Dist. 30, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/30/q/bon-sent-III-d30-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: *The answer is obscure, because the judgment is not easy, whether one and the same movement is toward a friend and toward an enemy.* For this seems to be simply false, because, since acts are diversified by their objects, and a friend and an enemy are diverse objects and diverse things-to-be-loved; it is impossible that one should love a friend and an enemy by one movement. — Likewise, a simple and finite power, to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly; but a man, by loving a friend, turns himself to him: therefore it does not seem that by one and the same movement, simultaneously and at once, he can love a friend and an enemy.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although what the Master says here is not altogether well intelligible, we can nevertheless expound both [statements] and uphold him in two ways. First thus: for it happens that one is affected toward someone in two ways: either properly and distinctly and under a proper account, or in a certain generality together with others; as, for example, one can be affected in two ways in loving Peter: either because he is affected specially with respect to him, or because he thinks generally that every man is to be loved, and is affected generally with respect to every man, according as the order of charity requires. — If the movement of love toward a friend is taken in the first way, then one and the same movement which is toward a friend cannot be toward an enemy, as the reasons adduced show. But if in the second way, then it can be the same; and in this way the Master takes it, when he says that there can be one [movement] with respect to both.

But it can be upheld otherwise, by distinguishing that it happens in two ways that some power is moved toward an object: either by a simple and absolute movement, or by a comparative movement and one in a certain way composite. If we speak of a simple and absolute movement, then there cannot be one

and the same [movement] toward a friend and an enemy; rather they are diverse, of which one is more intense and the other more remiss. — But if [we speak] of a comparative movement, by which one is affected concerning two things, preferring one to the other; then there can be one movement, according as the Master says, in some respect of itself more intense, but in some respect more remiss. — And according to this the response to the things objected is clear. For those two [objections] proceed from a simple and absolute act, which is with respect to one object only; but a comparative act can be with respect to two under the account of one.

To that which is objected, that the power of affection cannot be turned simultaneously, the response is clear. For from this it is not concluded that there cannot be one comparative movement, because in it there is to be found a before and an after.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about the words of Augustine, which he says in the text: *Without doubt the words of this promise are fulfilled, if a man, who has not so far advanced as to love his enemy, nevertheless forgives when he is asked by the man who has sinned.* But against this is: because, if he does not forgive before he is asked, he keeps anger toward his neighbor; and if he keeps anger, he does not have charity: therefore in his prayer he is not worthy of being heard, nor does it seem that he prays rightly. — Likewise, as was proved in what precedes, all are bound to love their enemies, even those who exercise enmities: therefore all are bound, even unasked, to forgive them offenses.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is forgiving *rancor*, and there is forgiving *the signs of rancor*. To forgive rancor is of necessity; and to this all are obliged, and to this a man is bound, whether the enemy attacks or asks pardon. But to forgive not only rancor, but also the signs of rancor, this is of perfection, nor is a man bound to this except in a [particular] case, namely when pardon is sought devoutly and humbly. — And of this forgiveness Augustine speaks; but the objections run on another [kind]. And through this both the text and the objections are clear.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Whoever does not forgive one who asks, let him not suppose that his sins are forgiven by the Lord.* It seems therefore, according to this, that everyone who keeps rancor toward his neighbor prays against himself, because, since he is unwilling to forgive another, he already asks by consequence that neither should God forgive him: and one who asks that God should not forgive sins mortally: therefore everyone who is in rancor and says the Lord's Prayer seems to sin mortally.

**I respond:** It must be said that everyone who says the Lord's Prayer from the heart intends by it to obtain the bestowal of goods and the remission of evils; and one who intends to attain this from the Lord, it is certain that either he repents, or he proposes to repent at some time. Although therefore someone may have hatred, nevertheless in saying the Lord's Prayer he does not incur a mortal offense, because he does not intend to ask that it be done to him according to the evil will which he now has, but according to the good will which, although he does not have it then, he nevertheless intends at some time to obtain by God's help. But if someone were to say that prayer, never proposing to withdraw from hatred of his brother, although he would not intend to ask for anger, he would nevertheless without doubt aggravate his own fault. — Yet it could be said otherwise, that when someone says this prayer, he does not say it in his own person, but in the person of the Church, of which he wishes to be a member. And as to this he asks nothing against himself, neither by a principal intention nor by consequence.

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