Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/29/q/bon-sent-III-d29-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether the order of charity is attended to in respect to effect only, or at the same time in respect to affect and effect. And that [it is attended to] in respect to both, seems [the case]:

1. First [Epistle] of John three: *Let us love not in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth:* therefore there is no true love unless it be in the heart and in the deed, in affect and in effect: therefore by parity of reasoning there is no true order of love unless it be attended to in respect to both of them.

2. Likewise, Gregory in a certain homily: « The proof of love is the showing forth of work »: therefore where there is a greater showing forth of work, there a greater love is proved [to be], and conversely: if therefore charity is ordered in loving, it seems that it ought to be ordered in the heart and in the deed.

3. Likewise, the ordering in *effect* takes its rise from the ordering in *affect:* if therefore charity ought to be ordered in *effect,* it is necessary that it first be ordered in *affect.* But charity is ordered as regards *effect,* as is evident by that which the Apostle says: *Let us work good toward all, but most of all toward those of the household:* therefore it is necessary that charity be ordered as regards *affect.*

4. Likewise, « God weighs more *from how much* a man does than *how much* he does »: therefore if the order of charity is acceptable to God, it seems that it consists not only in the exterior work, but also in the interior affect.

**On the contrary:**
1. That it does not consist in *affect,* seems [evident] by that which is said in Proverbs, the eighteenth: *A man friendly to society shall be more a friend than a brother;* but it is established that that friendship, of which the Wise Man speaks, is not opposed to charity itself, nay rather is consonant with it; but according to that [friendship] he says that a man of good society is loved more than a brother according to the flesh: it seems therefore that according to the aforeassigned differences the order of love is not attended to as regards affect.

2. Likewise, delight in familiarity follows upon the love and affect of loving; but there are many who delight more to speak with their friend than to speak with God through prayer: therefore it seems that no such person has ordered charity; which seems very hard to say.

3. Likewise, that it is not attended to in respect to *effect* seems [evident], because there are many who are powerless to expend the works of love: therefore such persons cannot have the order of charity; but if this is false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, if the order of charity is attended to in respect to *effect,* then he acts rightly and according to the order of charity who gives a prebendal benefice rather to his blood-relation than to some stranger; which nevertheless the prophet Micah reproves, the third: *Woe! who builds Sion in bloods;* and Ezekiel, the forty-fourth: *Let the house of Israel suffice you, who bring in the uncircumcised into the sanctuary of God;* where those are reproved who confer ecclesiastical benefits more on those of the household than on others.

> ### Conclusion.
> The order of charity, in respect to diverse lovable [persons], is attended to not only as regards the exterior effect, but also as regards the interior affect, which is understood, other things being equal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, according to what the Master says in the littera, some have wished to say that this order of charity is attended to only as regards the exterior effect, not as regards the interior affect except by comparison of ourselves to God; but by comparison of one neighbor to another the order consists only as regards the exterior effect. And they rely on these authorities of Augustine, which are set down in the littera, in which he seems expressly to hold that the order of charity in respect to the neighbor is attended to only in the showing forth of exterior work. And this same thing he seems to say in the book *On True Religion*, where he says that « this is perfect justice, that we love the weightier goods more and the lesser goods less ». From which it seems possible to elicit that these differences of nearness do nothing toward the affect of love. — Nevertheless, as the Master says in the littera, and the words of Ambrose sound forth, and the reasons adduced earlier confirm, the order of charity, by comparison of ourselves to the neighbor and of one neighbor to another, is attended to not only as regards effect, but also as regards affect; and this same thing is to be understood, all other things being equal. For if in two beloved [persons] there is equal dignity and need, as far as concerns these properties and conditions, they are to be loved equally in effect and in affect; but if in one of them there be superadded blood-nearness, it makes him more lovable in both ways. And in this way Ambrose intends to assign the order of charity in respect to neighbors; which he notes when he says, « that those of the household, if they are good, are to be preferred to evil sons ».

And if you should ask: since to the order of charity there concur the dignity of merit and the opportuneness of need, as also *nearness*, why does Ambrose assign the order of charity in respect to nearness rather than in respect to goodness, or the necessity of need? it must be said that the condition of goodness is neither so known to us nor in itself so stable and firm as the condition of nearness. For someone who today is evil, tomorrow will be good, and he who today is less good, tomorrow perhaps will be better; likewise it is concerning need and opportuneness. Therefore in respect to the degrees of need, goodness, and opportuneness the order of charity could not be assigned so certainly as in respect to the conditions of nearness.

It must therefore be granted that the order of charity, according to the aforeassigned differences, is attended to not only as regards the *exterior effect,* but also as regards the *interior affect;* and this is to be understood, *other things being equal.* Whence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

But for the evidence of the reasons which are adduced to the contrary, it must be noted that our *affect* can be taken in manifold ways, and *effect* be found to be manifold, so that the order of charity neither regards every *affect* uniformly nor every *effect.* For affect is sometimes taken for a *passion,* but sometimes for a *motion,* so that affect-as-passion is called a certain soothing complacency, but affect-as-motion is called a certain rational choosing. — But affect-as-motion is further taken in two ways. For one is *elicited* from charity, but another *commanded.* Affect elicited from charity is that by which one wishes for another the highest Good; but affect commanded is that by which one wishes for another some temporal good, which is ordered to the conservation of nature. — Thus therefore affect is threefold: one elicited from charity, by which indeed I wish for someone the highest Good; another commanded, by which I wish for someone some earthly good; but a third annexed, by which I am delighted in another's good, which holds rather the character of passion than of motion.

And since affect is threefold, the aforeassigned order of charity regards the affect elicited from charity principally, because I ought to wish the blessed life more for myself than for another; and after myself more for my father than for another, and so proceeding further. But it regards the commanded affect less principally; whence for diverse opportunenesses and conditions the order as regards that affect can be varied and reversed. But the annexed affect, which is a soothing passion, the order of charity by no means regards; for that [affect] regards rather sensible experience than the choosing of reason, as is evident: because one is more delighted and rejoices in looking upon a companion whom he sees present than in recalling a father who is absent, although he loves [the father] more; the sign of which is, that for the father he would do much greater things.

Likewise also on the part of *effect* a distinction must be made. For there is a certain effect or benefit which regards the common usefulness, as the conferral of an ecclesiastical benefice; another which regards the individual person, and this is twofold: for there is one which regards the salvation of the soul; but another which regards the sustenance of the present life. And thus exterior effect is threefold: one, which is the procuring of eternal salvation; another, which is the relieving of temporal need; but a third, which is the committing of an ecclesiastical benefice, which is in a certain way spiritual. — But the first of these effects the order of charity regards principally; for I ought first to procure my own salvation rather than the salvation of my neighbor, and first the salvation of my father rather than of any other, and so proceeding thenceforth. — But it regards the second effect less principally, because according to diverse opportunenesses a man can and ought to be more and less beneficent in the conferral of some temporal advantage. — But the third effect, which is the conferral of some ecclesiastical benefice, the order of charity by no means regards; for in the conferral of such benefices the dignity of merit is much to be attended to, and little or nothing the nearness of blood. For it is greatly to be feared lest under the cloak of charity there lie hidden an affect of carnality. — From these things all the things which were objected are evident.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the friendly affect, which is toward a companion more than toward a brother: the response is already evident: because that is understood of the affect which is of a certain soothing complacency, by reason of which a man is more delighted to dwell with a good companion than with a brother or with a blood-relation.

2. To that which is objected concerning this, that a man is more delighted to speak with a friend than to speak with God; likewise the response is already evident: because such delight follows sensible experience; and because he sees his neighbor, but does not see God: hence it is that he is sometimes more delighted to address his neighbor than to pray to God, although he loves God much more than his friend. But although this affect in carnal men, who are given over to this world, is in some way tolerable; in spiritual men, however, whose [part] it is to experience how *sweet and gentle is the Lord*, it is very reprehensible and ought to be rooted out with great diligence.

3. To that which is objected, that the effect is not in our power; it must be said that even if it is not in our power to expend the effect outwardly, it is nevertheless in our power to will the effect itself; and when the will is perfect, it is reputed as the deed: and therefore the defect of power in carrying out does not take away the order of charity, which as regards the exterior effect has to be attended to.

4. To that which is objected concerning the prebendal benefice, the response is already evident: because as regards that effect the order of charity is by no means attended to, as has been said.

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