Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/29/q/bon-sent-III-d29-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger.*

Fifthly it is asked about the order of charity in respect to the comparison of the member of the household to the stranger, and the question is whether a member of one's household is to be preferred to a stranger. And that [it is] so, seems [the case]:

1. By that which is said to the Galatians at the last: *Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household of faith;* and First to Timothy five: *If anyone has not care of his own and most of all of those of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.* From each of these authorities it can be shown that a member of one's household ought to be preferred to a stranger; by the one it is shown positively and by the other destructively.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the authority of Ambrose, which is set down in the littera, who says that those of the household are to be placed in the fifth rank in the order of charity, but strangers in the sixth.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason. The diffusion of bodily heat is sooner to nearer places than to more remote ones: therefore from a like [case], the communication of spiritual love naturally regards sooner that which is near, than that which is remote: if therefore those of the household are nearer to us than strangers, or enemies; it seems that in the order of charity they are to be placed first.

4. Likewise, charity sets in order [its love] sooner and more principally toward those to whom we are more bound and tied — for the order of charity is consonant with the law of justice — but according to the law of justice we are more obligated to those of our household than to strangers: therefore those of the household ought to be preferred to strangers in the order of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Colossians three: *Be renewed according to the new man, where there is not male and female, gentile and Jew, but all things in all is Christ:* therefore according to this, to a man having charity no one is a stranger: therefore according to the law of charity there is no distinction, no order between a member of one's household and a stranger.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On True Religion*: « A man is not to be loved by a man as carnal brothers or sons or spouses or kinsmen or relations or fellow-citizens are loved; for that love is temporal. For we would not have such necessities, which befall by being born and by dying, if our nature, remaining in the precepts and image of God, had not been relegated to this corruption »: therefore it seems that the order of charity is in no way to be attended to in respect to stranger and member-of-household and neighbor.

3. Likewise, the ground of loving one's neighbor out of charity is the image of God itself: if therefore a member of one's household and a stranger are equally the image of God, it seems that out of charity they are equally to be loved.

4. Likewise, charity loves the good, because [it is] good: therefore he who is more good is more to be loved out of charity, whether he be a member of one's household or a stranger: therefore nearness and familiarity, or strangeness, seem to do nothing toward the order of charity.

> ### Conclusion.
> According to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the aforesaid order, which is assigned according to these differences, which are near and remote, of-the-household and stranger, is said by some to be [a matter] of natural love itself, but it is not of charity except as [charity is] tolerating; for charity, being on the way [and] imperfect, bears with the imperfection of nature itself. Whence these [men] wished to say that the order of charity which belongs to it in itself is attended to in respect to greater good and lesser good, but not according to near and remote. — But this manner of speaking does not seem to agree with the words of Ambrose nor with the words of the Master. For Ambrose assigns this order in gratuitous love itself, of which the spouse says in the Canticle: *The king brought me into the wine-cellar, he set charity in order in me.* And the Master at the beginning of the distinction says that « he sins who acts preposterously » and perverts this order; which would not be [so], if such an order belonged only to charity as tolerating.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that the order which is attended to in respect to the aforesaid differences is not only [a matter] of charity as tolerating, but is also [a matter] of it as regulating nature and being consonant with it. For that those who are near are loved sooner than strangers — this is not [a matter] of disordered nature, but rather of the ordering of nature. — For as was touched on earlier, the right order of diffusion is that there be communicated sooner to the nearer and then to the more remote. Since therefore charity does not take away from nature the right order; hence it is that supervening charity perfects that order of nature, and in perfecting it is said to be ordered by the same order, not because that order belongs to it in itself, but because it belongs to it by reason of the nature in which it is.

On account of which it must be attended to that a twofold order is attended to in charity: one, which belongs to it in respect to itself; and this order is attended to in respect to good and more good and most good. Whence charity of itself moves more to loving the spirit than the body, and the highest God than a created spirit. But there is another order, which belongs to it by reason of the underlying nature; and this is attended to according to these differences, which are own and another's, near and stranger. For the affection of charity makes the affection of nature subordinate to itself and perfects and rules it according to that of rectitude which it has in itself. — It must therefore be granted that according to the order of charity those of the household are to be preferred to strangers; the reasons also, which show this, are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that in Christ Jesus there is no distinction of male and female, nay all are one in Christ; it must be said that the Apostle by this does not wish to exclude distinction and degree and order in the members of Christ, but wishes to show this, that in every sex and age and of every condition everyone can through Christ attain to salvation, in such a way that no one is to be excluded from the faith. And therefore from this it is not had that charity, in loving the members of Christ, does not keep order.

2. To that which is objected concerning the authority of Augustine *On True Religion*, it can be answered that he retracts that authority in the first [book] of the Retractations. — It can also be said otherwise, that Augustine does not wish to remove from charity the consideration of those conditions simply; but he wishes to say this, that charity does not consider those conditions first and principally, as does natural and carnal love. And this is evident from that which he subjoins: « For to love in a man that he is a *son*, this is not in him to love that which pertains *to God,* but that which pertains *to oneself* »; it is established that he understands it of him who loves a son *principally,* because he is begotten from him, not because he is made to the image of God. And therefore from that authority it is not had that the order of charity is not attended to in respect to those conditions, but that they are not the principal grounds of loving out of charity. But although they are not principal, they can nevertheless be annexed and concomitant, and from this contributing to the order of charity.

3. To that which is objected, that the ground of loving one's neighbor is the image; it must be said that this is the common and general ground, but besides this there can be other special [grounds]. But order and distinction, although it be not attended to in respect to general conditions, can be attended to in respect to special ones. And therefore, although a member of one's household and a stranger are uniformly [made] to the image of God, it does not yet follow that they are uniformly to be loved.

4. To that which is objected last, that charity loves the good, because [it is] good; it must be said that [this] is true of charity itself in itself. For as was touched on before, its order in itself is attended to in respect to greater or lesser goodness; but in charity not only is the order attended to in respect to itself, but also by reason of the underlying nature; and by reason of that the order between a member of one's household and a stranger is assigned. And thus it is evident that that reason is not repugnant to the order of charity.