Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/31/q/bon-sent-III-d31-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the duration of charity in comparison with the habits of the other virtues.*

Consequently it is asked about the duration of charity in comparison with the habits of the other virtues, which are said to be voided. And concerning this three things are asked according to the threefold habit which the Master says is to be voided.

First it is asked about the voiding of faith.
Second about the voiding of hope itself.
Third about the voiding of knowledge itself.

### Question I. *Whether faith is voided in glory.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether faith is voided in glory. And that it is, seems true:

1. Because, according to what the Apostle says, *faith is the argument of things that do not appear*; on which Gregory says that "the things which appear do not have faith, but recognition": if therefore in the fatherland all the things which we now believe will be manifest, it seems that faith will simply be voided.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* fourteen: "For when the human mind sees its own faith, by which it believes what it does not see, it does not see anything everlasting. For when we shall rejoice that we have been led through faith to vision, then there will no longer be faith, by which things not seen are believed, but vision, by which things believed are seen": therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the ground of voiding which the Apostle assigns is imperfection — for he says: *When that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be voided* — but it is established that the cognition of faith is *in part*, since it is *through a mirror* and *in an enigma*: therefore it is necessary that it be voided, when the vision of vision supervenes.

4. Likewise, to believe what is manifest does not pertain to the habit of any virtue, since it is simply a matter of necessity; but in the fatherland all the things which we believe will be made manifest: therefore to believe there will not proceed from any habit of virtue. But the habit of faith itself, speaking essentially, is a virtue: if therefore the character of virtue is there taken away, it is necessary that it be voided and removed as to its essence.

**On the contrary** it is argued first on the part of faith itself, which is to be voided, then on the part of that through which the thing comes to be voided. On the part of faith itself it is argued:

1. First by reason of its genus, thus. Faith is in the genus of virtue simply, and what is more, in the genus of theological virtue; but virtue is the perfection of a power, and a theological virtue is a greater perfection than a cardinal one; but the perfection of glory does not remove the perfection of a power nor void those things which are in the genus of cardinal virtue, because those virtues, as Augustine says, will remain in the fatherland: therefore since faith is not only a virtue, but also a theological virtue, it seems that it is in no way to be voided through glory.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the essence and definition of faith itself: because *faith* according to the Apostle *is the foundation of things to be hoped for*, according to Augustine it is "*the illumination of the mind for seeing God*"; but when glory comes, the foundation of the spiritual edifice is not destroyed, but rather made firm, the illumination is not excluded, but rather perfected and completed: therefore it seems that the habit of faith is not voided through glory.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of its *principal act*. For the principal act of faith itself is *to assent* to the first Truth on account of itself and above all things, and *to will* to believe it or to have believed it — for it belongs to the same habit to will to believe and to will to have believed — but in the fatherland we shall assent to the first Truth on account of itself and above all things, we shall also will to have believed God: we shall therefore have the principal act of faith: therefore also faith itself.

Likewise, this is shown on the part of *that through which* faith is said to be voided.

4. For the habit of faith itself is more repugnant to the deformity of *sin* than to the perfection of glory: but the habit of faith is not removed nor voided through the darkness of sin: therefore neither through the completion of glory.

5. Likewise, *morning cognition* in the angels does not exclude evening cognition, but rather they know things at the same time in the Word and in their proper genus: therefore the vision of God in his proper essence and nature does not exclude the vision of him in a mirror and in the creature; but the vision of faith is a specular vision: therefore it does not come to be voided through the vision of glory.

6. Likewise, *light with light* has no opposition, neither in bodily things nor in spiritual, as is plain: because in the same medium many lights can be unmingled, as Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*; likewise also in spiritual things the light of cognition through a cause does not exclude the light of cognition through an effect: therefore it does not seem that the light of faith is voided through the glorious light; nor does it come to be voided through anything else: it remains therefore that the habit of faith is not voided.

### Conclusion.

> The habit of faith will be simply removed through the vision of glory.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For to some it seems that it must be said that when it is asked whether faith is voided, one must not answer simply by affirming or by denying: for in a certain respect it is voided and in a certain respect it is not. For in faith itself two things are to be found, namely the *aptitude of illumination* and the *obscurity of enigma*. As to the *habit of light* faith is not voided, but perfected and consummated; but as to the *obscurity of enigma*, since it is in part, it is simply removed. — And this manner of speaking seems able to be confirmed by that which is said in the Gloss on that text of the first to the Corinthians, thirteen: *When that which is perfect has come* etc.; the Gloss: "The imperfection will be destroyed, not that which is true will be voided; there is a ceasing of imperfection, when that which is of imperfection is fulfilled." — And according to this manner of speaking it is easy to turn aside the arguments on both sides. For the first, which prove that the habit of faith is voided, conclude by reason of enigma and imperfection; but the arguments to the opposite conclude about faith itself as to the perfection of the habit and the completion of the light.

But although this manner of speaking seems probable enough, nevertheless it does not agree with the words of Augustine. For Augustine says in *On the Trinity* fourteen: "Faith, which is now in our mind as a body in a place, while it is held, is beheld and loved, effects a certain trinity. But it will not be itself, when this faith will not be in the mind; but that which will then be, when we shall now remember that it was in us and is not, will be another perfection." In which words he means, as is plain from the example which he sets out a little before this, that just as some body which a man beholds with the senses is corrupted, and, it being corrupted, he remembers that body not through the truth of the body itself, but through the likeness remaining in the mind; so also in faith itself. Hence he means that we should reckon the habit of our faith, which we behold inwardly, among *temporal* things; and because it sometimes fails, the character of the image, which is perpetual in the soul, cannot be attended to as to the beholding of that habit. But it is established that he is speaking of the habit of faith itself, according to that which it has of position and perfection, because according to that the soul beholds that habit within itself; otherwise that whole reasoning, which he carries on there quite at length, would have no force. — Neither does it seem to agree with the words of the Gloss and of the Apostle: because, if faith were voided only according to that which it has of imperfection, and remained according to that which is in it of completion and position: just as the cardinal virtues are not said to be voided nor the habit of charity, so neither would the habit of faith be said to be voided, but rather perfected and completed.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, more common and customary, that if we speak of the habit of faith, according as faith is a special virtue, so it comes to be simply voided through glory: for the reason that faith is a habit of virtue, inasmuch as the intellect is inclined by the affect, as was shown in the preceding; but this cannot be, except so long as the intellect is of itself uncertain about those things which it ought to believe. And since in the fatherland the illumination and clarity of vision will precede the motion of the *affection*; nor will the intellect be inclined by it on account of the clarity of that supreme light itself, from which the intellect will in no way be able to dissent: hence it is that the habit of faith comes *simply* to be removed through the vision of glory, according as the authorities of the Saints and the Gloss say quite expressly. — Hence the arguments which are for this side are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary on the part of *genus*, that it is a theological virtue, which perfects the power of the soul according to its more worthy part; it must be said that faith is the perfection of a power not of any kind whatever, but according to the state of imperfection and of the way, in which the intellect can stray from the truth and be taken captive on the way. Hence it is not voided because it is perfection *simply*, but because it is perfection *according to such a state*. Nor is it alike with the cardinal virtues, because their more principal acts

not only perfect the powers themselves according to the state of the way, but also according to the state of the fatherland.

2. To that which is objected on the part of the *definition*, it must be said that faith is not the substance or foundation *simply* of things to be hoped for, but only *according to that state* in which eternal goods are awaited; likewise it is not the illumination for seeing God *simply*, but for seeing God *through a mirror*. And since to this state there will succeed another state, in which there will be a more stable *foundation* and a more perfect *illumination*; hence it is that faith is voided not on account of the destruction of the foundation, but on account of the construction of something more stable; not on account of the privation of light, but on account of the perfection of light, which excludes specular and imperfect cognition.

3. To that which is objected concerning the *act* of faith, which is to assent to the first Truth and to will to believe or to have believed; it must be said that neither is an act of faith, except inasmuch as a man assents to a truth not seen, in which assent and credence the intellect is inclined by the will; and because this is not to be found in the fatherland, those acts are not in the fatherland from the habit of faith, but from a more excellent virtue.

4. To that which is objected, that the *darkness of sin* is more repugnant to faith itself than the excellence of the reward; it must be said that there are two ways of speaking of the habit of faith: either inasmuch as it is a habit *distinct* from the other virtues, or inasmuch as it is *informed by grace*. If inasmuch as it is *informed by grace*, so the proposed statement holds true; for the grace informative of that habit is removed through fault, but not through glory. But if we speak of faith itself, according as it is a *distinct* habit, fitting one to believe what is not seen; so on account of its imperfection it has a greater opposition to the state of glory than to the state of sin; and therefore it comes to be voided through glory, although it does not come to be removed through sin.

5. To that which is objected, that morning cognition does not exclude evening cognition, nor does vision in vision exclude vision in a mirror; it must be said that it is one thing to say, to see a thing *in a mirror* and *through a mirror*. For he is said to see God *through a mirror* who ascends from the cognition of the creature to the cognition of the Creator; but he sees *in a mirror* who beholds God clearly in the creature itself. The first vision will not be in glory, because there will not be there a necessary ladder; but the second will be, because God will be seen openly in all creatures, as Augustine says in the last book *On the City of God*. And that vision which is *through a mirror* pertains to faith itself; but that which is *in a mirror* of the creature pertains to *evening* cognition, which will be well able to be preserved in the fatherland. And therefore it is not alike with faith and with that cognition.

And it must be attended to here that vision *through vision* differs more from vision *through a mirror* as to the cognition of *God* himself than as to the cognition of any sensible creature. For if some *sensible creature* be seen in its proper nature and be seen *through some mirror* in which it is reflected; there is no difference between this vision and that except in this, that the one is through vision according to a *simple* direction, the other is through vision according to a *reflex* direction; and therefore from one and the same eye and according to every state a vision can be had of the same thing seen. But in the vision of *God* himself, which is *through vision* and *through a mirror*, the difference is greater: both on the part of the *seer*, because in one of them the cognitive power is shadowed, in the other illumined; likewise on the part of the *medium*, because in the one God is seen through his essence, in the other through a created effect. And therefore one of these cognitions is in *rest* and station, the other in *progress*, according as the Apostle says: *Through faith we walk*; and therefore the one is removed through the other.

6. To that which is objected, that *light* is not repugnant to *light*; it must be said that this is true, as far as concerns the *nature* of light. Nevertheless it well happens that one light is voided by another by reason of some inseparable *appendage*, or of a preceding *disposition*, or of a consequent *effect*. And so it is in the light of faith, which has an *enigma* appended; and from this it arises that the intellect is inclined by the affect and directs a man to knowing what is not seen. And since the interposition of that enigma is removed, that inclination too is removed, no less is removed the fitting toward knowing things not seen — since it will be impossible to be absent from that supernal light — hence it is that the light of faith, which is proper to that habit, although not by reason of itself, yet by reason of its *appendages* comes to be voided when glory supervenes. But this I say of the light which is proper to faith; for of the light of *sanctifying grace* it must be held that it does not come to be voided through glory, but rather consummated.