Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/33/q/bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the cardinal virtues are in the rational part of the soul, or in that part which only obeys reason.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their subject, and the question is whether they are in the rational part of the soul, or in that part which only obeys reason. And that they are in the rational part of the soul seems to be the case:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine in the *Soliloquies*: « Virtue is right reason leading to the end »; but it is established that this is a causal or material predication: therefore it seems that the subject of virtue is reason itself, that is, the rational power.

2. *Likewise*, virtue is the principle of meriting and of meritorious and praiseworthy work: therefore it has its being about that power about whose act praise and merit consist; but such is the rational power, namely free choice: therefore the same seems to follow as before.

3. *Likewise*, virtue is in that subject in which the soul has the image of God, since the other virtues have their origin from grace, of which the soul is capable through this, that it is an image; but there is no image except through the rational power: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, every virtue consists about the choice of the good and the flight from evil; but the elective habit belongs to the rational power properly so called alone: therefore it seems that every virtue is properly in the rational part of the soul itself.

5. *Likewise*, virtue is in the genus of the honorable, according to what Tully holds; but the good which is honorable, and its opposite, is the object of the rational virtue alone, since the sensitive powers are borne only toward those goods which are of the genus of the advantageous: therefore it seems that virtue is only in the rational part of the soul.

**On the contrary:**
1. Fortitude is in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible; but these are not rational, except because they obey reason, according to what the Philosopher says at the end of the *New Ethics*: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues do not have their being in the rational part, but rather in the sensible part.

2. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue, expediting and rectifying, is in that part about which proneness and obliquity have their being; but these two are most of all about the sensible motive [power], which indeed are the irascible and concupiscible: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is to be placed in them.

3. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue is as in its proper subject in that part which more immediately and more proximately elicits the act of the virtue itself; but the acts of temperance and fortitude are elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible, which are obedient to reason: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues are to be placed in them.

4. *Likewise*, the cardinal virtues are distinguished from the theological, as the customary [virtues] from the intellectual; but the intellectual, as wisdom and understanding and *phronesis*, are placed in reason properly so called, while the customary are in that part which obeys reason: therefore it likewise seems that the theological ought to be set in the rational part, and the cardinal in the sensible part, according as it obeys reason.

5. *Likewise*, the habit of virtue is most of all to be placed in that part which more needs to be rectified; but the part which more needs to be rectified is the sensitive part, since, according to what the Philosopher says, « the intellect is always right, the imagination right and not right »: since therefore the imagination names the sensitive power, it seems that the cardinal virtues have their being about it.

### Conclusion.

> According to the theologians all the cardinal virtues are to be placed in the rational part of the soul, insofar as that is called rational which participates in reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since "rational" is said in two ways, according to what the Philosopher holds, namely that which participates in reason, and that which obeys reason. If the rational part is taken broadly, then there is no doubt that all the virtues are in the rational part, whether theological or cardinal, whether intellectual or customary. — But if "rational" is said properly, according as it participates in reason, then some have wished to say that certain cardinal virtues are in the rational part, such as prudence and justice; but certain others are not, but rather in a lower power, which is rational in the broad sense, because it obeys reason, as fortitude and temperance, which are in the irascible and concupiscible.

But although this manner of speaking seems in some way probable according to the moral philosophers; nevertheless according to the theologian it does not seem to be said reasonably, that some cardinal virtues are set in a higher part and some in a lower; since all the cardinal virtues are equal as to the dignity of merit; they are also all a principle of meriting. And therefore, since merit consists radically about free choice, the virtues have their being only in those powers, whether cardinal or theological, in which the freedom of choice is found. — On account of which, since the freedom of choice is only in the rational part of the soul, according as that is called rational which participates in reason; it is necessary that the remaining cardinal virtues be placed in that part. And this their dignity necessarily requires; since they themselves have their origin from grace, and are perfections of the soul far nobler than knowledge itself, which is placed as in its subject in the rational and intellective part of the soul. — And therefore the reasons which are for this position are to be granted.

But for the elucidation of the objections which are urged to the contrary, another manner of distinguishing "rational" according to the theologian must be noted. For in one way "rational" is distinguished against the sensitive part; in another way it is distinguished against the affective power. According as it is distinguished against the sensitive power, so all the virtues are in this rational part. But according as it is distinguished against the affective power, so not all the virtues are in it, but only those which direct in discerning, as faith and prudence; while the others are placed in the affective power, which indeed is a part of free choice and is called the will, according as it is joined to reason; it is also called concupiscible and irascible, according as it is variously affected and moved. For the will is nothing other than an affection or a ratiocinated appetite. But every affection or appetite is either the irascible power or the concupiscible, which two powers, according as they are parts of free choice, are rational; and in them can be theological and cardinal virtues: theological, inasmuch as they are immediately raised up into God, loving Him and leaning upon Him; but cardinal, inasmuch as they are occupied about the created good. And by this the response to the objections is for the most part clear.

**To the arguments for the negative part** [To the opposed]:

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, that fortitude and temperance are in the irascible and concupiscible, and these alone are rational, because they obey reason; it must be said that without doubt these two cardinal virtues, as regards the habits underlying them, are placed in those two powers, although as regards the primary ground of meriting and ordering every virtue is to be placed in free choice. And these two are compossible, for the reason that free choice is not a power distinct in reality from the rational, concupiscible, and irascible. And therefore that assumption is false, that the concupiscible and irascible are rational only because they obey reason. — For in us there is a twofold irascible and concupiscible, namely rational and sensible: the rational, according to which we are immediately born to be borne into God, and in which we have communion with the Angels, and in which according to diverse comparisons the theological and cardinal virtue is to be placed. But the other is the sensible irascible and concupiscible, which is called rational only because it obeys reason. And in these the freedom of choice does not consist, nor is the cardinal virtue placed in these as in a subject, although through frequent habituation those powers may in some way not incongruously be said to be made apt; that aptitude, however, is not of the essence of the virtue, but rather annexed to it.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that proneness and obliquity have their being about the sensible part, because it is born to be subject to reason; it must be said that obliquity has its being about some power in two ways: either because it is begun in it, or because it is consummated. In the first way obliquity is in the sensible part, namely as regards its beginning, and this on account of the inclination of the tinder [fomes]. But in the second way it is in the rational part on account of consent and deliberate choice, and in this principally resides the obliquity of vice, and by the opposite the rectitude of virtue, and therefore not in the sensible part, but more in the rational.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that the act of the virtue of fortitude and temperance is elicited immediately from the concupiscible and irascible; it must be said that this is true, speaking of the human concupiscible and irascible; but if we speak of the brute and sensible concupiscible and irascible, then through those powers the act of these virtues is not elicited immediately, but rather as it were consequently: because, the rational concupiscible and irascible having been rectified by the habit of virtue, consequently the brute concupiscible and irascible itself is rectified, which have to be subjected to and to serve them. — Hence just as, the will having been rectified in dispensing, consequently the hand is rectified for bestowing the benefit, yet liberality is not in the hand as in a subject, but in the will itself; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the customary virtues are placed in that part which obeys reason; it must be said that this is not because the habit of the customary virtue, according as it is a virtue, has its being in that sensible part which obeys reason; but because from a certain custom of doing well a certain aptitude is left in that part. And therefore that argument can be answered in two ways: first indeed, because the case of the cardinal virtue and of the customary is not alike, according as it is customary: for the cardinal virtue names a habit directing in the works of the elective [power], while the customary, beyond this, names a habit acquired from frequently acting well. — It can also be answered otherwise, by the destruction of the minor: because the customary virtue, although in some way it is in the sensible part as in something executing and subjacent; yet in the rational part it is principally as in something commanding the act of the virtue and presiding over the sensible power.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the sensible power more needs to be rectified than the intellectual; it must be said that it is false, because the rectitude and the obliquation which is imputed to man, this is what has its origin from the part of reason. — And as to what it objects, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it regards the eternal laws and from them receives and in them contemplates, but not however according as it is moved in any way whatever from itself, nay rather it is frequently oblique and erroneous. — Or it can be said that this is understood of the intellect according as it is the reception of the most evident principles in any science, such as the axioms, about which it does not happen to err, but not as it has to be applied to special works; and therefore for the directing of these the virtues are necessary to it. And on account of this that argument does not conclude, because it proceeded from a false assumption.