Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/28/q/bon-sent-III-d28-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *On the number and sufficiency of the things to be loved.*

Sixth, the question is raised concerning the number and sufficiency of the things to be loved. For Augustine says that «there are four things to be loved out of charity, namely God and we ourselves, our neighbor and our body». And it seems, first, that there is superfluity here:

1. Because things that are of the same species and are not distinguished except according to matter ought not to make different members of a distinction; but we and our neighbor are of the same species: therefore a man having charity ought not to be counted together with his neighbor as distinct objects to be loved.

2. Likewise, sacred Scripture sufficiently enumerates the things to be loved in the precepts which it gives; but it enumerates only two, namely God and neighbor, concerning which it gives two precepts: therefore it seems that the other members are superfluous.

3. Likewise, nothing happens to be blessed except in three ways, namely *by essence*, by first influence, and *by redundancy*: therefore if charity does not extend itself to loving anything except what is blessed in act, or in potency; it seems that there are only three things to be loved, namely God, the soul, and the body.

But that there is a deficiency seems [to be the case]:

4. First, through Ambrose, who, as is found in the following distinction, assigns six members in the number of things to be loved: therefore if Ambrose was not *superfluous* in his enumeration, it seems that Augustine was *deficient*.

5. Likewise, just as our body is to be loved out of charity, so also the body of our neighbor: therefore just as our soul and our neighbor's soul constitute two members of the things to be loved, so it seems also our body and our neighbor's body: therefore it seems that there are five things to be loved out of charity.

6. Likewise, just as out of charity we love what is *above* us and *below* us and *beside* us; so also out of charity what is *against* us is to be loved, namely the enemy, as was shown above: it seems therefore that one member is lacking from the aforesaid members.

It is asked, therefore: why are there just so many things to be loved out of charity, and neither more nor fewer?

> ### Conclusion.
> Out of charity there are four things to be loved, whose sufficiency is demonstrated by a twofold way.

**I respond:** It must be said that the number and sufficiency of things to be loved can be taken in two ways: in one way by comparison to *love* itself; in another way by comparison to the *lover* himself.

According to *love* itself the number and sufficiency can be taken thus. For since love is an appetite for the good, in the appetite for the good there is to be considered the *good itself desired* and the one *who* desires and the one *for whom* he desires the good; now the *good desired* is the supreme Good, the one *who* desires is the one having charity; the one *for whom* it is desired can be in a fourfold difference — for he either wishes the supreme Good for God himself, or for himself, or for one *like* himself, or for one *cleaving* to himself — therefore there are four things to be loved out of charity, because the number of things to be loved is not taken from the side of the one *wishing*, nor from the side of *the good wished*, since it is one, but from the side of the one *for whom* it is wished; and since this is in a fourfold difference, there are four members of the things to be loved. And this is what was said above, that in the aforesaid division the number of things to be loved is taken according to the love of *friendship*, by which one is said to love another, when he wills the good for him.

In another way the number and sufficiency of things to be loved can be taken from the comparison to the *lover* himself. For the lover has a regard either to *himself*, or to that which is *above himself*, or to that which is *beside himself*, or to that which is *below himself*; and according to this there are only four things to be loved out of charity. — And according to this mode Augustine takes up the number and sufficiency of things to be loved in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, nor does he only assign the number, but also the due order. For he says thus: «There are four things to be loved: one, which is *above us*, namely God; another, which *we* are; third, which is *beside us*, namely the neighbor; fourth, which is *below us*, namely the body». And because all things can be reduced to these four members; therefore the number and sufficiency of things to be loved is clear.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that there is *superfluity* there, because we do not differ in species from our neighbors; it must be said that although we do not differ in *species*, nevertheless our charity is compared in different ways to us and to our neighbors according to the *ground* of loving and the *degree*. For first charity makes the one *having* it tend to beatitude and then the *neighbor*; for him it wishes to tend toward the same [end] as it were from the side.

2. To that which is objected, that sacred Scripture expresses only two things to be loved; it must be said that in the following commandment it implies three things to be loved. For in this that it says: *Love your neighbor as yourself*, it commands a man to love himself; and since he is constituted of soul and body, the love of both is included there.

3. To that which is objected, that something is blessed only in three ways; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless charity, which disposes to beatitude, regards in one way its *subject capable [of it]*, and in another way regards that which is *like* it: the first as *participating*, the second as *co-participating*; and therefore according to this diverse comparison different objects to be loved can be distinguished.

4. To that which is objected last, that there is *deficiency* there, because Ambrose assigns six members; it must be said that those six members are reduced to these four. For Ambrose distinguishes one of these members into four, namely the love of that which is *beside* us, namely the love of the neighbor. Nor is there any contrariety there, because Ambrose considers the *accidental* differences of the things to be loved, [whereas] Augustine considers the grades and the differences *more essential*; which will appear better below.

5. To that which is objected concerning the body of the neighbor, it must be said that both the body of the neighbor and our body are *below* us, and therefore is contained under the fourth member. Nor is it the same with our soul and the neighbor's soul, because charity is compared in *different ways* to each: to the one as to something *intrinsic*, to the other as to something *near*. But to bodies it is compared *uniformly*; for it is compared to each as to something *more interior*. — Otherwise some wish to say that the love of the neighbor's body is contained under the love of the neighbor, because charity is compared *uniformly* to each; but to our soul and to the body it is compared *non-uniformly*, because to the soul it is compared as informing it and inhering in it, but to the body as ruling over it and governing it.

6. To that which is objected, that out of charity that which is *against* us is to be loved; it must be said that this is contained under that member which is *beside* us, for the reason that, although enemies who are against us are to be loved, nevertheless they are not to be loved in that they are *against* us, that is by reason of fault, but in that they are *beside* us, that is according to the conformity of nature.

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