Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/28/q/bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q1
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### ARTICULUS UNICUS. *On the objects to be loved out of charity.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Wisdom, eleventh chapter: *Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest nothing of those things which thou hast made;* but charity makes us love conformably to God: therefore if God, who is charity, loves irrational creatures, it seems that men too who have charity ought to love them out of charity.

2. Likewise, rational creatures are to be loved out of charity, on account of the fact that they have some likeness of God; but in irrational creatures the likeness of God shines forth, though less perfectly than in rational creatures; for God shines forth in them as in a vestige: therefore if the likeness of God is the ground for loving out of charity, it seems that the other irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, just as it pertains to faith to believe that God is the creator of rational creatures, so it belongs to it to believe that He is the creator of irrational ones; and just as our intellect knows God in creatures through rational creatures, so also through irrational ones, though less fully: if then the faith and knowledge and contemplation of God Himself looks indifferently upon both rational and irrational creatures, by parity of reasoning it seems that gratuitous love does too: therefore it seems that irrational creatures too can be loved out of charity, since charity loves God just as faith believes Him.

4. Likewise, virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing: therefore that about which there is the vicious love of lust and cupidity, about the same there is the gratuitous love also of charity; but a man can love irrational creatures lustfully and covetously: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the just man should love them out of charity.

5. Likewise, someone loves temporal goods, so that through them he may serve God, just as the just man loves possessions, so that he may give alms; but it is plain that such love is meritorious love; but meritorious love proceeds from charity: therefore it seems that such irrational things are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, and it is contained in the text of the preceding distinction: «Those things alone are to be loved out of charity which are referred together with us into God by a certain fellowship, as is a man and an Angel or our body»; but irrational things are not such: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the principal object of charity is the Uncreated Good, since charity is a theological virtue: therefore since charity makes one cleave to that good and enjoy it, it loves nothing in the world except what is born to enjoy that good and to be beatified in it; but irrational creatures cannot be beatified in God: therefore they cannot be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, charity is the bond of connection, therefore those things alone are born to be loved out of charity which can be joined through charity; but such are only those which are born to be of the unity of the body of Christ; but such are only the rational ones: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the love of charity is nobler than is social love; but social love cannot and ought not be except in respect of rational creatures: therefore neither can the love of charity.

5. Likewise, those things alone are to be loved out of charity whose love is enclosed and expressed in the two commandments of charity; but the love of irrational things is neither included nor expressed in those two commandments: therefore it seems that the love of charity has no reason to be extended to irrational creatures.

> **Conclusion.** Irrational creatures are to be loved out of commanding charity, not out of eliciting charity; or, as is proved by another way, they are not loved out of charity except improperly, so that charity places no affection about them.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when some act is said to be from some virtue, this can be understood in two ways: in one way as from something moving and commanding, in another way as from something eliciting and informing. In the first way it can be said that all meritorious works are from charity, because charity commands every good work; just as out of charity I can go to Saint James and out of charity lift a straw from the ground. In the second way that act is said to be from charity which the habit of charity regards formally and directly, as to love God and neighbor, which the soul does not elicit by means of any other habit than the habit of charity.

According to this it must be understood that for something to be loved out of charity can be understood in two ways: in one way out of *commanding* charity; and thus it can be granted that irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity. For just as charity commands and moves toward doing and saying and knowing all things that pertain to our salvation and the divine praise, so too it commands toward loving. Whence, because many irrational creatures have been given to us as a help for performing meritorious works, they are also ordered to the praising of God; hence it is that charity, which is the lover of God and of neighbor, commands that such creatures be loved.

In another way something is said to be loved out of eliciting and informing charity; and thus that is loved out of charity in which the formal and proper act of charity itself is; but such is only that which is the supreme Good, or that to which the supreme Good is born to be united in some way through knowledge and love. Therefore since irrational creatures are not in this way capable of God, because they are not unto the image of God, the supreme Good cannot be desired for them through charity; and therefore charity does not descend to loving them according to its proper and formal act: and through this such things are not loved out of charity elicitively.

And if you ask: which virtue elicits that act of love by which one loves creatures, insofar as they are from God and unto God? it must be said that this is of a certain natural piety and affection. For just as a man loves a dog by a certain natural piety, because he sees it obedient to him; so also he was born to love and cherish naturally, by a certain piety, the other beasts and irrational creatures, as far as it was from the first condition. Whence according as a man is more reformed and led back to the state of innocence, accordingly creatures of this kind grow more tame toward him, and he is moved with greater piety about them; as is read of blessed Francis, that toward creatures of this kind he overflowed with a wondrous tenderness of piety, because he had now in some way recovered innocence. As a sign of this thing irrational creatures obeyed him.

And according to this distinction the response to the question is plain: that in one way irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity, namely out of commanding charity; but in another way not, namely out of eliciting charity. — According to this also it can be answered to the objections on either side, because they proceed according to diverse ways, as is apparent to one who looks closely.

There is also here another manner of speaking, not contrary to the aforesaid manner, but rather consonant, namely that something

to be loved out of charity can be threefold: either thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection and an end; and thus God alone is loved out of charity. In another way thus, that charity makes one place about the beloved itself an affection, yet not an end; and thus the neighbor is loved out of charity, because about the neighbor one is affected with the affection of charity, desiring for him the supreme Good, not on account of himself, but on account of God. In a third way something is said to be loved out of charity thus, that charity places about it no end, nor even affection with a view to it, but only by reason of that on account of which it loves; and in this way irrational creatures, in which God shines forth, are loved out of charity, because God is loved in them; in which way one is said to love the dog of his friend, not because he is affected about the dog with a special affection, but because he is affected about the friend. — And the sign of this is that the affection of charity does not bind a man to an irrational creature in the way that it binds and connects a man to the neighbor himself, or even to God Himself. Whence just as the love of friendship, which is toward a friend, extends itself to the friend's son, so that the friend's son is a friend and beloved, yet does not thus extend itself to the friend's pup, so that the dog be loved with a like affection; so it must be understood that charity, which is the love of God, extends itself to those who are born to be His sons through the grace of adoption. And because irrational creatures are not of this kind, therefore properly speaking they are not born to be loved out of charity in such a way that charity places affection about them, though indeed charity can love God in them; so that in a certain way it can be granted that those creatures are loved out of charity, although improperly. — Therefore they are not to be numbered among those things which are properly loved out of charity, as the reasons brought forward for this side show.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God loves irrational creatures; it must be said that for God to love irrational creatures is to conserve them in the being of nature; but to love something out of charity is to desire the supreme Good for it; and therefore more is connoted when it is said that something is to be loved out of charity, and that something is loved by God. And therefore it does not follow that if God loves them, they are to be loved out of charity. And if you object that charity conforms our will to the divine will; it must be said that this is not true primarily and *per se* in respect of all works and of whatever objects, but in respect of those which have an express likeness, and to which God wills to give Himself. For charity desires God for all those things which it loves out of charity. And this is what Augustine says, and it is contained in the preceding distinction: «Let us so love one another that, as far as we can, we may by love draw toward having God within us».

2. To that which is objected, that rational creatures are loved out of charity on account of their assimilation to God; it must be said that not every assimilation to God makes something loveable out of charity, but that which makes it capable of God; and this is the likeness of *image*. For the soul «is therefore the image of God because it can be capable and partaker of Him». For charity desires that that supreme Good be possessed by him whom it loves; for to that it inclines as to its principal object. And since the likeness of *vestige* does not make a creature capable of God Himself through knowledge and love; hence it is that it does not follow that if in irrational creatures some likeness of *vestige* be found, on this account the love of charity is extended to them.

3. To that which is objected, that faith believes God to be the creator of irrational things just as of rational ones: it must be said that the case of faith and charity is not similar. For faith is not only about God Himself, insofar as He is *end*, but also insofar as He is the *principle* of things. And because God is the immediate principle both in respect of rational and of irrational things; therefore in both respects it believes in God and contemplates Him. But charity regards God under the aspect of *end*, because under the aspect of *good*. And because rational and irrational creatures do not in the same way have to tend into that supreme end, since rational ones immediately, but irrational ones mediately; hence it is that it does not follow that the love of charity bears itself uniformly toward these and those.

4. To that which is objected, that virtue and vice are concerned with the same thing; it must be said that that argument is doubly faulty. First, because, although virtue and vice have being about the same subject, it is nevertheless not necessary that they generally have being about the same object; for more is required for virtue than for vice. Therefore if vice can subsist about something, it does not on this account follow that virtue does too. — There is also another defect there, because, since

charity is a virtue and a special love, it is not necessary that charity subsist about that about which any special vice subsists. Whence although cupidity subsists about temporal goods, it is not necessary that the virtue of charity be about them, but it suffices that the virtue of largesse be. And therefore it is not necessary that temporal things of this kind be loved out of charity, but be retained and dispensed out of largesse, which knows how to appraise them according to their worth.

5. To that which is objected concerning him who loves temporal things in order that through them he may serve God; the response is already plain through what has been said: because that motion is meritorious, not because it is from eliciting charity, but because it is from commanding charity, just as to go to Saint James, or to do any other work in God's service. Moreover, when someone loves temporal things to serve God, his affection is occupied about Him whom he wishes to serve, as was touched on before. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that such things are loved out of charity, except by a very extended use of the name. For properly nothing is loved out of charity about which charity does not place a special affection.