Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/33/q/bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse.*

Secondly it is asked of the cardinal virtues as to their diversity, and it is asked whether all the cardinal virtues are one virtue, or diverse. And that they are diverse is shown:

1. *First,* through the *powers* which they direct: for prudence directs the rational [power], temperance the concupiscible, fortitude the irascible: since therefore the powers are the proper subjects of habits, and, the proper subjects being formally diversified, it is necessary that their habits be formally diversified; and the aforesaid powers of the soul are diverse; it seems that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues be distinct and essentially diverse.

2. Likewise, the same is seen through the *acts* which they elicit: since the act of prudence itself is one, formally speaking, [and] that of temperance another, as is clear: since therefore habits are diversified through acts by a formal and essential diversification, it seems that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be essentially distinguished.

3. Likewise, the same is shown through the *objects:* for temperance is about pleasures and fortitude about passions: since therefore the first distinction of habits takes its origin from objects, it seems therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, the same is shown in the fourth place through the *vices,* against which they are. For if the vices to which such virtues are opposed are simply of diverse genera, and the privations are distinguished and diversified according to the habits themselves; it seems therefore that it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be formally and essentially distinguished from one another.

5. Likewise, the same is shown through the *means* according to which such virtues are regarded. For if such cardinal virtues have means formally differing; since the means regard the virtues according to their formal character, it seems therefore that it is necessary that the cardinal virtues themselves be essentially and formally differing.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Morals of the Church*: «That which is called the fourfold virtue is so called from a certain varied affection of love itself, as far as I understand»; but this does not assert a diversity according to essence, but only according to relation: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues have to be distinguished only according to comparison, not according to absolute essence.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*: «Virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason»; but the equality of life on every side cannot be according to one single comparison, but according to comparison to every act and to every object: therefore if this is the rightly assigned definition of virtue, it seems that any virtue has [the office] of ordering the soul to

every act and to every object. But this would not be, if the virtues were distinguished in respect of acts and objects: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have any essential difference.

3. Likewise, no forms disparate and diverse from one another denominate themselves — for although it be truly said that the musical [thing] is white, yet it is in no way conceded that music is white — but the cardinal virtues, according to what Bernard and Augustine hold, denominate themselves, because fortitude is prudent and prudence is brave: therefore it seems that they do not have an essential difference.

4. Likewise, «justice, according to what Anselm says, is the rectitude of the will»; but every cardinal virtue is rectitude of the will: therefore every cardinal virtue is justice. If therefore justice names one species of virtue, it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have an essential or formal diversity.

5. Likewise, to every virtue it is essential to look to the *mean,* to every one it is also essential to *preserve the mean,* to every one it is also essential to *attempt the difficult,* to every one it also belongs to *order*. If therefore *to look to the mean* belongs to prudence, *to preserve the mean* to temperance, *to attempt the difficult* to fortitude, *to order* to justice; it seems that any of these virtues enters the essence of another: therefore they are not formally distinguished.

### CONCLUSION.

> *The cardinal virtues are formally distinguished, insofar as they are ordered to special acts; yet they are less distinguished, insofar as they are informed by grace and meritorious through charity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a speaking of the cardinal virtues as to the form by which they are *gratuitous,* and as to the form by which they are *meritorious,* and as to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts.

If we speak of the form by which they are *gratuitous;* thus in it they are rather united than distinguished, because that form is the grace that makes [one] pleasing, which, although it be one, nonetheless renders the soul pleasing to God together with all its powers and virtuous habits, as was shown in the second book, distinction twenty-seventh. — Similarly, if we speak of the cardinal virtues themselves as to the form by which they are meritorious and have the formal character of meriting perfectly; thus they are more connected and united than distinguished; because that form is charity, by which the other virtues are inclined, as by a single weight, to one ultimate end as to their proper place; and this will be better shown below in the treatise on the connection of the virtues. — But if we speak of the virtues themselves according to the form by which they are ordered to special differences of acts; thus I say that the cardinal virtues are essentially and formally distinguished. And their diversity is gathered from five comparisons, as was shown in the objecting [arguments], namely from the diversity of the *powers* which they inform and perfect, and from the diversity of the *acts* which they elicit, and from the diversity of the *objects* to which they are ordered, and from the diversity of the *means* about which they consist, and from the diversity of the opposed *vices* which they exclude. And therefore the reasons which are adduced for this side are to be granted, because they conclude truly.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that virtue is nothing other than a varied affection of love; it must be said that Augustine speaks there of the cardinal virtues insofar as they have to be reduced to the one root of charity, through which they have [the office] of ordering, by a perfect ordering, to God Himself, and from this they obtain a certain connection and unity; or this is clear from the following text, in which, defining temperance, he says: «Let us say that temperance is the love keeping itself whole and uncorrupted for God, fortitude the love bearing all things easily for the sake of God», and so of the others. But such a relation of temperance and fortitude to God through love does not belong to the cardinal virtues, except insofar as they are governed and informed and commanded by charity. And in this way it is true that they have a certain unity by reason of one mover; but on account of this it does not follow that they are not diversified by their proper forms.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is the equality of life consenting on every side to reason; it must be said that by this [word] *on every side* the distribution can be understood in two ways. Either so that this [word] *on every side* distributes for the two *extremes* consisting about the mean; and thus it belongs to any cardinal virtue per se, because it neither declines to excess nor to defect. In another way this [word] *on every side* can distribute for all the *potential parts*

of the soul; and thus it does not belong to any cardinal virtue *absolutely,* but insofar as it has *connection* with another. And from this it cannot be concluded that all the virtues are one virtue *essentially,* but that they can be called one through a certain *connection* and aggregation; just as all the powers of the soul, although they be diverse, nonetheless give to the soul itself one *whole capacity,* so that one without the other could not make the soul capable. Thus it must be understood of the *equality of life,* which consists *partially* in respect of one virtue, but in respect of all consists *wholly* and perfectly.

3. To that which is objected, that one virtue denominates another; it must be said that there is a manifold predication, namely by *cause* and by *essence* and by *concomitance*. And when it is said that one virtue denominates another, this is not on account of *essential* agreement, but it is on account of this, that they *accompany* one another about one subject of the soul and about powers which mutually interpenetrate one another. And if you object that concomitance does not suffice, because it is not conceded that music is white; it must be said that concomitance does not suffice *simply,* but concomitance with *simplicity of the subject,* by which the subject can reflect upon itself and upon all that which is in itself; as is clear, that the intellective soul can simply turn upon itself through the act of understanding and similarly through the act of loving. And hence it is that the virtues existing in such powers can mutually denominate one another; and therefore it is not the same with *all* acts, even if they have to consist about the same subject.

4. To that which is objected, that every cardinal virtue is a certain rectitude of the will, so that every cardinal virtue is justice; it must be said that justice is taken in two ways: for there is *general* justice, and there is *special* justice. And general justice embraces all the virtues, not only the cardinal ones, but also the theological ones. But special justice is not simply rectitude of the will, but rectitude of the will ordering to another; and this does not belong to every cardinal virtue; and therefore it does not follow that the cardinal virtues do not have to be distinguished from one another.

5. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions which are in any virtue; it can be answered that it is true; but nonetheless from this it does not follow that the virtues are not distinct: because that any of those conditions be attributed to some special virtue, this is not by *property,* but rather by *appropriation.* For it belongs to every virtue to hold the mean; but this is appropriated to temperance, because it is most fitting to guard the mean about pleasures; so also it must be understood of the other conditions. — If, however, one objects that *to look to the mean* is proper to prudence itself, and thus it seems that prudence is of the essence of the other cardinal virtues; it must be said that *the looking to the mean* is in two ways, either by way of *discerning consideration,* or by way of *determinate inclination.* In the first way *to look to the mean* is proper to prudence itself, which perfects the rational power, whose [office] it is to consider and discern; and in this way *to look to the mean* does not belong to a cardinal virtue by its essence, but by concomitance, because it has directive prudence. Hence just as the eye sees for itself and for the other members, so prudence looks for itself and for the other virtues. — In another way *to look to the mean* is by way of *determinate inclination;* and thus it belongs not only to prudence, but also to any virtue, because every virtue is a certain weight rightly inclining and moving to the mean about which it has to consist. Hence just as the heaviness of the stone is rightly said to look to the place below or the middle of the world; so any virtue can reasonably be said to look to the mean of living rightly; and from this it cannot be concluded that prudence does not have to be diversified from the other virtues.

Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.

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