Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/33/q/bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q5
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### Question V. *Whether the cardinal virtues are from God's gift or from habituation.*

Fifth, inquiry is made concerning the cardinal virtues as to their origin, and the question is whether virtues of this kind are from God's gift or from habituation. And that they are from habituation, it seems.

1. The cardinal virtue and the habitual virtue are the same in reality and in essence; but the habitual virtue has its completed *being* from habituation, according to what the Philosopher says at the beginning of the Old Ethics: « To us by nature it is innate, but to those perfected it is from habituation »: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher wills and shows: « Each thing is generated from the very same things by which it is preserved in *being* and promoted »; but through the multiplication of good works the cardinal virtues are preserved in us and promoted to what is better: therefore through good works they are generated in us.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems clear by experience. For we see that a bad man, while he is exercised in good and grows accustomed to it, ever more and more

has himself disposed and made apt and rendered readier toward the good; but this would not be so unless through habituation in the good there were acquired a habit that would make one apt for the good: since therefore the cardinal virtues are such, it seems that they draw their origin from frequently acting well.

4. Likewise, many have and have had cardinal and habitual virtues of this kind who never believed in Christ nor are members of him: if therefore true grace through Christ is derived into his members, it seems then that the cardinal virtues can be acquired through human industry.

5. Likewise, just as the intellect is perfected and directed and rectified through the habit of knowledge, so too the affection through the habit of virtue; but although our intellect by its own power cannot come into the knowledge of eternal things, nevertheless through those things which it has naturally, it can come into the knowledge of these inferior things: therefore by parity of reason, although the affection cannot have the virtues which elevate it to things above, it seems nevertheless that it can have virtues directing it and rectifying it concerning these inferior things. But the cardinal virtues are of this kind: therefore, etc. — But if you say that the case is not similar, because the perfection of the affection is much nobler than the perfection of the intellect: against this it is objected that such perfection does not seem to be more excellent than the perfection of cognition. For we see that certain irrational creatures possess virtues of this kind almost naturally. For there is a certain animal that flourishes in liberality; a certain one in prudence; a certain one in meekness; a certain one in strenuousness of virtue; a certain one in chastity, as is clear from examples: therefore if the nature of man is worthier than the nature of beasts, much more strongly does it seem that man either has these cardinal virtues simply innate to himself, or, through that which is innate, can acquire them by the industry of reason.

**On the contrary:** 1. James, chapter one: *Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above*; but the gifts of the virtues are the best gifts, according to what the Gloss itself intimates: therefore it does not seem that virtues of this kind are from our habituation, but rather from the divine gift. *(To the contrary.)*

2. Likewise, Wisdom, chapter eight: *I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it*: therefore continence cannot be obtained except through the divine gift, and by parity of reason neither can any other cardinal virtue: therefore the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems clear by reason: « The agent is nobler than the patient, and the principle than the effect »; but the interior virtue of the soul is nobler than the exterior operation: therefore from frequent good operation it does not seem that one happens to acquire any cardinal virtue.

4. Likewise, if virtue is acquired through operations, either through a single operation or through many; it is established that not through a single one: therefore through many. But on the contrary: when one of those operations begins to be, another ceases: therefore the operations are never simultaneous; if one cannot do it, then neither can many, since, with new operations supervening, the others pass into the past.

5. Likewise, if a cardinal virtue is to be generated from works, then either from virtuous works or from non-virtuous ones. Not from virtuous works, because virtuous or studious works have their origin from virtue: therefore they are not the principle of virtue. If from non-virtuous works; but on the contrary: as the acts are, such are the habits: therefore if those works are not virtuous, they will not generate a virtuous habit: therefore it seems that no virtue can be generated from works.

> **Conclusion.**
> The cardinal virtues, insofar as they are political, have their origin both from nature and from habituation; but insofar as they are infused and informed by grace, they are from the divine gift.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the cardinal virtues are called virtues in one way because they make one apt for moral works; in another way they are called virtues not only because they make one apt for works of this kind, but also because they elevate one to meritorious works. *(Two kinds of these virtues.)* Now according as the cardinal

virtues are called virtues because they elevate the power; *(Conclusion 1.)* thus they do not have their origin from habituation, but from the divine gift; not from nature, but from grace. For because they elevate the power above itself, they are above the nature and act of the power itself, which belong to it of itself; and therefore it is necessary that they draw their origin from something superior both to the power and to the act of the power itself. And in this way the cardinal virtues are gratuitous virtues.

In another way one may speak of the cardinal virtues according as they make one apt for moral works; and thus virtues of this kind are political virtues *(Conclusion 2.)* and radically are from nature, but completively are either from the frequency and perseverance of works, or from the influence and presidency of grace, or from both causes. *(It is explained.)* From nature, I say, they are radically, because we have planted in our nature a rectitude through which we are apt, though imperfectly, for works of virtue and uprightness; but while we grow accustomed, little by little there becomes easy for us what before was difficult, according to what Bernard says to Eugenius, that nothing is so difficult that custom does not render it easy. — Nor only from habituation is that half-full aptitude led to its completion, but also through the aid of grace. For since grace itself is rectifying of the soul, the rectitude supervening amplifies the rectitude of nature of whatever kind previously existing, and by amplifying it confirms it. — From both causes also the political virtue can receive its completion, namely when there concur the aid of divine grace and the exercise of good custom, through which two the cardinal virtue rooted in nature is led to perfect completion. — And thus the cardinal virtue, insofar as it is political, having its origin from nature, is led to a certain completion from subsequent habituation, is led to a greater completion from supervening grace, but is led to perfect completion from both causes concurring, namely grace and habituation.

And an example of this kind can be found sufficiently clear. *(Example.)* For we see that some horse from its own natural composition has an aptitude for carrying and walking well; but that aptitude can be brought to completion through the horse's own habituation, or through the industry of its rider, who knows how to wheel the horse about with the bridle, or through both. And so it is to be understood in the matter at hand, because according to Augustine free choice is likened to the horse, and grace is likened to the rider, and good operation to right walking.

Thus therefore it is clear that, speaking of the cardinal virtue according as it is political, and according as it belongs to philosophical intention to determine about it, it can be granted that it draws its origin from nature and habituation, according as the Philosopher himself says, and as the reasons adduced for the first part show. *(Epilogue.)* But if we speak of the cardinal virtues according as they are gratuitous, and according as the theologian intends about them, thus they are from the divine gift. — But against this are not the reasons which are adduced for the first part, because they proceed only of virtue according as it bespeaks a certain habit facilitating the power of the soul. And therefore those reasons are to be granted. *(To the foundations.)*

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)* that every good gift and every perfect gift, etc., and the virtues are the best gifts; reply can be made in two ways. First, because the Gloss understands of the virtues not just any and in every mode, but insofar as they are gratuitous and meritorious, in which mode it has been said that the cardinal virtues are from the gift of grace alone. *(Reply 1.)* — In another way also it can be said that *(Reply 2.)* by that authority it is not proved that such virtues are not from us, because both natural and gratuitous things are said to be from God, as the Gloss explains there. And therefore from this it cannot be had that they are not from our operation. For our work does not exclude the divine work and gift, but rather presupposes and necessarily requires it, according as in the second book it was shown, where it was inquired whether every action is from God.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Wisdom, the response is already clear: because either it is understood of continence according as it is acceptable to God and meritorious; or it is understood of the action of God whereby God is said to give something by cooperating and helping, not of that special action whereby he is said to give the habit itself by infusing it. *(Note.)* For the philosophers were continent, and this with God giving it, not through the infusion of continence itself, but through liberal and benevolent cooperation.

3. To that which is objected, that the agent is nobler than the patient, and the principle than the effect; it must be said

that this holds true when the agent and mover differs substantially from the patient; but when it is such that the same thing moves itself, it is not necessary that it hold true except *in a certain respect*, so that the same thing be more noble and less according to diverse comparisons. Hence free choice, accustoming itself to the good through its own act, is more noble insofar as it moves and accustoms itself, and less noble insofar as it grows accustomed. And in this way the answer is to be given in all acquired habits. — And if one further *insists* that the exterior act is not nobler than the habit interiorly generated; it must be said that *(Note.)* the political virtue is not brought to completion through the exterior act, but through the interior act of the will; as is clear, when someone bestows alms, there is there the operation of the hand exteriorly carrying it out, and this is not the principle of virtue, but the sign; and there is the operation of the interior will moving and directing, by which it wills to bestow upon another; and from this operation, frequented with perseverance, the habitual or political virtue is brought to completion.

4. To that which is asked, whether one operation or many bring to the completion of virtue; it must be said that many, because a habit is generated not from one operation but from many. — And if *(Note.)* one objects that, with one supervening, the rest passes away, and there will never be many simultaneously; it must be said that although the first operation passes away as to *act*, nevertheless it remains as to *effect*, which effect indeed is not of itself so great that it deserves to be called a disposition or habit; but insofar as it is aided and promoted by the following acts, it grows into a disposition, and from a disposition it grows into a habit; just as we see that one drop does not suffice for hollowing out, yet the frequent dripping of the drop makes a pit, according to that poetic saying:

> A drop hollows the stone not by force, but by often falling.

So too it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that a cardinal virtue cannot be generated from virtuous works; it must be said that it is to be generated from virtuous works; but a virtuous or studious work, to speak more properly, is one *fully* virtuous, another *half-fully* virtuous. *(Distinction.)* That is fully virtuous which proceeds from a habit of virtue already complete; that is half-fully virtuous which disposes toward a habit of virtue. And this work indeed need not be from *virtue*, but can be from something that is consonant with virtue, *(Note.)* namely from a deliberative will consonant with natural rectitude, that is, with the judgment of conscience and the inclination of synderesis, to which virtue is conformed, as is clear. For virtue is defined as « a habit of the mind consenting to reason after the manner of nature ». And so it is clear that that reasoning does not compel, because it proceeds from a false supposition.