Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/32/q/bon-sent-III-d32-a1-q5
----------------------------------------
### Question V. *Whether God loved the human kind more than Christ.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether God loved the human kind more than Christ. And that [He did], seems to be the case:

1. John, chapter three: *So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son;* but he who gives something for the sake of something loves that more, for the sake of which he gives, than that which he exchanges: if therefore God gave His Son for the salvation of the human kind, it seems that He loved the human kind more than Christ.

2. Likewise, Christ the man is of finite goodness, [whereas] the human kind, since it is of itself multipliable into innumerable persons, has in a certain way an infinite goodness; but what has more of the formal character of the good has more of being loved by God: therefore it seems that God loves the whole human kind more than that man alone.

3. Likewise, «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more»; but the Son of God was incarnate for the saving of the human kind, and that human nature was assumed for the redeeming of the whole human nature: therefore God loved more that nature itself, on account of which He assumed flesh, than that which He assumed: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, he is foolish who exchanges a thing of greater value for a thing of lesser value: if therefore God in redeeming the human kind did not use foolishness, but rather wisdom; He did not lose, but gained: therefore that which He redeemed was a greater good than that through which He redeemed. And what is more good He loves more: if therefore God redeemed the human kind through Christ, it seems that He loved that whole kind more than Christ.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Philippians, chapter two: *He gave Him a name which is above every name;* but the prerogative of love is attended to according to the dignity of the name communicated: therefore if He communicated to Christ, even according to His human nature, a name above every name, it seems that He loved Him above all things.

2. Likewise, John, chapter three: *The Spirit was given to Him* not by measure: if therefore to all others the Spirit is given by measure, and according as God more excellently bestows the Spirit, accordingly He more eminently loves: it seems therefore that He loved Christ more than the whole human kind.

3. Likewise, either God valued that man as much as the whole human kind, or not. If so, I have what I propose; if not: therefore He did not reckon [it] a sufficient price: therefore by the death of Christ satisfaction was not made to Him. But if this is manifestly false, because most abundantly satisfaction was made to God by the death of His Son; it seems that Christ was of greater price than the whole human kind.

4. Likewise, it is infinitely greater to be God than to have God; but God so loved Christ that He made Him to be God, whereas others He so loves that He makes them His dwelling-place: therefore He loved Christ infinitely more than the whole human kind.

### Conclusion.

> *God loved Christ more than the whole human kind.*

**I respond:** It must be said that "Christ" names a person in two natures, of which one is of infinite nobility and dignity, namely the *person* in itself; and the *united nature*, by reason of the person, has a certain singular and inestimable nobility and dignity. Therefore without any calumny it can be conceded and said that God loved and loves Christ more than the whole human kind. And this is gathered sufficiently expressly from the words of Anselm, where he shows that the life of that man outweighed the whole world, indeed even a thousand worlds. — Therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that what is bought is held more dear than the price by which it is bought; it must be said that this is true when the price is wholly alienated from the buyer and transferred into the dominion of another; but it is not so in the case at hand, because the Father did not hand over Christ without hope of having Him back again, but rather He so handed Him over to temporal death that without the loss of delay He might raise Him to immortal life. Hence although Christ laid down His life for us, yet He did not lose it; because by the same power by which He laid down His soul in willing to suffer, He took it up again in willing to rise.

2. To that which is objected, that the human kind is of infinite goodness, since it is infinitely multipliable; the response must be made by the negation of both. For although the human kind is infinitely multipliable, as far as it is of itself, through the succession of generation, if time and motion were to endure infinitely; yet, however much it be multiplied, it is always actually finite and of finite goodness. But the human nature in Christ, by reason of the grace of union, through which the Spirit is given not by measure, has in a certain way the dignity of immensity, on account of which it exceeds the whole human kind almost disproportionately. And therefore to that reason the response must be made by negation.

3. To that which is objected: «on account of which each thing [is so], that too [is so] the more»; it must be said that that is true insofar as *on account of* expresses the relation of a principal final cause, not insofar as it expresses the relation of an inducing reason. But the human kind, with respect to the incarnation and nativity of Christ, was not a reason finally moving, but in a certain way inducing. For Christ is not finally ordered to us, but we are finally ordered to Him, because the head [is] not on account of the members, but the members on account of the head. Yet the reason inducing to so great a good was the remedy of our reparation, as was shown at the beginning of this third book. But from this it does not follow that the human kind is better, because a lesser good can induce to the doing of a greater good.

4. To that which is objected last, that the merchant is foolish who buys a thing more dearly than it is worth; it must be said that this holds true only in the case of that merchant who has need of the price and intends rather, in trading, to enrich himself than to relieve another's want. But it is not so in God, who is rich in mercy and has no need of our goods; who does not trade for the increasing of His own advantage, but for the relieving of our want; who also does not trade for the promotion of His own advantage, but rather for the showing of His liberality. And therefore He willed to redeem us at a greater price than we were worth, so that, knowing His liberality toward us, we might cleave to Him with our whole heart, so that we might love Him and might also better know our own preciousness from the immensity of so great a price. — Moreover, God did not redeem from another, but from Himself. For the hand of mercy redeemed from the hand of justice, in which redemption there was considered not only the preciousness of the thing bought, but also the dignity of justice itself, to which damage and offense had been brought. And because the offense of the immense divine justice had a certain immensity; therefore, although the redeemed man was not of infinite value, it was nevertheless necessary that he be redeemed at a price of much greater and more immense value than is the value of the human kind.

---