Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/28/q/bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether evil men are to be loved out of charity.*

Thirdly it is asked whether evil men are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Matthew the fifth: *Love your enemies* etc.; but he who hates the just is without doubt iniquitous and evil: therefore if such a one is to be loved out of charity according to the dominical command, evil men are to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, all the predestined are to be loved out of charity; but many who are evil are predestined: therefore some evil men are to be loved out of charity. But we do not know who are the predestined and who the foreknown, while they are on the way: therefore all evil men are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, all those for whom one ought to pray are to be loved out of charity; but one ought to pray for sinners: therefore such persons are to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the most perfect charity was in Christ; but Christ, while we were unjust and sinners, loved us: if therefore every right love ought to imitate the charity of Christ, then it seems that sinners and the impious are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Psalm: *Did not I hate them, O Lord, that hated thee, and pined away because of thy enemies?* but all unjust men offend God and are themselves enemies to God: therefore all sinners are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, charity makes our will conformed to the divine will; but sinners and the unjust are hateful to God, according to that of Ecclesiasticus the twelfth: *The Most High hates sinners;* and that: *In like manner the impious man and his impiety are abominable to God:* therefore it seems that according to the law of charity the evil are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, « in contraries the consequence follows in the same way », and as goodness stands to love, so malice stands to hatred; but this is true of itself: the good are to be loved, therefore also this: the evil are to be hated; but what is to be hated is not to be loved: therefore the evil are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, charity is the bond of unity: therefore those alone are to be loved out of charity who are of the unity of the mystical body; but the evil are not of the unity of the mystical body: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

> **Conclusion.** Evil men are to be loved out of charity, inasmuch as they are men made to the image of God and capable of beatitude; but inasmuch as they are evil, they are rather to be detested than loved.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of evil men in two ways, and one may also consider them in two ways: either inasmuch as they are men, or inasmuch as they are evil; that is, inasmuch as they have in themselves the character of the divine image, according to which they are capable of beatitude, or inasmuch as they lack the perfection of the divine likeness.

If we consider evil men in the first way, namely inasmuch as they are men and to the image of God, according to which they are capable of beatitude; then they are to be loved out of charity, because the liberality of charity and its amplitude gathers up all who have the aptitude for that highest beatitude. — But if we consider evil men according as they are evil and deprived of the perfection of the divine likeness; then they are rather to be detested than loved. And thus the same men are both to be hated and to be loved: to be hated indeed by reason of the disorder of fault, but to be loved by reason of the ordering of nature, which is capable of the perfection of grace. And this is what Gregory says in a certain Homily, « that although we owe indignation to vices, we owe compassion to nature ». And Isidore in the book On the Virtues: « He does not love the whole Christ who hates the man; it is good not to hate nature, but fault ». Therefore although we hate the fault of the evil, we ought nevertheless to love them. — And thus it must be conceded that, although the malice of evil men is to be detested, yet the evil men themselves, inasmuch as they are ordered to beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. Hence also the reasons which are brought forward for this can be conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:**
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Prophet held in hatred those who hate God; it must be said that the Prophet did not hate nature, but their fault; on account of which he adds: *With a perfect hatred I hated them*; the Gloss: « that is, I hated their iniquities, not their nature; for this is to hate with a perfect hatred, that you neither hate men on account of their vices, nor love vices on account of men ».

2. To that which is objected, that God hates sinners; the response is already clear: because God does not hate them by reason of nature, but by reason of vice. For although by reason of vice they are punished by the divine justice, yet by reason of nature, ordered to the good, they are cherished and drawn by the divine mercy, according to that which is said to the Romans the fifth: *But God commends his charity towards us, because, when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us;* for so God loved the world, as is said in John the third, *that he gave his only-begotten Son* etc.

3. To that which is objected, that « if the proposed of the proposed, then the opposite of the opposite »; it must be said that this holds true when understood of itself; and therefore in that reasoning there is a twofold defect. *First,* because good men are to be loved not only because they are good, but also because they are ordered to the good, that is, not only because they are good in act, but also because they are good in aptitude and capacity; and therefore it does not follow that the evil are to be hated, because the evil, even if they are not good in act, are nevertheless good in aptitude. *Moreover,* granted that this be true, that the good, inasmuch as they are good, are to be loved; from this it follows only that the evil, inasmuch as they are evil, are to be hated. And this indeed is true; but from this it is not further to be inferred that evil men are not to be loved, because, although there is in them the malice of fault, which is the ground of hatred, there is nevertheless in them the goodness of nature, which is the ground of love.

4. To that which is objected, that charity is the bond of unity; it must be said that the bond of love, although it regards two extremes, yet regards one of them as subject, but the other as

terminus; nor is it necessary that it regard both as subject, except where a perfect character of union is found. Since therefore one having charity is of the unity of the body, but another, actually evil, can be of the unity of that body, although he is not so in act; hence it is that charity can be in one with respect to another, because the bond of friendship does not necessarily require for its being the mutual conjunction of the extremes; for many love who are not loved. Hence, for charity to be the bond of union, it is not necessary that it place both of the extremes in the act of uniting; but it suffices that it place one in act, namely the subject in which it is, and the other in habit, namely the object, just as knowledge places the knower in act, but places the knowable in habit.