Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/30/q/bon-sent-III-d30-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect.*

Fifthly it is asked whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Old Testament, Exodus twenty-three: *If you see the ass of one who hates you lying under a burden, you shall not pass by, but you shall lift it up with him*; and this same thing is said in Proverbs twenty-five: *If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink*: if therefore these commands were set forth to all, it seems that all were bound to love enemies as to effect.

2. *Likewise*, this seems from the authority of the New Testament, Matthew five: *Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you*, etc.; there a certain Gloss says: « In three ways one sins against the Church: by hatred, by words, by torment of the body. On the contrary the Church does three things: it loves, it does good, and it prays »: therefore he is not a member of the Church who does not love enemies both in affection and in effect: therefore all are bound to love in this way.

3. *Likewise*, this seems by *reason*, because the love of affection without the love of effect is not true love; « for the proof of love is the showing forth of work »: if therefore all are bound to love enemies with a true love, it seems that all are bound to love enemies not only in affection, but also in effect.

4. *Likewise*, our own flesh is a more pernicious enemy than any neighbor of ours; but we are bound to nourish and cherish our rebellious flesh as to its nature: therefore if we are bound the more to love our neighbors, it seems all the more forcibly that we ought not only to love them in affection, but also in effect to nourish and cherish them and to share benefits with them.

5. *Likewise*, a man takes vengeance on another not only by inflicting evil, but also by withholding good; but all are bound not to seek vengeance, according to what is said in Leviticus nineteen, and to the Romans twelve: *Not avenging yourselves*: therefore all are bound not to withhold any good on account of an injury received. If therefore all are bound to love those who are not enemies, in affection equally and in effect; it seems that likewise all are bound to love enemies in both ways.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is frequently commanded in the Law that they should kill their enemies, as is commanded in Exodus twenty-three: *You shall not enter into a covenant with them*, etc.: therefore it seems that in the old Law they were not bound to love enemies as to effect: therefore by parity of reasoning neither are the imperfect bound in the new.

2. *Likewise*, on that text of Matthew five: *Love your enemies*; a certain Gloss says: « The summit of perfection is to love enemies and to pray for them »: if therefore not all are bound to the summit of perfection, not all are bound to love enemies in effect.

3. *Likewise*, Augustine in the Enchiridion — and it is contained in the text — says that to love enemies and to do good to them does not belong to as many as are heard in the Lord's Prayer: if therefore in the Lord's Prayer none but the good are heard, it seems that not all the good are bound to love enemies in affection equally and in effect.

4. *Likewise*, this same thing seems by the rule of the Philosopher: « If the opposite [is] in the opposite, then the proposed [is] in the proposed »: since therefore good is to be done to friends, properly speaking, it seems that evil is to be done to enemies.

5. *Likewise*, we see in every nature, both animate and inanimate, that enmity is the cause of strife, just as friendship is the cause of concord: if therefore no one ought to act against natural rectitude, it seems that it is more right according to the order of reason to fight enemies than to help them: therefore it does not seem that all are bound to love them in effect.

### Conclusion.

> *To love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation when necessity presses; but it is of perfection when only the opportunity of time presents itself.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For some have wished to say that although to love enemies *in affection* is of necessity, so that both the perfect and the imperfect are bound to it; yet to love *in affection* together with *in effect* is of supererogation and perfection; nor are the imperfect bound to it, but only the perfect. — But this manner of speaking includes in itself a contradiction: *first* indeed, because by the same command it is commanded to love enemies and to do good to them. If therefore that command is general, it seems that generally all are bound to both. — And *again*, the perfect, as to the obligation which is through a command, are bound to nothing to which the imperfect are not bound, because the commands of God are set forth to all generally. If therefore by that command the perfect are bound to love an enemy both in affection and in effect, it seems likewise that the same is to be said of the imperfect. — *Further*, if true love consists not only in the heart, but is also manifested in work; to say that the rest are bound only to love in heart, not to love in work, when the opportunity of time and place presents itself, seems to say the same as if we were bound to love enemies *feignedly*. — *Besides these*, the love of enemies is included in the command concerning love of neighbor; and it is established that that command is understood as to affection and effect, and to that command all are bound. And therefore the aforesaid response cannot stand.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that to love in exterior effect can be twofold: either whenever the opportunity of time presents itself, or when necessity presses. If we speak of the showing forth of exterior work generally, when the opportunity of time presents itself; thus to love enemies in effect is « the summit of perfection ». But if we speak of the showing forth of work when necessity presses; thus to love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation; because, if anyone sees his neighbor, whether friend or enemy, to be in need, and shuts his heart against him, according to the saying of blessed John, the charity of God is no longer in him. — Thus therefore it is clear that, just as to love in affection is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection; so to love in effect is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection and supererogation. And according to this manner the diverse authorities of the Saints, which seem to conflict with one another concerning the love of enemies, can be resolved.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also for the greater part clear. For the reasons which show that all are bound to love their enemies in effect are to be understood in the case of necessity. But the authorities which are adduced to the contrary are to be understood of the showing forth of work more generally, namely when the opportunity of fittingness presents itself.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that if good is to be done to friends, then evil is to be done to enemies; it must be said that it does not follow, on account of the fact that good is to be done to friends not only on account of that in which they differ from enemies, but also on account of that in which they agree, namely because they are to the image of God. Hence just as that argument is not valid: *white is visible, therefore black is invisible*; because white is visible through that in which it shares with black: so neither is the foregoing reasoning.

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that according to the order of nature enmity induces strife; it must be said that this is true where the enmity is ordered according to the order of nature, as hot is at enmity with cold, and moist with dry; but where there is an enmity beyond the order of nature, there is no strife according to nature, but rather against nature. And such is the case in men; because, since « man

is by nature a gentle animal », according to the natural order he ought to have peace and concord with all. Hence in his enemy a man ought not to hate the nature, but only the fault; because it is not the nature, which God made, that pursues him, but the malice, which man made, as Augustine says. But the other things which are objected are sufficiently made clear by the things which have been said.