Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On charity as to act and mode.*

Consequently, charity itself is inquired into as to act and mode. And concerning this six things are asked.

First it is asked whether the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.

Second, whether it is possible that the motion of charity be mercenary.

Third it is asked whether the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be the same.

Fourth it is asked which of them precedes the other.

Fifth it is asked whether the motion of charity toward God has a mode.

Sixth and last, whether we are bound to fulfill that mode.

### Question I. *Whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, through that which the Apostle says to the Romans 13: *The fullness of the Law is love*; but no one fully fulfills the things that are of the Law except one who observes it meritoriously: if therefore the fullness of the Law is attributed by the Apostle to charity itself, it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in its act.

2. *Likewise*, upon that passage to the Galatians 5: *But the fruit of the Spirit is charity* etc.; the Gloss: « Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he placed charity as the head of the virtues. For what other thing among the fruits of the Spirit deserved to hold the primacy except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues, and from which all good things are born »? If therefore from charity all good things are born, and this cannot be understood except of meritorious goods; that which is first born from charity first holds the account of the meritorious: therefore the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of any [other] virtue.

3. *Likewise*, Gregory: « The branch of a good work has nothing of greenness unless it remains in the root of charity »: therefore the root of charity gives greenness to all works; but this greenness is nothing other than efficacy in meriting: if therefore charity gives this to the other virtues through its act and motion, it seems that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious among all the acts of the virtues.

4. *Likewise*, merit is in every virtue from a right ordering to the end; but charity is the virtue which immediately orders to the end, and by the mediation of which the other [virtues] are to be ordered: it seems therefore that it is in its act first and principally that the act of merit happens to be found.

5. *Likewise*, no service is meritorious before God except what is done freely; but nothing is done freely except what is done from love, since love is the gift in which all the other gifts are given: if therefore the efficacy of meriting consists in liberality, and liberality is found first and principally in the motion of charity and of love; the same seems as before, namely that the motion of charity is first and principally meritorious.

6. *Likewise*, the act of faith is not meritorious except according as faith believes *in God* — for to believe *God* and to believe *that there is a God* is common to unformed faith and to formed faith — but that faith believes *in God*, this it has by reason of the charity joined to it — « for to believe in God, as Augustine says, is by believing to love » — therefore it seems that the act of faith is not meritorious except by the mediation of the act of charity. If therefore the act of faith is the first among the acts of all the virtues, it seems that merit consists first and principally in the act of charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every act proceeding from a formed virtue is pleasing to God and meritorious, because as the habits are, so are the acts; but, the virtues being formed, faith goes forth into act prior to any other virtue: therefore it seems that its act is first meritorious.

2. *Likewise*, in everything in which the account of directing first consists, the account of meriting first consists; but the account of directing first consists in the act of faith, since it is the director of all the virtues: therefore the account of meriting also first consists in it, and therefore not in the act of charity.

3. *Likewise*, grace in meriting moves conformably to free will, and conversely; but free will judges prior to choosing; therefore grace seems to regard the act of cognition prior to that of affection. But that which grace regards prior first has the account of the meritorious: therefore it seems that the account of meriting is found prior in the act of cognition than of affection, and thus prior in the act of faith than of charity.

4. *Likewise*, unformed faith merits the working of miracles by congruity in the state of sin; but formed faith is of much greater efficacy with respect to attaining the reward than unformed faith with respect to obtaining a miracle: if therefore the obtaining of a miracle is attributed first and principally to the act of unformed faith, it seems that to the act of formed faith the merit of eternal life ought first and principally to be attributed.

5. *Likewise*, that which is more difficult and more against nature holds more the account of merit in this life; but the motion of faith is more discordant with nature than the motion of charity, because to love God is not against the dictate of nature, as is to believe many articles: therefore it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in the act of faith itself.

6. *Likewise*, just as prudence is related to the cardinal [virtues], so faith is related to the theological virtues; but right ordering is found prior in the act of prudence than in the act of the cardinal virtues: therefore right ordering is found prior in the act of faith than in the act of the other theological [virtues]. But that is prior in being meritorious in which ordering is found prior: therefore it seems that the act or motion of faith is prior in being meritorious than the motion of charity.

### Conclusion.

> The motion of charity is first and principally meritorious, not indeed by priority of origin, but by priority of completion.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that some wished to say that merit consists first and principally in the act or motion of faith, since it is the first of the virtues, and its act the principle of the others. — But others, on the contrary, wished to say that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious, since it, according to Gregory and Ambrose, is the head and root of all goods. And great clerics have upheld each of these positions. And if we are willing to understand soundly, they do not contradict one another; indeed, both can hold what is true.

On account of which it must be noted that, according as the Philosopher holds, something is said to be prior to another in two ways. For one thing is prior to another in origin, and is prior in completion and definition. If we speak of priority of origin, the account of meriting consists prior in the act of faith, since it is the origin of the motions of the other virtues; and since it proceeds from a formed virtue, it is to be said that it is meritorious. If therefore the motion of formed faith is meritorious and prior in origin than the motion of the other virtues; speaking of priority of origin, the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior

to the motion or act of faith itself. — But if we speak of priority of completion, then the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior to the act of charity, since it is the most complete of all the virtues, and in its act the merit itself is consummated.

But the reason why charity is more excellent than the others is that it most of all makes us deiform, both by reason of *liberal bestowing*, and by reason of *conforming union*, and by reason of *final repose*. By reason of *liberal bestowing*: because, just as God out of love bestowed all gifts, so charity liberally carries out all services and commands. — By reason of *conforming union*: since, just as the Father and the Son are bound and united by the bond of love, so man, by cleaving to God through charity, is made one spirit. On account of which it is said in John 17: *That they may be consummated in one, as we also are one*. — By reason of *final repose*: because, since love is a weight, it makes [one] tend toward God and rest in God, just as bodily things by their weights are situated and made stable in their proper places.

For these reasons therefore man is made most conformed to God through charity according to the threefold kind of cause, according as a creature is to be referred to the Creator, namely according to the account of the *moving principle*, the *exemplifying form*, and the *quieting end*; and by reason of this it holds the primacy among the other virtues, according to what the Apostle says. — And therefore, if we speak of priority of completion, its motion is first and principally meritorious, as the authorities show which are adduced for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. *To that* indeed which is objected to the contrary in the first and second and third [places], the response is clear: because all those three first reasons, as is apparent to one considering, proceed from priority of *origin*; and thus they do not stand against the truth nor against the reasons which can be adduced for the opposite. For it is true that the motion of faith goes forth prior from free will informed by grace than the motion of the other virtues; but yet it does not have a full and perfect tendency and ordering to the end, until the motion of charity is joined to it, which gives it weight and inclination; whence from the support of charity the perfection of merit is in faith itself. And therefore the quantity of merit is said to be measured more according to the quantity of charity than according to the quantity of another virtue.

4. *To that* which is objected, that faith merits the working of miracles; it must be said that this is because in faith is the first elevation of man above himself; therefore it seems to obtain from the divine power that it work something above the power of nature. But the merit of the consummated reward does not regard principally the first elevation, but the highest and complete elevation; and this indeed is not found in the act of faith in itself, but rather in the act of charity.

5. *To that* which is objected, that the act of faith is of greater difficulty and more against nature than the act of charity; it must be said that, although the act of faith be more against *judging* nature, yet it is not more against, or above, *executing* nature, indeed much less. For it is much easier to believe the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, than to love it for its own sake and above all things and to cleave to it alone and to despise all things for its sake. And because this is the greatest [thing] which man can render to God; and this charity itself does: therefore it first and principally claims for itself the efficacy of meriting.

6. *To that* which is objected last, that just as prudence is related to the cardinal virtues, so faith [is related] to the theological [virtues]; it must be said that it is not altogether alike, for the reason that the theological virtues, since they have an uncreated object, are the more perfect the more intimately they unite and join [us] to it. And therefore the spiritual edifice is said to be *founded* in faith and *raised* in hope and *consummated* in charity, because charity among the theological virtues is most of all unitive, and therefore its act most of all makes men deiform. And hence it is that with respect to the uncreated object the manner of apprehending by way of touch and embrace is nobler than by way of sight and gazing; the contrary is the case concerning bodily and material things; and therefore that reasoning does not compel.