habit is required specifying and determining grace to such a use and enabling the power to go forth into its act. — *And the authority of Bernard.* And to this manner of speaking the *authority of Bernard* sufficiently accords, where he says in the second chapter *On the Love of God* that « free will was given to man, which, when it accords with assisting grace, receives the advance and the name of virtue and becomes love: but when, left to itself, it wishes to enjoy itself, it suffers a defect in itself, and as many vices as there are, it obtains the names of so many vices, as of cupidity, avarice, luxury ». From this it is hinted that there is something on the part of our will which, with grace coming, becomes virtue; and it is none other than the virtue of charity, of which he speaks there: therefore the habit of charity, according to him, denotes something beyond grace. — *Another reason.* This position also seems sufficiently consonant with reason: because, just as *faith* concerns assent, so *charity* concerns the affect; and just as cognition is something differing from grace-making-pleasing, so also is love; and as faith concerns cognition, so charity concerns affection, according to what Augustine says: « Charity is the most upright affection of the soul, by which God is loved for his own sake and the neighbor for God's sake ». And the same is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* near the beginning: « The affections of the soul are to be ordered to that to which they ought, so that they may be able to advance into virtues ». And a little after: « Love, through hatred of self, advances into the love of God and of neighbor ». *Conclusion.* It seems therefore sufficiently consonant with reason to say that, just as the virtue of faith concerns a certain habit beside grace-making-pleasing, so also does the habit of charity. And this the reasons brought forward to this side seem reasonably enough to show. If anyone, then, wishes to maintain this side, he can quite easily reply to the reasons which are brought forward to the contrary.

**Solution of the objections:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that charity informs the other virtues, which is proper to grace; it must be said that one may speak of the virtues as to *being* [esse], and as to *well-being* [bene esse], and as to *operating well* [bene operari]. *Note.* If we speak of the virtues as to *being*, then each virtue has in itself its own form, by which it is distinguished from another, as faith from hope. But if we speak of them as to *well-being*, then they are informed by grace, which makes them gratuitous and acceptable to God. If we speak of the virtues as to *operating well*, then they are informed by charity, which is the weight inclining and making the operations of all the virtues tend to a good end. And thus grace informs in one way, charity in another; and therefore it does not follow that there is no essential difference between charity and grace.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that charity is the most excellent gift; it must be said that, because charity is not separated from grace, although it adds something beyond it; therefore the excellence of grace-making-pleasing is attributed to charity; and hence it is that it obtains also the name of grace and is set before all the virtues by the Apostle as to its excellence and dignity. And therefore it does not follow that it adds nothing beyond grace, because in that comparison it is not compared to the gratuitous gifts insofar as they are gratuitous, but insofar as they are gifts of grace-freely-given; and in this it is set before them, because charity is never separated from grace, although the other gratuitous gifts can be separated from it; and therefore it is said to be the most excellent gift among the rest.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that love is the life of the soul; it must be said that, just as in the *life of nature* "to live" is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is the *first* act, in another way, insofar as it is the *second* act; and in the first way it is from the *essence* of the soul, and in the second way from the *power* of the soul: so it is to be understood in *moral being* [esse moris] that to live, insofar as it is the first act, is from grace itself vivifying the whole soul; but insofar as it is the second act, it is from the virtue itself. And although it can be attributed to every gratuitous virtue, such as to faith itself, according to what is said to the Romans first: *The just man lives by faith*; nevertheless it is most especially attributed to charity itself on account of the great affinity which it has to grace.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that charity renders one acceptable and pleasing to God; it must be said that it does this by reason of *grace*; but from this it does not follow that it is precisely grace, because charity not only has [the function] of rendering one acceptable to God, but also of expediting some power and enabling it for some special and determinate act, by reason of which it adds something to grace itself, which is, as it were, the substrate and material to grace itself, as was shown in the preceding [questions] concerning faith.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that charity is altogether destroyed by sin; it must be said that this is not because charity adds nothing over grace-making-pleasing, but because every sin is repugnant to the very habit substrate to charity. *Note.* And therefore, just as faith is totally taken away by unbelief, because it is repugnant to it not only as to that which is in it of grace-making-pleasing, but also as to the substrate habit; in this manner it is to be understood that charity is taken away by every sin; but that will be more clearly manifested in the following problem.