Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/29/q/bon-sent-III-d29-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### SOLE ARTICLE. *On the order of charity.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether there is an order in charity with respect to the things able to be loved. And that there is, it seems.

1. Song of Songs, chapter two: *He has set charity in order within me*; but the order of charity is observed only in loving: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine* says that «first God is to be loved, who is *above us*; second, that which *we* are; third, that which is *beside us*; fourth, that which is *beneath us*»: therefore from this it is plain that there is an order in charity with respect to the things to be loved. For it is established that these are not ordered to one another according to the order of time, but according to the order of excellence and dignity.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, who assigns in the text an order of charity in loving: if therefore he does so rightly, it seems that an order must be posited in charity with respect to those things which are loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, this seems to follow *by reason*: it belongs to charity to rectify the affection; but the affection is not right unless it sets the greater good before the lesser good, and this expresses an order: therefore an order must be posited in charity.

5. Likewise, charity loves many things able to be loved; either, then, *equally primarily*, or *not equally primarily*. Not *equally primarily*; this is established, since charity is a single habit, and a single habit has a single principal object. If *not equally primarily*: therefore one is prior, and the other posterior: therefore there is a necessary order there.

6. Likewise, an order belongs more to deliberative love than to natural love; but we see that natural love is ordered with respect to the things able to be loved: therefore much more strongly does it seem to be so concerning deliberative love. But the love of charity is of this kind: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Order presupposes distinction: therefore where there is no distinction, there is no order; but charity with respect to the diverse things able to be loved is not distinct nor multiplied: therefore neither will it be ordered with respect to them.

2. Likewise, wherever there is order, there is proportion; but among the things loved out of charity there is no proportion, because there is no proportion of the created to the uncreated, and the proportion of body to spirit is slight or none: therefore if there is no order or proportion among the things able to be loved, it seems that charity is not ordered with respect to them.

3. Likewise, order pertains most of all to cognition, because «it belongs to the wise man to order»: therefore if no order is posited in cognition with respect to the things to be known, much less should an order be posited in charity with respect to the things to be loved. *If you say* that on the contrary there is order in the sciences; *it is objected* concerning faith itself, which is a cognitive habit, by which also the diverse articles are believed, exceeding one another according to degree and dignity, as those which concern the divinity are more excellent than those which concern the humanity: if therefore no order is posited in faith with respect to the things to be believed, no order should be posited in charity with respect to the things able to be loved.

4. Likewise, just as in faith there is one ground of believing, namely the supreme Truth, so in charity there is one ground of loving, namely the supreme Goodness; but on account of the single ground of believing, faith assents equally to all the articles: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems with regard to charity that it too ought to love all the things to be loved equally.

5. Likewise, charity by a certain natural inclination inclines to loving the good: if therefore it is one and the same habit, and «the same, remaining the same, is always apt to do the same» in those things which naturally

incline toward something: it seems therefore that charity moves altogether uniformly and equally to loving every thing able to be loved.

6. Likewise, if an order is observed in charity, either it is observed as regards the *habit*, or as regards the *act*. As regards the *habit*, no; this is established, since the habit is one and the same. If as regards the *act*: then it seems that in one who is asleep charity is not ordered, since in him it does not exercise its act.

There is therefore a question: by what is order observed in charity; and why is an order observed in it more than in another virtue, since every virtue, as Augustine says in the book *On the Morals of the Church*, is «ordered love»; and again, since concerning every good there is *measure, species, and order*; why is charity called *ordered* rather than *measured*?

### CONCLUSION.

> Charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that charity is a *binding bond*, according to that which the Apostle says to the Colossians, chapter three, where he calls it the *bond of perfection*; and Dionysius in chapter four of *On the Divine Names* says that «love is a unitive power». Hence, since the love of charity is a most liberal love, it embraces many things and gathers them into one. Hence charity not only unites to the end him in whom it is, but also in a certain way binds to him that which is apt to attain to the same end.

Nor is charity only a binding bond, but also an *inclining weight*; for «what weight is in bodies, that love is in spirits». Since therefore each thing is ordered through its own weight, and charity is a weight and an even balancer: hence it is that the formal character of *order* belongs most of all to charity. And since it is a *bond binding and embracing many things*, therefore it not only orders the one loving toward the *end*, but also toward the *things loved themselves*, according as the ground of loving and the habit of charity itself are compared in diverse ways to them. — Therefore the reasons showing that charity is ordered with respect to those things which are to be loved out of charity are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that order presupposes distinction; it must be said that order is observed in charity by reason of the *habit related to act and object*. For although in charity there is no distinction on the part of the *habit*, there is nevertheless distinction on the part of the *things to be loved* themselves and on the part of the *acts*, by reason of which diversity the *commandments* of charity must be multiplied, and charity itself must be ordered.

2. To that which is objected, that where there is order, there is proportion; it must be said that *proportion* is taken in two ways: *strictly* and *broadly*. If proportion is said *strictly*, then it expresses a certain commensuration and is of things of the same genus; and in this way the aforesaid proposition does not hold true, that wherever there is order, there is proportion. But if it is taken *broadly*, so that proportion is called any relation observed according to the agreement of analogy: in this way there is *proportion* of the created good to the uncreated, and also *order* according to the formal character of causality and priority. For the end is more worthy and more excellent and is set before those things which are toward the end, and as regards this an order is observed in charity.

3. To that which is objected, that order seems to pertain most of all to the act of the cognitive power, since it belongs to the wise man to order; it can be answered first by *distinguishing* that order is twofold: *one* of the parts in a whole and of things in the universe, and *another* of those things which are toward the end with respect to the end itself. And although the first order is principally about *cognition*, the second consists more principally about *affection and love*, whose office it is to incline toward the end. But the order of charity is observed by comparison to the end; and therefore the case of charity and of the cognitive habit is not alike.

Otherwise it can be said that order in the habit is observed by comparison to act and object, as was said before. Since therefore the supreme Goodness is compared in one way and another to the diverse things able to be loved

and is participated by them according to more and less, as is plain in body and spirit; hence it is that the love of charity is called *ordered*. By this manner too, if any cognitive habit considers certain things in which there is greater and lesser evidence of truth, certainly in such a one an order can be found, just as the science of principles is prior to that of conclusions; and thus that objection can be answered *by removal*. And if one *objects* concerning faith, it must be said that the case is not alike: for all the articles are compared uniformly to the supreme Truth, according as they are believed by faith. For faith in believing assents to all the articles as to the first Truth, as to one dictating and asserting; therefore it believes them all uniformly and equally.

4. To that which is objected, that there is one ground of loving in charity, just as one ground of believing in faith; it must be said that although it be one, nevertheless Charity itself is not compared so uniformly to the things able to be loved as Truth itself is to the things able to be believed; for the supreme Goodness itself is more desirable for God than for us, and for our spirit than for our body; therefore the case is not alike on the one side and the other.

5. To that which is objected, that the same, remaining the same, is apt to do the same; it must be said that this holds true of that which is naturally inclined, both by reason of itself and by reason of what is joined to it, and this with respect to the same object. For according to the diversity of objects there comes about a diversification of operations; hence the sun illumines crystal more than it illumines stone or wood; but each of these falls short in charity. For charity itself is the ruler of the will itself and must be moved together with it, which will indeed is voluntarily inclined toward the things willed themselves. Moreover, one of the objects is more lovable than the other, just as one body is more illuminable than another and is more brightly lit by the same light.

6. To that which is objected lastly, whether it is observed as regards the habit, or as regards the act; it must be said that it is observed as regards the *habit compared*. Hence although the habit of charity be one, nevertheless it is called *ordered*, even if it be not in act, because it disposes the soul to this, that it be moved in an ordered way; hence the just man asleep is said to have ordered charity. — From these things which have been said, it is plain why charity is called *ordered* more than another virtue, and is also called *ordered* more than *measured*. For this is because it is proper to it to have at once the formal character of a *binding bond* and of an *inclining weight*; but weight corresponds to order.