Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible for the motion of charity to be mercenary. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. On *Luke* fifteen, upon that text: *How many hired servants in my father's house abound with bread*, Ambrose says that there are many good hired servants, who serve God in the hope of eternal goods; but no one serves God well except one who serves him out of charity: therefore it is possible for the motion of a hired servant to have its origin from charity.

2. Likewise, Augustine, upon that text of the Psalm: *God searching the hearts and reins*: « The end of care and of thought is delight, to which each one strives to come »: therefore one having charity finally seeks to be delighted; but he who seeks his own delight seeks his own advantage, and every such one is mercenary: therefore it seems that the affection of charity can be mercenary.

3. Likewise, he who wishes to fulfill the commandments of God for the sake of reward is mercenary; but of the holy man it is said in the Psalm: *I have inclined my heart to do thy justifications for the sake of reward*; and to the Hebrews eleven it is said of Moses: *He looked unto the reward*: if therefore both this one and that one was just and was moved out of charity, it seems that the motion of charity can be mercenary.

4. Likewise, the holy man desires *to be dissolved and to be with Christ*, that he may enjoy him, according as the Apostle desired, to the Philippians one; but that desire cannot be except of charity, since no one by natural affection desires to die: therefore if such a desire looks to its own advantage and delight, it seems that it is possible for the affection of charity to be mercenary.

**On the contrary:** 1. First to the Corinthians thirteen: *Charity seeketh not the things that are her own*; but every mercenary seeks what is his own: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

2. Likewise, Bernard, *On Loving God*: « Although one cannot be served without reward, nevertheless one must be served without regard to reward »; and a little after: « Let us serve God in charity, which expels fear, does not feel toil, does not require reward, does not look to merit »: if therefore every mercenary requires reward, and charity does not require reward: therefore the motion of charity cannot be mercenary.

3. Likewise, the love of charity is gratuitous love; but the gratuitous and the mercenary are divided by opposition, because what is done gratis is not done out of hire: if therefore it is essential to charity to be gratuitous, it seems that its motion and act can in no way be mercenary.

4. Likewise, fear, which principally has its eye on punishment, is servile fear, which is not acceptable to God: therefore by parity of reasoning love also, which has its eye on reward, cannot be meritorious; but such love is mercenary; but every affection of charity is meritorious: therefore none can be mercenary.

> **Conclusion.** Some motion of charity can not improbably be called mercenary, insofar as it looks to the uncreated Good as to a final reward.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that he is called mercenary who principally has his eye on the wage; for if he looked to it not principally, he would not on this account be mercenary. According to this it is to be understood that there is a twofold wage, namely created and uncreated, temporal and eternal. And according to this there is a twofold mercenary, namely good and bad; and a twofold hire, one praiseworthy and the other blameworthy. For he who principally looks to the created and temporal wage is a bad mercenary; and the Lord censures him in John ten, saying: *But the hireling flieth, because he is a hireling*. But he who looks principally to the eternal wage, of which it is said in Genesis fifteen: *Thy reward [is] exceeding great*, is a good mercenary; and this mercenary « abounds with the bread of faith, hope, and charity », as Ambrose says upon that text: *How many hired servants* etc.

Understanding it of the first hire, there is no doubt that the motion of charity cannot be mercenary, because that hire is neither from charity nor with charity, since it is repugnant to charity.

Concerning the second hire there is doubt, inasmuch as it can be with charity; it is not however altogether certain whether it is from charity. — For some have wished to say that it is not from charity, but rather from an affection of nature accompanying charity. For the love of charity, as they say, since it is gratuitous love, does not look to reward; nay, it makes a man serve God altogether liberally, as a son [serves] his father. — But to others it seems that such a mercenary affection can be from charity. For the desire of having the eternal wage and of enjoying the eternal good is a desire of grace, and is neither of natural nor of acquired love, but rather of gratuitous love, especially that desire by which the Apostle said: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ*. For to the affection of charity it belongs not only to love God with the love of friendship, but even with the love of concupiscence. « For to enjoy is to cleave by love », and it is established that to enjoy God is through charity. And therefore these wished to say, and quite probably, as it seems, that the motion of charity according to some kind of hire can be mercenary, namely insofar as it constitutes its wage about the uncreated Good, toward which it tends as to a final reward and desires as every good. — If therefore we wish to maintain this position as probable, the reasons which are to the opposite part are easily

dissolved.

1. For to that which is first objected, that charity seeketh not the things that are her own; it must be said that *her own* is there called one's proper good, in such a way that the *common* good is excluded. But he who desires God as his wage does not in this manner seek what is his own, because that good is common to all. For to seek and to see and to love God as one's wage and reward is not to seek one's proper good, in that manner of calling [a thing] *proper* which sounds toward vice.

2. To that which is objected, that God is to be served without regard to reward; it must be said that there is a twofold motion in charity, namely the motion of *friendship* and the motion of *concupiscence*. The motion of *friendship* is that by which one desires to please and to serve God; the motion of concupiscence is that by which one desires to have and to see God. When therefore Bernard says that God is to be served without regard to reward, he understands it of the love of friendship. For if by the affection of friendship a man serves a friend and loves him without regard to reward, as the Philosopher says, much more by the love of charity does a man will good to God without regard to any retribution; but by this it is not excluded that charity by the love of concupiscence may long for and desire to attain that highest wage, to which it finally intends to come.

3. To that which is objected, that the love of charity is simply gratuitous, therefore it cannot be mercenary; it must be said that that argument is good concerning that hire which is repugnant to grace; but the hire of eternal life is not repugnant to grace, nay it is consonant with it, because it specially orders [one] to it. Hence just as the love of *concupiscence* is not repugnant to the love of friendship in charity, nay the more rightly one desires God, the more he pants toward his honor; so the affection of this kind of hire is not repugnant to grace.

4. To that which is objected concerning fear, that he who principally has his eye on punishment cannot be acceptable to God, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike. For since punishment is neither God nor anything of God: he who principally looks to punishment as the ultimate end is not rightly ordered, since he has a more principal regard to something other than to God. But the wage and the highest beatitude is God himself: and therefore one can principally look to it, and yet be rightly ordered to the end. — And so it is plain that there is nothing unfitting in saying that the motion of charity can be mercenary, if one is said mercenary from regard to the eternal and uncreated wage. And in this way the reasons run to the first part. But if mercenary be taken in another way, those reasons do not compel us to confess that the motion of charity can be mercenary.