Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/33/q/bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether the cardinal virtues ought to be only four, or more.*

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their number, and the question is whether they ought to be only four, or more or fewer. And that there are only four seems to be the case:

1. By that which is said in Wisdom the eighth chapter, that wisdom *teaches sobriety, prudence, justice, and fortitude*: if therefore it names the cardinal virtues sufficiently, it seems that they are four, and not more nor fewer.

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the Gloss, on Genesis the second chapter, where it is said that the river which went out *from paradise was divided into four heads*; there the Gloss says that by those four heads are understood « the four cardinal virtues ».

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine, who in the book *On the Morals of the Church* says that the affection of virtue is fourfold; but it is established that this cannot be understood except of the cardinal virtues: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the Philosopher and by other treatise-writers who speak on this matter, who reduce all the customary and political virtues to the number four.

**On the contrary:**
1. The theological virtues are three on account of the trinity of objects and powers; but in the same powers are the cardinal and theological virtues, although according to one comparison and another: therefore it seems that there are only three.

2. Likewise, the virtue which orders to another is only one, namely justice toward the neighbor: therefore it seems that there is only one virtue by which man is ordered to himself; or if there are three virtues by which he is ordered to himself, it seems that there are three by which man is ordered to the neighbor, so that there are not only four, but they even extend as far as the number six.

3. Likewise, on that text of Matthew the fifteenth chapter: *There were those who ate, about four thousand men*; the Gloss: « Through prudence there is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be avoided; the second is the curbing of cupidity from those things which delight temporally; the third is firmness against the troubles of the world; but the fourth, which is diffused through all, is the love of God and of neighbor »: if therefore the love of God and of neighbor is placed as one among the cardinal virtues, it seems that there are more than four.

4. Likewise, humility, patience, and obedience are great virtues, and yet they are not any of the aforesaid, nor do they seem theological: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is not sufficiently divided by four members.

There is therefore a question concerning the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid cardinal virtues. *[a connected question]*

### Conclusion.

> The number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four. — But the ground and sufficiency of this number is assigned in many ways, which, although they are not in all respects reasonable, nevertheless make up one reasonable and sufficient way of speaking. Now these ways of speaking can be reduced to four according to a fourfold comparison of the cardinal virtue itself,

namely to its *proper subject*, to its *intrinsic act*, to its *opposite*, and to its *proper object*.

The *first* way of taking [it], then, is according to the diversity of the *subjects*. For the proximate and immediate subjects of the virtues themselves are the powers of the soul, or the forces, which are three, namely the *rational*, the *concupiscible*, and the *irascible*, such that fortitude is in the *irascible*, temperance is in the *concupiscible*, but justice and prudence are in the *rational*, according as it has to be compared with the other forces in two ways: either in the character of *deliberating*, and so it is prudence; or in the character of *passing sentence*, and so it is justice; or according as it has to be considered *in itself*, and so it is perfected by the habit of prudence; or according as it has to rule and order the others, and so it is perfected by the habit of justice.

But the *second* way of taking the sufficiency of the virtues is regarded according to the diversity of the *intrinsic acts*. For there are three acts which necessarily concur for virtue, namely « *to know, to will*, and immutably to *operate* ». But to know what is to be done belongs to prudence; to will the good belongs to justice; but immutably to operate belongs to temperance and fortitude, but to temperance in prosperity, to fortitude in adversity.

But the *third* way of taking [it] is regarded according to the comparison *to the opposites*, which are four, inflicted on us through sin, namely *ignorance, concupiscence, infirmity*, and *malice*. And against ignorance is the virtue of prudence, against concupiscence is the virtue of temperance, against infirmity is the virtue of fortitude, and against malice is the virtue of justice. And this way of speaking seems to be sufficiently reasonable; nevertheless it is taken *a posteriori*, since the virtues are not distinguished through the vices, but the vices through the merits of the virtues.

But the *fourth* way of taking [it] is from the side of the *objects* themselves, and this way of taking [it] seems to be more reasonable, because « habits have to be diversified through acts, and acts through objects ». And this way of taking [it] has to be fourfold; in one way thus: for virtues are either about the *passions* or about the *actions*. If about the *passions*; either those *inflicted*, and so it is fortitude; or those *innate*, and so it is temperance. If about the *actions*; either about *intrinsic* actions, which indeed consist in *choosing*, and so it is prudence; or about *extrinsic* [actions], which indeed consist in *carrying out*, and so it is justice, to which it belongs to render to each one his rights. — In another way it can be taken thus, from the side of the object, because virtue either deals with *evil* or with *good*. If about *evil*; either it is *innate*, and so it is temperance; or *inflicted*, and so it is fortitude. If about *good*; either by reason of the *useful* and *expedient*, and so it is prudence; or by reason of the *honorable* and *praiseworthy*, and so it is justice. — But in another way it is taken thus: because the cardinal virtue either orders to the *neighbor* or orders to *itself*. If to itself; either in things to be *chosen*, and so it is prudence; or in things to be *rejected*, and so it is temperance. But if it orders to the *neighbor*; either this is in things to be *rendered*, and so it is justice; or in things to be *endured*, and so it is fortitude.

Yet all these ways of speaking seem to have some flaw and not in every respect to attain to the proper ground. And therefore there yet remains another way of speaking, which with respect to the aforesaid is the *seventh*, and to all the aforesaid seems to be more suitable. For since the cardinal virtue is so called because it orders man about those things which are toward the end, or about something created; since man has to be compared to himself and to another, the cardinal virtue is either regulative of the acts of man with respect to himself, or with respect to the neighbor. If with respect to himself; this can be in three ways according to the principal act of a threefold virtue, namely the *rational*, about which is prudence, the *concupiscible*, about which is temperance, and the *irascible*, about which fortitude consists. — But if it orders to *another*, then it is one virtue, which indeed is called justice, because there is one ground according to which it orders to another, namely the ground of what is owed. And because this ground can be regarded according to the act of any power whatever; hence it is that the cardinal justice is said to traverse all the forces, and yet it is one on account of one ground of ordering to another. — And so the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid four virtues is clear.

**To the objections:**

*To 1.* But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that the theological virtues are three according to the trinity of powers etc.; it must be said that the case is not alike, because it belongs to the theological virtues to order man to God, who alone is the end of all goods; but to the cardinal it belongs to order man to himself and to the neighbor: and therefore it is necessary that more virtues be found on this side than on that, on account of one difference of comparison superadded, by reason of which justice is regarded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that justice, which orders to another, is only one: therefore likewise the other cardinal virtues also, which order man to himself; it must be said that the case is not alike. And the reason of this is: that the virtues which regard man in himself are regarded according to the principal acts of the forces, which, since they are diverse, it is necessary that those [virtues] be diverse: but the virtue which orders to another does not take the ground of its distinction from the principal acts of the forces themselves, for the reason that through the same acts, according to which man is ordered in himself, he is also ordered to the neighbor: and therefore it takes its distinction from the ground of comparison to another. And because that ground, as has been said, is single; therefore the virtue of justice, which is ordinative to another, has unity; nor from this is it necessary to conclude likewise about the others, because the case is not alike on this side and that.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that besides these cardinal virtues the Gloss places the love of God and of neighbor; it must be said that the love of neighbor itself is not placed there because it is a cardinal virtue, but because it is that which most of all aids the virtue of justice, that it may be able rightly to regulate our affection with respect to the neighbor. For unless one loves his neighbor, it is not easy that he render to him the right owed.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the other virtues, namely concerning humility, patience, and obedience; it must be said that all those virtues for the most part have to be reduced to these, as to radical principles, in which resides the primary ground of moving and directing; on account of which also they are called cardinal, from the hinge [*cardo*]. Hence patience is reduced to fortitude, and many others, which are its material species, according as the moral treatise-writers indicate. But humility and obedience have to be reduced to justice itself. — And if you object that humility does not always order to another, and likewise patience; it can be answered that the same man takes on the character of a double person, as is evident: a man, when he accuses himself, is the same accuser and accused; and when he judges himself, is the same judge and condemned. So it is to be understood in humility and patience and other special virtues also, which have to be reduced to justice itself, according as it is a cardinal and special virtue. Yet it is said to traverse all the forces, because certain habits which are reduced to it pertain to the rational part, as truth; certain ones to the concupiscible, as liberality; certain ones to the irascible, as anger through zeal and penitence, according as is said in the fourth book, distinction fourteen. And by this the response to the objections is clear.

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