Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/30/q/bon-sent-III-d30-a1-q6
----------------------------------------
### Question VI. *Whether it is of greater perfection and merit to love a friend, or to love an enemy.*

Sixth and last it is asked, which is of greater perfection and merit, whether to love a friend, or to love an enemy. And that to love an enemy [is so], it seems.

1. Matthew chapter five: *If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have?* The Gloss, there: « None in heaven »; but it is established that for the love of enemies a great reward is had: therefore it is of greater perfection and merit to love enemies than to love friends.

2. Likewise, to love enemies is among the things superadded by the Lord in the Gospel; but the Lord superadded only those things which were of greater perfection: it seems therefore that it is of greater perfection to love enemies than to love friends.

3. Likewise, where there is greater struggle, there the victory is more glorious; and where there is greater difficulty, there is the greater account of virtue and of merit, on the ground that « art and virtue are concerned with what is difficult »; but the struggle and difficulty in loving enemies is greater than in loving friends: therefore greater perfection and merit reside in the love of enemies than in the love of friends.

4. Likewise, the more a man is raised above himself in some movement of virtue, the more that movement and action is more perfect and more excellent; but in the love of enemies a man is raised more above himself and above the things that belong to nature than in the love of friends: therefore the movement of love toward enemies is more meritorious and perfect than the movement of love toward friends.

5. Likewise, the more the movement of love is perfect, the more it is liberal and pure — for spiritual love is pure and liberal — but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more liberal than toward friends: purer indeed, because it has less admixture of carnality; more liberal, because it has less of the necessity of obligation: therefore it seems that it is much more perfect and more acceptable to God and more efficacious for meriting.

**On the contrary:** 1. The love of enemies is placed by Ambrose in the last degree: therefore that love recedes most from the first degree of love, which is the greatest and most noble; but the more anything recedes from the first and highest in that genus, the less it has of perfection and completion: if then the love of enemies recedes more, and the love of friends approaches more; therefore it seems that the movement of love toward friends is much more perfect and more excellent than toward enemies.

2. Likewise, the more excellent love is, the more like to the love of God; but God loves more those who love him, according to that which is said in Proverbs chapter eight: *I love those who love me:* therefore the love of friends is more assimilated to the love of God than the love of enemies; therefore it is much more perfect.

3. Likewise, the movement of love is so much better and more excellent, the more fervent and more frequent it is; but the movement of charity toward friends is more fervent and more frequent than toward enemies: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more the movement of love is right and has of rectitude and equity, the better and more excellent it is in itself; but it is more equitable and just to love friends than enemies: therefore this movement of love is better than that.

5. Likewise, in that which is better and more perfect a man ought more to exercise himself: therefore if the movement of love toward enemies were better and more perfect, more frequently ought a man to be affected toward them and to pray for them. But if this is unfitting to say, that a man ought more to pray for enemies than for friends, because this would be to pervert the order of charity: therefore it remains that it is not a greater good to love enemies than friends.

### Conclusion

> If the acts of either love are compared to diverse habits, it is more excellent to love enemies than friends; but if [compared] to the same [habit], they mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since it is asked concerning the comparison of these two movements of love, of which one is toward friends, the other toward enemies; it can be asked in two ways: either insofar as they are compared to diverse habits and roots, or insofar as they are compared to the same. — If they are compared as to diverse roots and habits, such that one habit qualifies only for friends, while the other extends even to enemies; then without doubt it is much greater and more excellent to love enemies than friends; and we have need of a much more perfect habit for this, that we may go forth into this act, than for this, that we may go forth into the other. And this is what Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, and is found in the [Master's] text: « It is a great thing to be benevolent and beneficent toward one who has done you no evil; but that other is far greater and of most magnificent goodness, that you love even your enemy ».

But if we speak of these acts insofar as they are compared to the same root and proceed from the same charity; then in a certain way they are equal and in a certain way mutually exceed one another. For as to the account of meriting with respect to the substantial reward they have equality, because the quantity of that reward corresponds to the quantity of the root; but as to the account of meriting with respect to the accidental reward and as to the vigor of the act and movement itself, they mutually exceed one another. For the movement of love toward friends exceeds as to fervor and frequency; but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more difficult; and so in a certain way one of these movements is greater than the other, and conversely, according to the varying mode of taking greatness. For in the love of friends the virtue of charity is exercised more intensively, but in the love of enemies it is exercised more extensively; just as the virtue of the heat of fire warms nearer things more amply than more remote ones, and in a certain way the efficacy of that virtue appears more in those things which are near, in a certain way in those which are far off: by reason of intensity more in the warming of near things, and by reason of extension more in the warming of distant things. So also in the matter proposed it is to be understood that the love of friends and the love of enemies, insofar as they proceed from the same root, mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions and respects. — And according to this the arguments which are adduced to the diverse sides can be resolved; for they proceed by diverse ways, according to which both can conclude the truth without contradiction.

But if it be further asked, which of these two movements, all things weighed, exceeds the other; here there are diverse opinions. For some wish to say that that movement which is toward a friend is better, because it is more intense, and has more of the account of the good; and this manner of speaking the Master seems to approve in the text. — And if we should wish to maintain this manner, which seems probable enough, it can be replied to the arguments which are first adduced, that they proceed from an insufficient [ground]. For when it is said that a movement, the more difficult and purer and more above the powers of nature it is, the more perfect and excellent; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal. But when one assumes concerning the movement of love of enemies that it is of this kind; it can be replied that other things are not equal, because the movement of love toward friends is much greater and more fervent than that one is.

But there is another manner of speaking, that the love of enemies is more excellent, speaking absolutely, and in it the perfection of charity is more exercised. And if we should wish to maintain this manner, since the authority of Augustine seems to make it probable enough, it can be replied to the things which are adduced to the contrary.

1. To the first which is objected concerning the order of those to be loved, it can be said that Ambrose in those degrees does not intend to lay down or assign degrees of perfection in love, but degrees of exhibition according to greater and lesser obligation.

2. To that which is objected, that the love of friends is more like to the love of God; it can be replied by interception; because the perfection of the divine love is more manifested in this, that he loved us when we were enemies, than if we were friends, according to that of the Apostle to the Romans chapter five: *But God commends his charity in us, in that, while we were yet sinners, in due time Christ died for us.* Hence although in the love of friends the charity of God be shown to be great, in the love of enemies it is shown to be exceeding;

according to that to the Ephesians chapter two: *On account of his exceeding charity, with which he loved us* etc.

3. To that which is objected, that the movement of love is so much better, the more fervent; it must be said that this is true, where there is equal difficulty and resistance. But where there is not equal difficulty, as in the matter proposed, it does not hold true; which is plain, because a small fire burns up hay sooner than a great fire perhaps burns up wood.

4. To that which is objected, that the more the movement of love is right, the more perfect; it must be said that it is true. But when one assumes that the movement of love toward a friend is more right and equitable; it must be answered by a distinction, that greater equity can be in two ways: either on account of the exigency of merits and of dignity on the part of the one loved, and thus it is more equitable to love a friend than an enemy; or on account of more abundant rectitude on the part of the one loving, and thus it is not more equitable to love a friend than an enemy, but rather the converse, because this is of a more abundant justice than that.

5. To that which is objected, that a man ought more to exercise himself in that which is of greater perfection; it can be replied that in the exhibition of some benefit and the execution of some act a man can exercise himself with a double intention: either for the advancement of another, or for his own merit; nor ought a man in his works to regard only his own merit, but also the advancement of his neighbor. Although therefore in the exercise concerning the love of an enemy there is a greater way of advancing and gaining and arriving at perfection; yet because a man is more obligated to a friend than to an enemy, he ought more frequently to exercise himself in the love of a friend. Hence as to what he says, that we ought more to exercise ourselves in those things which are of greater perfection; it must be said that this is not everywhere true, but rather we ought to exercise ourselves more in those things which are of greater obligation. — And thus it is plain how either side can quite reasonably be maintained.