Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/32/q/bon-sent-III-d32-a1-q1
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### THE SOLE ARTICLE. *On the love of God himself.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether God loved creatures eternally.*

Concerning the first [matter] one proceeds thus and it is asked whether God loved creatures eternally. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Ephesians, chapter one: *He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in him;* but no one chooses except what he loves: if therefore from eternity, before the foundation of the world, he chose us, it seems that from eternity he loved us.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*: «It is absurd that God should love anything temporally»: if therefore

what he loves he loves either *temporally* or *eternally;* and not *temporally*, that is established: therefore what he loves he loves *eternally.*

3. Likewise, the Master says in the text that «love is *usia*» or substance: if therefore the substance of God cannot but be eternal, it seems that the love of God is likewise eternal: therefore whatever he loves he loves eternally.

4. Likewise, either the love of God *precedes* the things themselves, or it *follows.* If it *precedes:* then it was before the things were: therefore God loved the things before their production, therefore not from time, but from eternity. If it *follows:* then it seems that the love of God is caused by the things themselves. But if this is unfitting, it remains that God loves the things which he loves eternally.

5. Likewise, if God were made powerful from non-powerful and wise from non-wise, he would be changed and imperfect: therefore by parity of reasoning, if from non-loving he became loving; since love regards what is within, there would be in him change and imperfection. But if this is impossible, it is necessary that God love eternally the things which he loves.

**On the contrary:** 1. Love is the love of the good; but «good and being are convertible»: therefore what is not being is not lovable: therefore if things, before they were produced, did not exist; it seems that before they were produced, they were not loved by God.

2. Likewise, love is the bond of the lover and the beloved; but if there is a bond, the extremes must necessarily exist: therefore it is impossible that God love a creature, until the creature has actual existence. But this is only from time: therefore it seems that God did not love any creature eternally.

3. Likewise, God is not said to love anyone by *affection:* therefore if he loves, this is because he loves by *effect;* but the effect of the divine goodness is only from time: therefore God loves no one except temporally.

4. Likewise, the love of God is the sufficient and proximate and immediate cause of the created good; but the efficient cause being posited, proximate and immediate and sufficient, the effect is posited: therefore if created things are only from time, it seems that God loves them only temporally.

5. Likewise, if God loves creatures, either he loves them as *enjoying*, or as *using;* but it is established that he does not love them as *enjoying*, since a creature is not something to be enjoyed, as

was shown in the first book, since that which is to be enjoyed is the highest Good: it remains therefore that if he loves a creature, he loves it as *using.* But it is established that one cannot *use* except that which is in act: therefore God never loves a creature except one being in act: therefore he does not love any creature eternally.

> ### Conclusion.
> Creatures are loved by God not only temporally, but also eternally.

**I respond:** It must be said that certain words are said of God with respect to a creature which connote an effect in *act*, like the word *to create;* certain ones which connote an effect in *habit*, like the term *to predestine;* certain ones which [connote] indifferently in *either way*, like the term *to love.* For God is said *to love* someone either because he *actually communicates* a good to him, or because he *proposes to communicate* it. And since *communication* is an effect in time, while the *proposal* of communicating is from eternity; hence it is that *to love* is said of God sometimes *eternally*, sometimes *temporally.* Hence it can well be conceded that creatures are loved by God not only temporally, but also eternally, as the reasons adduced for the first part show. — Nevertheless that reason which he brings forward as if *by way of similitude* concerning power and wisdom does not hold, since it is not similar. For *to be able* and *to know*, as far as concerns the force of the word, do not connote an effect in *act* in the way that *to love* does. For the word *to love* is imposed from the very liberality of an affection communicating itself to another.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary, that good and being are convertible; it must be said that this is true of the good in *act* and being in *act.* But when it is said that love is only of the good; it must be said that it is not true only of the good which is in *act*, but also of the good which is in *cause.* For just as for cognition the truth of a thing in its cause suffices, so for loving the goodness suffices, according as the thing has *being* in its producing principle, even before it is produced externally. Hence the artisan loves not only the good which he has made, but also the good which he proposes and disposes to make.

2. To that which is objected, that love is the bond of the lover and the beloved; it must be said that this is true insofar as love is a certain affection and bond of friendship, by which some are bound to one another; but in this way it is not taken in the matter at hand, when it is said that God loves a creature; for «the love of God is his *usia*», it is not some unitive affection, as the Master says in the text: and therefore that reasoning does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that God is not said to love by *affection*, but by *effect;* it must be said that *to love by effect* can be in two ways, according as the effect can be connoted in two ways: by *act*, or by *habit;* and since a thing is in *habit* and in *potency*, before it is in *act:* hence it is that the love of God, which connotes an effect in *habit*, can be before the production of the things themselves. And therefore from this it does not follow, if God is said *to love by effect*, that he then only begins to love when the effect is produced into *being.*

4. To that which is objected, that the love of God is the cause, sufficient proximate and immediate, of the created good; it must be said that this is true; but just as the divine *will* is said to be an *immediate cause*, because no other cause intervenes, yet not such that it always posits the effect, but only for the time for which it wills, as it willed from eternity; but it made [it] at once, when the time came for which it willed: so too it must be understood in the very *love* of God.

5. To that which is objected, that if he loves, either as *enjoying*, or as *using;* it must be said that the love of God is one, by which he loves himself and by which he loves the creature; and this indeed, referred to God himself, is *enjoyment*, but compared to the creature is *use.* When therefore he says that one cannot *use* except that which is; it must be said that if *use* is taken for *exterior* action, it is true; but if it is taken for the *interior* and habitual ordering toward the end of some effect to be produced, thus it does not hold true, because the efficient cause refers to the end, long before, that which it intends to make, before it even produces it in reality.