Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/30/q/bon-sent-III-d30-a1-q1
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### Article unique. *On charity as regards the perfection of merit.*
### Question I. *Whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether anyone can, by however little charity, resist however great a temptation. And that he can, seems [to be the case].

1. On that [verse] of the Psalm: *The law of thy mouth is good to me* etc.; Augustine says: "Charity loves God more than cupidity [loves] thousands of gold and silver." This is true of however little charity; and if this is so, however little charity exceeds all cupidity by its power: if therefore the magnitude of a temptation is reckoned according to the magnitude of cupidity, it seems that by however little charity we can resist the greatest temptation.

2. Likewise, Gregory: "Weak is the enemy who conquers none but the willing"; but however little charity a man has, he has that whereby he is able not to will to be conquered: therefore if by not-willing to be conquered he resists every temptation and tempter, it seems that by however little charity a man can overcome every temptation.

3. Likewise, charity is more powerful for good than fault is for evil; but a mortal sin, however small, suffices to expel a great grace: therefore charity, however small it be, suffices to resist the greatest temptation.

4. Likewise, charity, however small it be, makes a man love God for His own sake and above all things, and makes a man trust in God more than in himself; but he who loves God for His own sake and above all things and trusts in God has God for a helper, and he who has God for a helper can resist every temptation: therefore a man can by however little charity overcome every temptation.

5. Likewise, grace, however slight it be, is more powerful and more excellent than nature; but a man in the state of innocence, constituted in his pure natural [powers], was able to resist however great a temptation: therefore one existing in grace can resist however great a temptation, however little charity he have.

6. Likewise, suppose that someone has slight charity and is tempted by a great temptation, either he can resist it, or he cannot. If he can, I have my point. If he cannot; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid: therefore by consenting to such a temptation he does not sin. But this is false: therefore so too is that from which it follows: thus the same conclusion as before returns.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the First [Letter] to the Corinthians, the tenth [chapter]: *God is faithful, who does not permit you to be tempted above that which you are able [to bear]*; it is settled that he is speaking to those having charity: therefore if God were to permit, the devil would tempt a man having charity beyond his power: therefore it does not seem that by however little charity a man can resist the greatest temptation.

2. Likewise, on that [verse] of the Psalm: *Prove me, O Lord, and try me*; an authority says: "First inspect our powers, and afterward permit [us] to be tried"; but he would not ask this unless he could be tried above his powers: therefore it seems that there is some temptation which the power of slight and imperfect charity does not suffice to resist.

3. Likewise, Ambrose, in a certain sermon on the Confessors: "There are diverse kinds of enemies, who struggle with us in a contest measured to the quantity of our powers"; but perfect charity has greater powers than imperfect: therefore if the former has a struggle proportioned to its powers, it seems that there is some struggle above the powers of imperfect charity.

4. Likewise, the power of charity shines forth most in the fight and in the victory of temptation: therefore if however little charity can resist the greatest temptation, it seems that slight charity is of the greatest power and perfection; and since this is manifestly false, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.

5. Likewise, the magnitude of the crown is reckoned according to the magnitude of the fight: therefore if slight charity could resist the greatest temptation, it seems that the greatest crown would be owed to the least charity. But this is manifestly false: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is a certain fight from whose victory the soul is purified of all venial [sins] and at once flies up into heaven, as is the case when death is threatened upon a man for justice' sake: therefore if slight charity could resist however great a temptation, slight charity could blot out all venial [sins] and make [one] at once fly up into heaven. But if this is absurd, the same conclusion as before remains.

### Conclusion.

> It can be granted that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, if the comparison is made both to the disposition of divine providence and to the temptation's beginning, and to the freedom of the will; but it must be denied of charity by comparison to the consummation of the victory and to the defect of proneness [to evil] and of difficulty in the will.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether however little charity can resist however great a temptation, this can be understood in two ways: either by speaking of the power of charity by comparison to the help of governing divine providence, or by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice. According to each of these ways there was here a twofold manner of speaking.

For if we speak by comparison to the disposition of the divine governance, then some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; others, however, that one cannot. And

both could speak truly and do not contradict one another, if they are rightly understood.

For if we speak as regards the temptation's beginning, however little charity can resist however great a temptation, because God never deserts a man having charity unless he voluntarily withdraws from Him; rather, according as the war of temptation is increased, God works an increase of charity. Hence however slight the charity in a man be, he can never be cast down unwillingly by the adversary, because, according as the war grows, the help grows, if a man does what is in him. — But if we speak of the temptation as regards the consummation of the victory, then it cannot be that a man by slight charity resist the greatest temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow that an amplification of merit not arise from the victory of a great war. Hence, just as these two [statements] do not contradict but are at once true: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning of a temptation and great at the end a great temptation be resisted; and again: it is possible that by charity small at the beginning and at the end a great temptation be not resisted: thus those two opinions do not stand in each other's way.

Similarly, if we speak of the power of charity by comparison to the powers of the cooperating free choice, there was a twofold opinion. For some said that by however little charity one can resist however great a temptation; some, that one cannot. And the reason of this is: that of the powers of the free choice helped by grace one may speak in two ways: either as regards the freedom of the will, or as regards the vice of difficulty toward the good and proneness toward evil.

If therefore we speak of grace by comparison to the freedom of the will, then, since the will is of itself free to consent, and through grace is freed from the servitude of sin and cannot be compelled, it can resist however great a temptation. — But if we speak by comparison to the vice of difficulty and proneness, then it cannot resist the impulse of a strong temptation, unless the charity be so strong that by its vigor it restrains from evil against proneness and kindles toward good against difficulty. For free choice, on the one part helped by the help of grace, on the other part corrupted by the vice of concupiscence, when in it through temptation the impulse of concupiscence is aroused, according as it is aroused more and more strongly, according to this it needs a greater restraint. — And thus by diverse considerations it can still be granted of charity, by comparison to free choice, that however little charity can resist however great a temptation, and that it cannot: it can indeed, if it be compared to the lordship of freedom; it cannot, if it be compared to the vice of proneness and difficulty. And this is better seen if one considers and attends and learns by experience the state and conflict of tempted men.

From these things the response to the proposed question is plain, and likewise plain is the response to the objections. For the reasons which prove that however little charity can resist however great a temptation proceed of charity itself by comparison to God Himself helping and promoting it, and by comparison to the freedom of the will, as appears to one who looks.

Nevertheless that reason which is objected concerning sin is not valid. For what is said, that however small a sin suffices to expel however great a grace; this is not because the sin acts upon the grace itself, but because it makes free choice fail from the completion of grace. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that on this account however little grace suffices to conquer every impulse of temptation, because it is easier to fail than to do well. Yet it can be inferred that however little grace can expel every sin.

To the reasons, however, which are adduced to the opposite, the response is likewise manifest; for they proceed of charity itself by comparison to the defect of proneness and difficulty, as is plain of the first three reasons; or by comparison to the term and consummation of the victory, to which corresponds the perfection of merit and the magnitude of the reward as regards the excellence of the victory and the crown; and in this way it was granted that it cannot be that slight charity resist a great temptation, because the order of divine justice does not allow this, as was touched on before. — And along this way the last three reasons proceed; nor is it necessary to linger here further, since those reasons are of themselves plain enough to one who works them through.