Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/27/q/bon-sent-III-d27-a2-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one and the same motion of love can be toward God and toward neighbor. And that it is so, seems [the case].

1. The motion to the end and to that which is to the end is the same, because a motion is not numbered on account of a difference of the means, but of the extreme; but the motion of charity is toward God as toward the end, toward neighbor only as toward the way: therefore one and the same motion can be toward each object.

2. Likewise, where there is one thing loved, there is one motion of love; but when God and neighbor are loved, there is one thing loved — for, as Augustine says, « in the neighbor nothing is loved but God »: — therefore with respect to each there is one act and motion of charity.

3. Likewise, one and the same is the honor by which the image of blessed Peter is honored and blessed Peter himself, because « the honor of the image is referred to the prototype », as Damascene says; but the love of neighbor is referred to God: therefore there is one motion of love by which God and neighbor are loved.

4. Likewise, « where one [is] for the sake of another, in both [cases] there is only one », as the Philosopher holds; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle holds both by one holding: therefore by parity of reasoning, since a man loves his neighbor for the sake of God, he can by one love love both.

5. Likewise, although the divine persons are several, nevertheless they are loved by us with one love, because in them there is one ground of loving, namely the highest Goodness; but similarly there is one ground of loving God and neighbor, namely that highest Goodness itself: therefore it seems that by one motion of love God and neighbor can be loved at once.

**On the contrary:** 1. As the Philosopher holds, « a motion is numbered in a threefold manner, namely by subject, by time, and by term or object »; but the term or object of love is other when God is loved and when neighbor is loved: therefore the motion of love is on this side and that one and another.

2. Likewise, no one loves anything deliberately without forethought; but no one can understand God and neighbor at one and the same time, because, as the Philosopher says, « we understand one thing only »: therefore by parity of reasoning he cannot love both at one and the same time: therefore by one motion of love God is loved, by another the neighbor.

3. Likewise, one and the same motion cannot be more intense and more remiss; but the motion of love toward God is more intense than the motion toward neighbor: therefore this motion and that one are one and another.

4. Likewise, Peter and Paul are more conformed in the ground of loving than God and neighbor; but there cannot be one motion of love toward Peter and Paul, nay according to their proper grounds they are loved by diverse motions: therefore the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor is one and another.

5. Likewise, a precept regards the act and use of a virtue; but the precepts of charity are two, according as it is said in Matthew twenty-two: one with respect to God, and another with respect to neighbor: therefore it seems that the motion and act of love with respect to those two must be distinguished and numbered.

> **Conclusion.** The motion of charity toward God cannot be the same [as that toward neighbor], except when it is toward God as toward the ultimate end and toward neighbor as toward the object; or when it regards each object under a different ground, namely God as the good which it wishes, but neighbor as that for whom it wishes [it].

**I respond:** It must be said that the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be twofold: either in such a way that it is toward each as toward object and term; or in such a way that it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end. If it is toward the one as toward object and toward the other as toward the ultimate end; thus there can be one and the same motion toward neighbor and toward God, as is plain, because by one act of love the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, and that motion is as it were collative. — But if it is toward each as toward object, this can be in two ways, because, since the act of charity is to love, and to love is « to will good to someone », accordingly the object of charity can be assigned in two ways, namely that that good which is wished be called the object, and also that one for whom it is wished. The motion of charity, then, can be compared to God and neighbor in the character of object in two ways: either under the same and uniform ground, in such a way that it loves each as that for whom it wishes good; or in a different manner, in such a way that it regards the one as that good which it wishes, and the other as that for whom it wishes [it]. — If it regards [them] in a different manner, thus the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can still be the same. For charity, in that motion by which it loves the neighbor, wishes God for the neighbor. — But if it regards [them] uniformly, thus it is necessary that the motion of love be one and another toward God and

toward neighbor. For the motion of love by which I will good to God is one, and that by which I will good to neighbor is another, because the term of love is one and another; and the one is more intense, the other more remiss. And according to this, about the act of love there stand the two precepts. — And according to this way the reasons adduced to that part proceed, and therefore they can be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, the answer is plain: because it proceeds insofar as the act of love is toward neighbor as toward object, and toward God as toward end; and thus it does not receive a numbering, but a certain relation and right ordering.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the thing loved is the same in both [cases]; similarly the answer is plain: because it proceeds according to the other way, namely insofar as God is said to be loved when [good] is wished for the neighbor; but if we understand of the thing loved, so that that be called the thing loved for whom good is wished, the thing loved is not the same when God is loved and when neighbor is loved.

3. To that which is objected, that the adoration is the same by which the image of Peter and Peter [himself] are adored; it must be said that it is not alike on this side and that, because the love of neighbor is referred to God in one way, the honor of the image is referred to the prototype in another. For the honor of the image is referred to the prototype not only as to an end, but also as to an object. Whence the honor is referred wholly to him who is signified by the image; for the sign is not adored as a thing, but only the very thing signified. But it is not so in love, because, when the neighbor is loved for the sake of God, the man is truly affected toward the neighbor, and otherwise than toward God.

4. To that which is objected, that where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one; it must be said that this is true in those things which cannot be separated from one another; but it is not so in the case at hand. For a man can be so affected toward God that he thinks nothing of the neighbor; so too he can be affected toward the neighbor in such a way that he is then not affected toward God; and therefore that consideration has no place here.

5. To that which is objected last, that the ground of loving is the same in both [cases], as in the divine persons; it must be said that it is not alike: because in the divine persons there is one ground of loving and it is compared in the same way to those three persons loved; but it is not so in the love of God and of neighbor, because, although in both [cases] there is one ground of loving, it nevertheless is compared in a different manner to God and to neighbor. And because from the diversity of comparisons there arises a plurality of acts, [while] from the unity of the ground principally moving there arises a unity of habit; hence it is that the habit by which God and neighbor are loved is one, although its motion toward God and toward neighbor is one and another.