Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/32/q/bon-sent-III-d32-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether God loves all creatures equally.*

Thirdly it is asked whether God loves all things equally. And that he does so, it seems.

1. *Wisdom* six: *He made the little and the great, and he has care of all alike;* but he loves in the same way as he has care: therefore it seems that he loves all equally.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher says, « the first stands in one way to all things »; but for God to love a creature is for God to stand in some way toward the creature: therefore if he stands uniformly toward all things, he also stands uniformly and equally toward them: therefore he does not love one more than another.

3. Likewise, by the same love by which the Father loves the Son he loves the creature; but the love by which he loves the Son is the very greatest love: therefore he loves every creature with the highest love. If therefore in what is highest there is no place for *more* and *less,* but only the equal; it seems that he loves every creature equally.

4. Likewise, as God knows creatures, so he loves [them]; but he knows all creatures equally, not one more than another: therefore he loves all equally.

5. Likewise, as the clarity of knowledge contributes to its nobility, so the magnitude of love contributes to its commendation; but since the knowledge of God is most noble, he knows every creature most clearly: therefore likewise, since the love of God is most excellent, he loves every creature most greatly: therefore if in what is greatest there is no place for *more* and *less,* it seems that he loves equally all the things that he loves.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text: « Who can worthily express how much God loves the members of his only-begotten Son, and how much more the Only-begotten himself »? if therefore he loves the Only-begotten himself more than his members, it seems that he does not love all things equally.

2. Likewise, God loves the good because [it is] good, therefore the more good he loves the more; but not all things are equally good: therefore not all things are equally loved by God.

3. Likewise, our charity is ordered: if therefore order belongs to its completeness, it seems much more strongly that it belongs to the highest and uncreated charity to love things in an ordered way, since that is the exemplar of created charity: if therefore God loves things in an ordered way, it seems that [he does] not [love them] equally.

4. Likewise, according as God loves, accordingly he distributes his gifts; but he does not distribute his gifts to all equally: therefore he does not love all equally.

5. Likewise, if he loved all equally, he would be equally favorable to all; but he is not equally favorable to all, indeed *he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens*: therefore he does not love all creatures equally.

### Conclusion.

> God loves all with an equal love, if it is taken according to essence, or the act of willing; but not so, if it is taken according to efficacy, or the good willed.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the love of God in two ways, namely according to *essence* and according to *efficacy*; or according to the essential act and according to the consequent effect. If we speak of love as to essence or as to the essential act; thus he does not love all things with merely an equal love; indeed by only one and the same act, simple and indivisible, nothing varied, nothing multiplied, which is the divine *usia*, he loves himself and all other things. — But if we speak of love as to efficacy or as to the consequent effect; thus, since the effects proceeding from the love of God itself are ordered and surpassing one another, one must say that God does not love all creatures equally.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that since *to love* is the same as *to will the good*, the equality of love can be regarded in two ways: either on the part of the *act of willing,* or on the part of the *good willed.* If on the part of the act of willing, thus he loves all things equally, because God does not will the good for one thing more intensely than for another, indeed by his very highest love he wills the good for whomever he wills. — But if on the part of the *good willed,* thus, since he wills a greater good to one than to another, one cannot say that he loves all things equally, but some most greatly, some least, according as he wills to communicate to someone a good small, or great, or greatest. — And because the reasons showing that God does not love all things equally proceed along this way, as is clear to one who looks; therefore they are to be conceded. — Nevertheless that reason which is taken from the order of our charity does not hold, because our love is moved by diverse motions about diverse lovable things, which can be intense and remiss; but it is not so on the part of God.

**Reply to the objections:**

1. To that which is objected from *Wisdom* six, that he has care of all alike; it must be said that that *equality* does not exclude an ordered communication of the good, but excludes acceptance of persons, which indeed is an inequality not only deficient from the *unity of equality,* but also from the *beauty of order;* and therefore it is reprehensible and cannot be found in God.

2. To that which is objected, that the first cause stands in one way to all things; it must be said that this is true as to that which is on the part of God; but nevertheless creatures, as he himself says, do not stand uniformly toward him; and since *to love* in God's case expresses not only what is on the part of himself, but also the created effect: hence it is that by reason of that an inequality can be regarded.

3. To that which is objected, that by the same love God loves his Son and the creature; it must be said that although the love is the same as to the formal character of the *principal thing signified,* yet the *connoted* thing is different and different. For when he says that he loves the Son, no created good is connoted there, but rather is denoted the communication of the highest and infinite Good: but when it is said that he loves the creature, there is connoted the communication of a created and finite good; and on this side it has been said that inequality can be regarded.

4. To that which is objected, that as he knows, so he loves; it must be said that if *to love* is taken for the very act of loving; thus it has truth, because in God to love and to know are the same. But if [it is taken] for the *connoted effect,* thus it does not have truth, because *to know* does not connote an effect, as *to love* [does]. And therefore a grade and order cannot be regarded in the knowledge of God by reason of the connoted [effect], as [they can] in love.

5. To that which is objected, that the magnitude or immensity belongs to the perfection and nobility of love, as the very clarity belongs to the perfection of knowledge; it must be said that this is true as to what is on the part of the very act of loving; whence God loves each thing with the very greatest love, nor is God more delighted in the love of one than in the love of another. For God in loving himself and in enjoying himself loves the rest, so that loving all things he enjoys himself and is supremely delighted in himself; yet with this greatest and highest love he communicates greater goods to some, lesser to others. Whence as the love of God in itself is fruition, yet related to the creature it can be called *use* by reason of the connoted; thus, although in itself it is highest, yet by reason of the connoted effect it happens to be said that something is loved more, something less, by him.