Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/28/q/bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q5
----------------------------------------
### Question V. *Whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.*

Fifth, it is asked whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, through Augustine, in the book *On the Trinity*: « Let him who loves his neighbor love love itself especially »: therefore if he loves his neighbor out of charity, he loves love out of charity; but the love by which he loves his neighbor is a gratuitous gift: therefore gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

2. *Likewise*, everything that orders toward beatitude and leads to it is to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are of this kind: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

3. *Likewise*, it is established that spiritual gifts are to be loved and sought from God, and that he who loves them merits by loving; if then a meritorious love is the love of charity, it seems that such gifts are to be loved out of charity.

4. *Likewise*, as gratuitous love stands to gratuitous gifts, so natural love stands to natural goods; but natural goods are loved by a natural love: therefore by parity of reasoning gratuitous gifts are loved by a gratuitous love. But gratuitous love is the love of charity: therefore it seems that gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. No creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity; but gifts of this kind have no reason: therefore they ought not to be loved out of charity.

2. *Likewise*, « to love is to will good to someone »; but he is foolish who wills good to some virtue or to charity: therefore it seems that gifts of this kind are not to be loved out of charity.

3. *Likewise*, that alone is lovable out of charity which is in some way capable of beatitude; but gifts of this kind are not capable of beatitude: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

4. *Likewise*, Augustine sufficiently enumerates the things that are to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are not among those that Augustine enumerates: therefore it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

> ### Conclusion.
> Gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity, not indeed with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that gratuitous gifts are not to be loved out of charity, insofar as to love out of charity is a motion of charity as eliciting; but if they are loved out of charity, this is insofar as to love belongs to charity as commanding. For in this charity differs from natural affection, that natural affection seeks its own advantage, « but charity, as Gregory says, reaches out toward another »; and since our advantage rightly and properly consists in spiritual gifts, which order us to beatitude: therefore the love of such gifts is from natural love eliciting, but from charity commanding, whose office is to command our affections, so that they may be rightly moved toward their end. — But it does not suffice to say this: first indeed, because charity does not always tend toward another; for one having charity desires through it to enjoy God. And second, because, although it belongs to nature to seek and love natural conveniences, yet to love spiritual gifts perfectly cannot be except of gratuitous love.

And therefore there is another way of speaking: that since good is the object of charity, and the act receives its species from the object; the intention of the act of loving must be varied according to the account of the good. Now a thing is called good in two ways: in one way *concretively*, because it is ordered to beatitude and toward the end; in another way *abstractively*, because it is that by which something is ordered to the end. Gratuitous gifts, therefore, are not called goods in the *first* way, but in the *second*, because through them rational substances have to be ordered to the end; therefore, properly speaking, they are rather *goodnesses* than *goods*, and rather *grounds of loving* than *lovable things*. And therefore these say that the *subjects capable* of these spiritual gifts are to be loved out of charity, but the *gratuitous gifts* themselves are not properly to be loved out of charity, but rather are *grounds of loving* out of charity their subjects. And since an accident is one with its subject, therefore the love of these gifts together with the love of rational creatures does not constitute a separate count. — But this too is still open to objection, in that God, who is the very highest Goodness by essence, is counted among the things that are to be loved out of charity. And again: « If on account of which each thing [is such], then that thing more so » — but such spiritual gifts are the goods on account of which men are loved — much more strongly do they themselves seem to be loved out of charity.

And therefore there is yet a third way of speaking, that, as was touched on in the preceding, the motion and affection of charity is twofold. For there is the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence. By the love of friendship those things are loved for which good is desired; but by the love of concupiscence those things are said to be loved which are desired. Since therefore the desire of spiritual goods belongs to charity itself, inasmuch as the Saints say that spiritual goods hold the account of the honorable; it must be granted that gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity.

And this Augustine expressly says in the eighth book of *On the Trinity*, when he says that « charity itself is to be loved out of charity ». Experience itself also expressly teaches this of spiritual men, who desire nothing so much after God as to have a perfect love of God. — Whence the reasonings that are for this part are to be granted.

**To the solution of the contrary arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, that no creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that if it is understood of the love of friendship, it is true; but if of the love of concupiscence, it is not true. And if you object that then temporal goods will be loved out of charity, since charity causes those goods to be desired for the service of God; it must be said that it is not the same: because those temporal goods have only the account of convenience, but spiritual goods have the account of the honorable; and therefore the desire of *wisdom* is praised in Scripture, although the desire of *money* is blamed. Moreover, « temporal goods are the least goods », as Augustine says; but gratuitous gifts are counted among the greatest goods; and therefore there is no likeness between these and those.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that to love is to will good to someone; the response is already clear: because it speaks of loving insofar as it is an act of friendship; for insofar as it is an act of concupiscence, to love is not to will good to someone, but rather is to desire some good or to accept some good. And although it is not to be granted that charity causes [a man] to will good to itself; yet it causes itself to be desired and accepted as a true good.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that nothing is to be loved out of charity except what is capable of beatitude; it must be said that this at first sight has an instance in God, who is beatitude itself. Moreover, even if it has truth in creatures in some way, this is true in those things which are to be loved with the love of friendship.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that Augustine does not enumerate whatever things are to be loved, but the things to be loved with the love of friendship. And if you ask the reason why; it must be said that this is because the motion of friendship is of greater generosity than the motion of concupiscence; and according to it charity reaches out toward another: and therefore according to that mode the more lovable things are distinguished, and the things that are to be loved are commanded to be loved. Nor is there any diminution, because in those the latter are included.