Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/28/q/bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### QUESTION II. *Whether demons are to be loved out of charity.*

Secondly it is asked whether demons are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Leviticus, nineteenth chapter: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;* the Gloss: «The neighbor is to be understood not by closeness of blood, but by the fellowship of reason»; but demons are rational: therefore demons are our neighbors. If then neighbors are to be loved out of charity, it seems that demons are too.

2. Likewise, the ground for loving the neighbor is that he is unto the image of God; but this is to be found in demons: therefore since the ground for loving is found in them, it seems that we ought to love them out of charity.

3. Likewise, the Angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity, on account of those things which they had in themselves; but Dionysius says that «demons have the things given to them whole and most splendid»: therefore if they were then to be loved out of charity on account of those things which they then had, by parity of reasoning it seems that we ought now to love them out of charity.

4. Likewise, we ought to love out of charity whatever things contribute to the increase of our merit; but demons, by tempting and vexing us, contribute to the increase of our merit: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

Likewise, everything that contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of divine justice is to be loved out of charity; but demons, cast down from heaven and subjected to punishments, contribute to the manifestation of the adornment of divine justice: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity. The first [premise] is proved thus: because charity loves beatitude and desires to be beatified; therefore it loves everything which is ordered to beatitude: therefore by parity of reasoning, since

charity loves the honor and praise of God, it loves everything which contributes to the amplification of the divine praise. The *minor* is manifest of itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the commandment of love of neighbor it is commanded that a man love his neighbor as himself; expounding which Augustine says: «As thyself, that is, unto that unto which thyself»; but we ought to love ourselves unto participation in the supreme Good: if then demons cannot attain to this, it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, upon that passage of Luke, tenth chapter: *Who seems to thee to be neighbor?* the Gloss: «The neighbor is he to whom mercy is shown, or who shows mercy»; but demons are not such: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, Augustine, eighth book *On the Trinity*: «He who loves men ought to love them either because they are just, or that they may be just»; but demons are not just nor can they be just: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the heavenly court does not love demons, but rather hates and detests them: therefore if charity is most perfect in them, and is so much the more perfect on the way insofar as it is more conformed to those who are in the fatherland; it seems that no charity ought to extend itself to the love of demons.

5. Likewise, nothing is to be embraced by the bond of charity which is perpetually separated from those things which are bound by charity; but demons are everlastingly separated from the members of Christ: therefore in no way are they to be loved out of charity.

> **Conclusion.** Demons and the damned are not to be loved out of charity elicitively and properly; taking charity broadly, that is, out of commanding charity, they are to be loved by reason of nature, hated by reason of fault.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as irrational things are not to be loved out of charity elicitively, because they are not ordered to the attainment of that supreme Good which charity desires for its beloved; so demons, because they are obstinate in malice and rendered incapable of attaining eternal beatitude, are not to be loved out of charity elicitively. — For charity makes none be loved elicitively except those whom it desires to attain to supreme beatitude. But it desires none to attain to that supernal beatitude, since it is moved rationally and discreetly, except those who are fit for attaining it both according to the order of nature and according to the order of divine justice. Therefore since demons, although they are by nature apt to be made happy and beatified in God, yet because divine justice resists, by which they are damned to everlasting misery; hence it is that charity does not desire the supreme Good for them. And therefore it must be granted that demons are not to be loved out of charity.

In the same way too it must be said of the damned, according as to love out of charity is taken *properly*. But if to love out of charity be taken *broadly*, inasmuch as the act of loving is from commanding charity; thus demons are in a certain way to be loved and in a certain way to be hated: to be hated by reason of fault, by which they are unlike God, to be loved by reason of nature. For the image of the supreme King, considered according to its own nature, as far as it is of itself, is fair and beautiful and by natural affection lovable to a like nature. — Nevertheless, because one having charity greatly detests their fault; and their fault totally and inseparably possesses their nature: hence it is that charity moves the natural affection more toward loving irrational creatures than toward loving demons. — Therefore the reasons showing that demons are not to be loved out of charity are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the neighbor is he who shares in reason; it must be said that to share in reason is twofold: either according to the pure nature of reason itself, or according to its order and fitness toward grace. I say therefore that proximity according to the nature of reason is not sufficient for this, that someone be called a neighbor in respect of the act of loving; for gratuitous love regards the order toward grace. And since demons lack this proximity, because they have been rendered incapable of grace; therefore they are not contained under the name of neighbors. And therefore from that reasoning it does not follow that they are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that the image is the ground for loving in a creature; it must be said that the image is not a sufficient ground for loving, except insofar as

it is ordered to grace and glory, to which charity orders. And because in this way it is not in demons, but rather wholly disordered; therefore that reasoning does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that the angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this was because they then had the fitness and suitability for attaining glory; but this they did not have after the fall: and therefore they are not now, as then, to be loved out of charity. And *if you object* that «they have the things given to them whole and most splendid»; it must be said that that is said as regards their powers in respect of *natural* operations, but not as regards the fitnesses of the same in respect of *gratuitous* ones. For they were rendered unfit for doing well: for such fitnesses are corrupted by sin, according as Augustine holds, and was shown in the second book.

4. To that which is objected, that whatever contributes to the increase of our merit is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this can be twofold: either *according to principal intention*, or *by occasion*. Although therefore the aforesaid proposition can have truth concerning that which contributes to the increase of our merit according to principal intention and primary ordination; nevertheless concerning that which contributes to the increase of merit by occasion, it need not have truth, because out of many evils and sins God draws forth goods for just men; and in this way demons contribute to the furtherance of our merit, because, while they intend to pervert us to sin, by divine power their exertion is turned to just and holy men unto the increase of merit.

5. To that which is last objected, that everything which contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of justice is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that, as is plain from the foregoing, if to love out of charity be taken *properly*, the proposition does not have truth. And *if you object* that what is ordered to *beatitude* is to be loved out of charity, therefore likewise what is ordered to *praise*; it must be said that a thing is ordered to *beatitude* in two ways: either because *it of itself* is ordered to attain beatitude; or because *through it something else* is ordered to attain it. And what is ordered to beatitude in the *first* way is to be loved out of charity; what is ordered in the *second* way is not to be loved out of charity, taking it *properly*. — Likewise a thing ordered to the *praise* of God can be twofold: either because *it itself* praises and magnifies God and glories in the praise of God, or because it is the *matter* of the divine praise. And what is ordered to the praise of God in the *first* way is to be loved out of charity; but what is ordered in the *second* way, it is not necessary that it be loved out of charity, unless it be said to be loved out of commanding charity. For charity commands a man to will that everything be in the universe which arouses the just man to praise and magnify his God.

---