Dist. 29, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/29/q/bon-sent-III-d29-dubia
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# Doubts concerning the text of the Master

### Dub. I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that which he says: *He sins who acts in reverse order.* For it seems to be false. For suppose that someone exposes himself to death for the salvation of another better than himself, and endures want, in order that he may provide for another better than himself unto sufficiency; he puts another before himself, and yet he does not seem to act against charity, nay rather to proceed very charitably. — Likewise, granted that I do for my father whatever I owe, I am not obliged to do more for him: therefore if I do more for another than for him, I neither do him an injury nor [an injury to] the order of charity.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain reversal of this order *from* a due cause, a certain [reversal] *beside* a cause, a certain [reversal] *against* a due cause. There is a reversal *from* a due cause when one prefers the common good to his own good in temporal things; and this reversal indeed makes for the heaping-up of merit, and although it may seem a reversal, it is much more a more perfect ordering. — Another is a reversal *beside* the due cause, as if from the mere liberality of my own will I show myself more to some stranger than to one of the household and a blood-relation, and even to my father, considering in him some strenuousness rather than the will of God, or the dignity of merit; and this reversal takes away merit, because in this he does not merit. — But the third is a reversal *against* a due cause, namely if my father be more in need, and I am able to come to his aid, and, neglecting him, I come to the aid of a stranger; and this brings about sin, and of this is understood the authority of the Master in the littera. — And by this the response to the objections is evident.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which Ambrose says in the littera: *The charity of many is disordered.* On the contrary: charity cannot be unformed, but is always formed; and formed charity is always ordered: therefore opposites are implied when *charity* is called *disordered.* — Likewise, he seems to speak badly in that which he subjoins: *that in the first place they put the third, or the fourth.* For if God is first to be loved, and those who put anything before God do not have charity; it seems that he speaks badly [in saying] that some have disordered charity from the fact that they put God in the third, or fourth place.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name of charity is taken *broadly* and *properly: broadly* for any love whatsoever which holds a beloved [object] greatly dear; and this can be ordered, or disordered; but he objects concerning charity taken *properly.*

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning those six grades, which the Master sets down there: *Before all things let us love God, then ourselves, after [that] our parents, then our children, then those of the household, lastly our enemies.* For in this distinction the Master, nay rather Ambrose, seems to be *superfluous,* first, because Augustine enumerates only four grades, but here he enumerates six: therefore it seems, if Augustine is not *deficient,* that this one is *superfluous. If you say* that under one of those members, namely under the love of neighbor, four of those members are contained; *it is shown* then that it is

deficient, because the love of our own body is not touched upon there. — Likewise, as there are grades in the love of neighbors, so it seems there are in the love of God: because we ought to love God the creator much, and the recreator more, and the glorifier most: therefore he insufficiently assigns the grades of love. — Likewise, there are many other conditions in which the members of Christ are joined to one another besides the aforesaid, namely the relation of *wife* to husband, of *disciple* to master, of *lord* to servant, of *subject* to prelate, all of which Ambrose omits: therefore he seems to assign the order of those-to-be-loved insufficiently.

It is asked therefore concerning the number and sufficiency of these grades.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was said, the order assigned by Augustine regards charity itself *in itself;* therefore it is attended to according to the principal differences of good, which are the good *above* us and *within* us and *beside* us and *below* us. But the order of Ambrose regards charity itself, as it is *in nature,* which it directs and rules; and here it is attended to not only in respect to the *differences of good,* but also in respect to the *account* of one's own and another's, of near and far: and here the order is multiplied into six differences.

For charity either regards good *simply,* which is the highest Good, and thus it is the *first* grade; or it regards one's *own* good, and thus it is the *second* grade; or it regards *another's* good as joined to oneself, and thus the grade is fourfold, according as the difference of the *mode of joining* is fourfold. For either there is a joining in *the conformity of nature,* and thus it is the *last* grade, which is attended to in the love of enemies; or in *the conformity of nature* and *the familiarity of common life,* and thus it is the *next-to-last*, which is attended to in the love of those of the household; or in *these* and beyond these in *the nearness of blood,* and this can be in two ways: either in *ascending,* and thus it is [the love] of son toward father; or in *descending,* and thus it is [the love] of father toward son, and in respect to these two *intermediate* grades are taken. — And thus the number and sufficiency of those six grades is evident, the dissolution of the objections is also evident.

For to that which is objected concerning Augustine, the response is already evident, because the order of those-to-be-loved is assigned in one way by Augustine, in another by Ambrose.

To that which is objected concerning the love of our own body, it must be said that this is reduced to the love of oneself.

But to that which is objected, that there are grades in the love of God; it must be said that it is false, because there is one God [who is] loved, and those [grades] are nothing but accounts moving toward the loving of God and leading us according to more and less, which nevertheless do not constitute on the part of the [object] loved a diversity of grades.

To that which is objected concerning the other conditions according to which the bond and conjunction is attended to; it must be said that all can be reduced to these. For the wife, since she is the flesh of the husband, and conversely, is reduced to the love of oneself; but the spiritual father is reduced to the love of the natural father; the other blood-relations to the love of the son; lord and servant, master and disciple are referred to those of the household. And thus it is evident that nothing superfluous, nothing also deficient, is contained in the aforesaid grades.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the solution of that question which the Master proposes there: *It is also wont to be asked: if our parents are evil* etc. For there seem to be reasons on either side. For by reason of nearness it seems that evil parents are to be preferred to good strangers, since parents are placed in the third grade; but by reason of goodness the contrary seems [the case]. And *if you should respond* that there is no contrariety, because by diverse respects they can be preferred to one another and stand as exceeding and exceeded; this does not solve [it], because the question still remains, which of them more excels, whether goodness, or nearness. And that [it is] goodness, seems [the case], since charity through itself and first regards goodness. That again [it is] nearness, seems [the case], because in respect to it the order of charity is attended to and assigned.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a love of *complacency* and a love of *beneficence.* By the love of *complacency* one loves someone when he accepts his deeds and approves him and takes complacency in his goodness. But by the love of *beneficence* one loves someone when he wishes to do him good and loves him, not only *because* he is good, but *that* he may be good. As regards the first love, *goodness* weighs; as regards the second, *nearness* weighs. Whence granted that my father be evil, and some other stranger be good; I ought more to will and desire and procure that my father be good and remain in charity than [that] some other stranger [should], although I ought not to approve him and his deeds so long as he is in the state of sin. — And by this the response to the proposed question is evident, the response to the objections is also evident.

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *This is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren.* For it is objected against this: that, if this is perfect charity, that one be ready to die for the brethren; since a man established in imperfect charity is not ready to die for God, it seems that the perfect [man] loves his *neighbor* more than the imperfect [man loves] *God.* But against this is: that charity, however small, loves God for His own sake and above all things; but this the perfect [man] never does toward his neighbor.

Alongside this it is asked: since charity is the noblest work of God, and the works of God are perfect; it seems that all charity is perfect: badly therefore is it here distinguished by *perfect* and *imperfect.*

Alongside this also it could be asked how imperfect charity has [the capacity] to be perfected and increased; but this was determined in the first book, distinction seventeen, and in the second, distinction twenty-seven.

**I respond:** It must be said that the *sign* of perfect charity and [its] *effect* is the readiness of dying for a brother; yet this readiness is not in charity from the love of a brother alone, but from the love of a brother referred to the love of God, whom the perfect [man] loves for His own sake and above all things and for love of whom he wishes to die even for the brother himself. Therefore, although this is not found in an imperfect man in respect to *God,* it nevertheless does not follow that he loves God less than the perfect [man] loves his neighbor, but that the love of the one is less in respect to God than [the love] of the other.

To that which is objected, that charity is always perfect; it must be said that *perfect* is said in two ways: either *in itself,* or *in order*. Speaking of perfection *in itself,* charity in its beginning is imperfect, but is perfected by increase. But speaking of the perfection *of order,* by which perfection indeed all the works of God are said to be perfect; thus charity, in whatever state it be, has perfection, because it is ordered to its end and can elicit the due operation. — Otherwise perfection is distinguished into [that] of *sufficiency* and [that] of *excellence,* or perfection according to *nature* and according to *time,* as was explained in the second book, distinction four.

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that charity, when it shall have come to perfection, says: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.* Against this is, that blessed Martin, who had very perfect charity, said at death: « Lord, if I am still necessary to your people, I do not refuse the labor ». — Likewise, this same thing seems [evident] by reason, because it is a sign of greater perfection to desire to labor and be afflicted for someone than to desire to rest with him: therefore it seems that it does not pertain to perfect charity to say: *I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ,* but rather: I desire to labor for Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that the desire of resting with Christ can come from a twofold cause: either on account of *weariness of present evils,* or on account of *contempt of earthly things* and an abundant *foretaste of heavenly things.* In the first way it is a sign of *imperfection,* not of perfection, because thus he refuses to labor; in the second way it is a sign of *perfection,* because he does not refuse to labor, but the spirit is bound by so great a longing of the love of Christ that it can scarcely endure the interposition of the bodily wall between itself and God; whence this is a sign that he loves God perfectly. — But the other things which are said in the littera are plain enough, and certain of them will be sufficiently explained in the next distinction.

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