Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/29/q/bon-sent-III-d29-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether charity in loving sets God before us.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the order of charity by comparison of ourselves to God, and the question is whether charity in loving sets God before us. And that it does, it seems:

1. First, by that commandment, Deuteronomy six: *You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole soul*; this is said to be the first and greatest commandment: if therefore it is enjoined upon no other thing that we should expend our whole affection except on God alone; it seems that in the love of charity God holds the first and highest place.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine and Ambrose, each of whom, as is set down in the text, in the order of loving sets God before us.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen *by reason*: since «on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself is so all the more»; but charity, whatever it loves, loves on account of God: therefore first and principally and most of all it loves God himself: therefore according to the order of charity God is set before us.

4. Likewise, according to what the philosophical doctrine maintains, «the end is more to be chosen than those things which are toward the end»; but it pertains to the order of charity that it love more those things which are more to be chosen: if therefore the uncreated Good is the end, and the created good is that which is toward the end; it seems that in the order of charity the uncreated good, which is God, is always set before the created good, which we are.

**On the contrary:** 1. Grace is the perfection of nature, but nature lacking grace loves itself more than God: if therefore perfection does not pervert the order of that which it perfects, it seems that the same order ought to be preserved in charity: therefore by charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

2. Likewise, «if some one thing be added to certain equal things, it is necessary that those, after the addition, be equal»: therefore by parity of reasoning, if it be added to unequal things, after the addition they will be unequal; but the love of ourselves before the coming of charity outweighs the love of God, therefore also after its coming: therefore according to the order of charity we ought to love ourselves more than God.

3. Likewise, the affection of love follows the knowledge of cognition, «for we cannot love things unknown»; but we know ourselves more than we know God, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer: it seems therefore that it pertains to the order of charity to love ourselves more than God, according to the present state.

4. Likewise, it seems that at least *equally*: because as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God and to be made blessed in him; and as much as he desires to enjoy God, so much does he desire his own blessedness; and as much as he desires his own blessedness, so much does he love himself: therefore it seems that as much as one loves God, so much does he love himself.

5. Likewise, the motion of charity toward God is finite, since it is from a finite power; likewise the motion of charity toward oneself; and it is possible that the motion of charity toward God be remitted, and the motion of charity toward oneself be intensified; but when two things are finite, of which one is intensified and the other remitted, it is possible that they arrive at equality: therefore it seems that out of charity we can love ourselves and God equally: and thus the same conclusion returns as before.

6. Likewise, love is a «unitive power»; but it is impossible that anyone be united to another more than to himself: therefore it is impossible to love another more than oneself: therefore it does not seem that in the order of charity God is to be set before our very selves.

### CONCLUSION.

> According to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made equal to nor set before the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the order of charity God is to be set before us to such a degree that love with respect to ourselves can neither be made *equal to* nor *set before* the love of God, the substance of the habit of charity being preserved.

Now the ground of this is the following: since charity causes God to be loved as the ultimate end and as the supreme good; and since the ultimate end is one only, and likewise the supreme good has nothing *above itself* or *equal to itself*: hence it is that according to the law of charity it is impossible to love anything *more* than God, or *equally* with God himself. For charity, because it loves God as the *supreme good*, loves him above all things; because it loves him as the *ultimate end*, it loves him for his own sake. But that which is loved *for its own sake* and *above all things* is loved with the love of *fruition*; whereas that which is loved *for the sake of another* is loved with the love of *use*. Since therefore it belongs to *charity* to refer all things to God as to the ultimate end, just as it belongs to *weight* to incline a body to its proper place; hence it is that charity causes us to love God more than ourselves. — Whence the reasons which are for that side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that grace is the perfection of nature; it must be said that in nature one may consider something by way of *position*, and something by way of *privation* and defect and corruption. But that which is in nature by way of *position* is *perfected* and *preserved* by grace; whereas that which is there by way of corruption and *privation* is *corrected* and *supplied* by grace. Since therefore it is said that it belongs to nature to love itself more than God; it must be said that this is not a condition found in nature looking to its *perfection*, but rather to its *corruption*; therefore it does not follow that it ought to be *preserved* by grace, but rather it follows that it ought to be *removed* by grace.

2. To that which is objected, that if one thing be added to unequal things, they will still be unequal by the same inequality as before; it must be said that this holds true when the thing added regards *equally* both of those unequal things: but it is not so in the present case. For charity more principally regards that affection of man which is toward God than that which is toward himself; whence at the coming of charity the love of self is diminished and the love of God is intensified.

3. To that which is objected, that affection follows cognition; it must be said that affection is said to follow cognition not only on the side of the *clarity* in knowing, but also on the side of the *goodness* considered in the very thing known. But although a man know himself more clearly than God, nevertheless no one having charity esteems himself as good and as lovable as he esteems God. And therefore love following cognition sets God himself before us in loving rather than the contrary.

4. To that which is objected, that as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; it must be said that it happens to love God by a twofold motion of love, namely by the *affection of friendship* and by the *affection of concupiscence* or desire. Since therefore it is said: as much as one loves God, so much does he desire to enjoy God; *to love* can denote the motion of *friendship*, or the motion of *concupiscence*. If it denotes the motion of *concupiscence*, it has the truth without doubt; but this motion is not reckoned together with the love of ourselves: and therefore it does not follow from this that we love God and ourselves equally. For to love ourselves out of charity is nothing else than to wish the supreme Good for ourselves. — But if *to love God* denotes the motion of *friendship*; then this *as much* and *how much* can import *proportionality*, so that the sense is: if you greatly wish good to God, you greatly desire to enjoy God; or it can import the *commensuration of proportion* or equality. In the first way it has the truth, but in the second way it does not have the truth. For by charity I love the supreme good for God and the supreme good for myself, in such wise that I will that God have the supreme good and be the supreme good *by essence*, but I [have it] *by participation*; and I wish much more for him than for myself. And therefore it does not follow from this that the love of God can be made equal to the love of ourselves, the substance of charity being preserved, or even to the love of any creature, such as the love of the glory and fruition of God or of created blessedness.

It could also be answered otherwise *by removal* to that objection: as much as you desire to enjoy God, so much do you love yourself, according as *as much* and *how much* denote *commensuration*, because one can desire to enjoy God *for his own sake* and *above all things*, although it is in no way to be conceded that out of charity he loves himself *for his own sake* and *above all things*.

5. To that which is objected, that the motion of charity toward God is finite and toward ourselves likewise, and so by intensification and remission they can be made equal; it must be said that although each be finite, since it proceeds from a finite power; nevertheless by reason of the object itself the one exceeds the other to infinity. Nor is this unfitting, because the finite can exceed another finite to infinity, as a line exceeds a point, and a surface a line. Whence just as infinite points cannot be made equal to a line, so neither can the love of creatures themselves according to the law of charity be made equal to the love of the Creator. For just as a line can never be constituted out of points, so neither can the supreme good of the rational soul be constituted out of infinite created goods. But the love of God, the substance of charity being preserved, can never be so remitted that God be not loved as end and as supreme good; nor can the love of a creature be so intensified that the creature be not loved as a good ordered to the supreme Good: and therefore it does not follow that those motions can come to equality.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; it can be answered in two ways: first, that this can be understood of union as regards *natural agreement*, or as regards *the inherence of love*. In the first way it is true, in the second way false, because in this second way love is called a unitive power.

Otherwise it can be said that God is more intimate to each thing than the thing itself is to itself; and the *being* of a thing depends more on God conserving it than on the intrinsic principles themselves; and the completion of the blessedness of the rational spirit it has from God, not from itself. And therefore, when it is said that nothing can be more united to another than to itself; if this be understood of *creatures* themselves, it can have the truth; but if it be understood of *God* himself, it does not have the truth. For God enters intimately into the soul itself; and therefore the soul out of the inmost marrow of its affection cleaves to God; and when it has charity, it tends toward him more than toward itself, and rests in him more than in itself, because God is better to it than it is to itself.

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