Dist. 32, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/32/q/bon-sent-III-d32-dubia
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# DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is a doubt about the placement of this part. For since to treat of the love of God belongs to the first book, it seems that this treatise is ill-placed in this third [book]. But if you say that the Master does this because the love by which we love God and that by which God loves us are the same, then it is objected that the whole of this part, which is about charity, is ill-placed here. For if charity is not a habit of virtue, but rather an uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, it seems that it ought not to be determined among the other virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that the order of placing this chapter is regarded according to the opinion of the Master, by which he held, as he touches on in the text, that the love by which God loves us and that by which we love God are the same. And if you object that then he ought not to have determined about charity among the other virtues, it is answered on his behalf that he did not do this because charity is a species of virtue, but because charity is the root of the virtues. For in the gift of love, which is the Holy Spirit, the other habits of the virtues are given. — It can also be said otherwise, that this chapter is introduced here incidentally. For since the love of God is the exemplar of our love, this treatise about it is introduced here for greater clarity; or indeed, that the difference of divine love from our love, that is, its preeminence, may be assigned here; because, since our love is an ordered affection, the love of God is nothing other than the divine substance or *usia*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the love of God is the divine *usia*. If therefore the love of God is substance and essence, then it seems that *to love God is to be God*: since therefore God is not other than himself, it seems that he loves nothing other than himself either. — Likewise, God begins to love someone: therefore if his love is his essence, it seems that God begins to be. — Likewise, nothing eternal is temporal, and nothing temporal eternal; but the love of God by which he loves just men is temporal, [whereas] God's substance is eternal: therefore God's love is not the divine substance.

**I respond:** To these and similar [objections] it must be said briefly that there are two ways of speaking about the love of God: either from the side of the *principal signified*, or from the side of the *connoted*. If we speak of it as to the *principal signified*, thus it is the essence of God and is something eternal, nor is it other than God. But if we speak of it as to the *connoted*, thus it connotes something temporal and has a respect to something extrinsic, which is diverse from God and which is not the substance of God, but of which God's substance is the cause; and as regards this, those three objections run their course. And thus the response to all of them is clear.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Far be it that God should love anyone temporally.* For it seems false. For someone who is now evil begins to be good; but God hates the evil and loves the good: therefore since this man ceases to be evil in time and begins to be good, it seems that God temporally ceases to hate this man and begins to love him. — Likewise, in God *to will* is the same as *to do*, as Augustine says, and it was held in the first book: therefore to will good to someone and to do good to him are the same; but God temporally does good to someone: therefore it seems that he temporally wills good to him, therefore he loves [him] temporally.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a love of *election* and a love of *approbation*. The first is eternal, just as the will of God is also; but the second, by reason of the *connoted*, can be from time. And Augustine understands [it] of the first, but he himself raises the objection about the second. — Or otherwise. This [word] *temporally* can be referred to the word of loving by reason of the *principal act*, or by reason of the *connoted*. If by reason of the *principal act*, thus it is false. For this is an act of the divine will, which is eternal: and in this way Augustine understands [it], as is clear from the following text. For he speaks thus: « Far be it that God should love anyone temporally as if with a new love, which was not in him before ». But if it is understood as to the *connoted*, thus it can be conceded that God loves someone temporally; and in this sense he raises the objection.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that of the non-elect it is not to be simply conceded that he loved them: because every man whom God loves in time, he loved from eternity, since the love of God is the cause of every good; but there are many who are foreknown [but not elect] who have present justice and grace, which God prepared for them from eternity and disposed to give: therefore it seems that he loved them from eternity.

Along with this it is asked whether God loves the predestined sinner more than the foreknown just man. And that [he loves] the predestined sinner more, seems [to be the case]: since it belongs to the wise to consider more the end and outcome of a thing than its beginning or progress; but God knows that this sinner, who is nevertheless predestined, will be his friend finally, but the other not at all: therefore he loves him more. — Furthermore, to this one he wills to give eternal beatitude and sets before him what is the highest Good, but not to the other: therefore he loves the predestined sinner more than the foreknown just man. — But *against* this is: that this sinner is more unlike God than the just man: therefore he is less lovable. — Likewise, this [just man] loves God more: therefore he is loved more by God, since God loves more those who love him.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched on before, there is a love of *approbation* and a love of *election*. The love of approbation, since it is temporal, regards the present state; but the love of pre-election, since it is eternal, regards that state in which a man ought to remain eternally. And since the reprobate, even if they are good, are nevertheless not said to remain finally in the good, therefore the Master does not wish that they be loved by God eternally, unless the word of loving be drawn out according to its proper meaning. Hence the Master rightly concedes [it] with a qualification; but without the qualification he says it is not to be conceded, because the understanding of it approaches falsity.

And through this the response is clear to that which was asked consequently, that as to temporal love, which regards the state of present justice, God loves the foreknown just man more; but as to the other mode of loving he loves the predestined sinner more, if indeed one may speak of *more* there. — But if you ask, speaking simply, whom he loves more, it must be answered that simply he loves more the one whom he predestines than the one whom he reprobates, because the question is not about the man as to the quality of fault, but as to the order of nature with respect to grace and glory.

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