Dist. 31, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/31/q/bon-sent-III-d31-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether charity is dilated in the fatherland.*

Secondly it is asked, whether charity is to be dilated in the fatherland. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Breadth belongs to the perfection of charity: if therefore charity in the fatherland is made more perfect, it necessarily follows that it is made broader.

2. Likewise, the more God dwells in the heart, the more the heart of man is dilated unto good things; but God will dwell in man in a more excellent manner in the state of the fatherland than in the state of the way: therefore the habit of charity in the fatherland has more of breadth.

3. Likewise, the greater the virtue and goodness is, the more ample and more liberal is its diffusion; but in the fatherland charity will grow according to virtue and goodness: therefore, and consequently, it will grow according to the amplitude of its communication.

4. Likewise, affection follows cognition; but in the fatherland cognition will be dilated and amplified: therefore it is necessary that the affection of charity be likewise dilated.

**On the contrary:** 1. "The more a virtue is united, the more it is infinite"; but in the fatherland the virtue of charity will be most powerful: therefore it will be most united. But what most approaches unity most recedes from breadth: if therefore charity in the fatherland is the more united, it seems that there it rather is to be straitened than dilated.

2. Likewise, on the way we love the foreknown and the predestined, but in the fatherland the predestined only: therefore the love of the way extends itself to more than the love of the fatherland; but the love which extends itself to more is broader: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the breadth of charity is most of all regarded in the love of enemies; but on the way we love not only friends but also enemies, whereas in glory enemies will not be loved: therefore it seems that charity in the fatherland rather is to be straitened than dilated.

4. Likewise, the charity of the way loves every lovable thing — both what is *above*, and what is *below*, and what is *beside*, and what is *within* — according to what Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*: but there cannot be more lovable things, nor more distant from one another: if therefore the breadth of charity is regarded with respect to the multitude and distance of the things to be loved, it seems that charity cannot be more ample in the fatherland than it is on the way.

### Conclusion.

> Charity in the fatherland will be dilated as to the magnitude of its liberality, not as to the multitude of the things to be loved, which in a certain manner will be restricted.

**I respond:** It must be said that the breadth of charity is to be regarded in two ways, namely in the *magnitude of liberality* and in the *multitude of the things to be loved*. The first breadth is essential to charity, but the *second* is accidental to it. As to the *first* breadth it must be conceded that charity is dilated in the fatherland, because its goodness and the liberality of its communication and the praiseworthiness of its power grow. But as to the *second* breadth charity in the fatherland will not be dilated, but rather will be restricted — not by reason of charity itself in itself, but on the part of the lovable things; for the lovable things will be fewer. For now there are to be loved out of charity both those who are in the state of the *fatherland* and those who are in the state of the *way*, who are ordered so that they may be able to arrive at that state; but after the consummation of the number of the elect, only those will be loved out of charity who will be in the state of the *fatherland*, because the others will not be able to arrive at participation in that highest Good.

It must be conceded therefore that charity in the fatherland will be dilated as to the magnitude of liberality. For God will be loved with a more ample affection in himself and in his creatures, so much so that he who now seems to be remote, in the fatherland is most beloved; and charity will then enfold within itself all the Blessed more than now a man can affectionately love even one most-loved friend. And because the reasons for the first part show this, therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that virtue more united is more infinite; it must be said that to love many things is twofold: either many things as *many*, or many things *related to one*. Since therefore in the fatherland God will be *all in all*, and in all God will be loved; hence it is that charity, from its conversion to many things and its dilation, will not be dispersed, but rather gathered together. Hence such dilation and the union of virtue have no repugnance; nay rather, one of these conditions follows upon the other.

2. To that which is objected, that now we love the foreknown and the predestined, in the fatherland the predestined only; the response is already clear: because it speaks of breadth on the part of the *numerousness of the lovable things*. *Moreover*, when the number of the elect will be complete and gathered into one, so that each of them will be known to each, charity will then have more toward whom it can and may be affected *specially* and distinctly, than it has in the state of the way.

3. To that which is objected concerning enemies, it must be answered in like manner. For this happens because those who are in the fatherland have no enemies, but [only such as] are capable of beatitude; or they will not have, after the day of judgment, any other enemies than the damned; yet if they did have them, they would love them more than they did when they were in the state of the way.

4. To that which is lastly objected concerning the number of the things to be loved, the answer has already been given; because we do not say that charity is dilated on account of the numerousness of the things to be loved, but on account of the greater liberality of affection. *Moreover*, that reason does not compel, because, although there are not more things to be loved in *generality* than four, yet in the *special* and in the particular nothing prevents the number of the things to be loved from being increased; and when charity is converted familiarly and intensely to all these things, it is not without reason said to be dilated.

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