Dist. 33, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/33/q/bon-sent-III-d33-dubia
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### *Doubts concerning the text of the Master*

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition of justice which he sets down: *Justice consists in coming to the aid of the wretched.* And it seems that he defines it badly, because justice is distinguished against mercy, or mercy is a part of the virtue-of-justice: since therefore it belongs to mercy itself to come to the aid of the wretched, it seems that the disposition of the virtue-of-justice is here ill-defined. — Likewise, it belongs to justice to "render to each what is his own"; but to some we owe honor, to some assistance: therefore the aforesaid description does not apply to justice universally. For obedience is a part of justice, yet obedience does not consist in coming to the aid of the wretched, but in obeying commands.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master, or Augustine, whose words these are, does not intend to define the virtue itself in general, but according to its most excellent state, in which and according to which we are conformed to Christ. And since in this act of justice, although they be many, we are most conformed to Christ, namely in coming to the aid of the wretched; therefore justice is described by this act, not because it applies to all justice in general, but because it applies to justice in its most excellent state. — From this, nevertheless, its general description can be gathered, because, just as we owe assistance to the wretched, so to other kinds of men we owe other and other things. Hence the general description of justice itself can be drawn from this, that justice is the virtue rendering to each what is his own. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear.

It must be noted, however, that one can come to the aid of the wretched in two ways: either inasmuch as one is moved under the account of what is due, or inasmuch as one simply considers the need of the neighbor, with whom one must have compassion. And the first belongs to justice, the second to mercy. Nevertheless, as has been said, mercy is contained under cardinal justice, although in some way justice is distinguished against mercy.

On account of which note that justice is spoken of in many ways: in one way broadly, inasmuch as it signifies generally the rectitude of the mind whether in turning away from evil or in doing good; and in this way justice is a general virtue, according to which any holy man is said to be just. In another way justice is said to be the rectitude ordering one toward another in rendering to him what is his own; and thus it is a cardinal virtue. In a third way justice is said more properly, inasmuch as it signifies rectitude in rendering what belongs to punishment; and there justice is taken for severity. And thus justice is distinguished against mercy and is a part of cardinal justice. — But if you ask why justice is taken more generally than any virtue; this is because the name of justice is imposed from the order of rectitude, which can apply generally to every virtue.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about another description, which he sets down: *Prudence consists in guarding against snares.* Against this is: that, since snares are among future and hidden contingents, and these are not known through any virtue, but rather through the gift of prophecy; it does not seem that that description applies to prudence. — Likewise, there are three parts of prudence, as Tully says, namely "memory, intelligence, and providence"; and providence alone is with respect to the future: therefore it alone consists in guarding against snares: therefore it does not seem that this description of prudence is common and general.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as was said before concerning justice, so it must be understood concerning prudence, that because the highest act of prudence consists in guarding against snares, therefore the Master defines prudence by that act. Hence it is true that this description, taken precisely, applies to one single part of prudence, which is providence; yet, taken broadly, all the parts of prudence are ordered toward it, because memory of the past is ordered toward caution about the future; for it avails little to be circumspect in things that have been done, unless through these a man becomes more circumspect in things that are to be done.

Therefore to that which is objected, that no one can foreknow future snares except a prophet: it must be said that although he cannot foreknow them by certain cognition, he can nevertheless foreknow them by cognition of conjecture, just as a man forecasts a future event from present signs.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about the description which he sets down concerning fortitude, saying that *fortitude consists in enduring troubles.* For it seems ill-assigned: because, according to what the Philosopher says, in this a sufferer is distinguished from the brave man, that the sufferer suffers but is not led off, the brave man neither suffers nor is led off: therefore it does not seem that fortitude consists in enduring troubles. — Likewise, every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows: therefore fortitude is concerned not only with those things which trouble, but also with those which give pleasure. — And again, since every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows, it seems that the aforesaid description applies to every virtue.

**I respond:** It must be said that to endure troubles, although it has joined to itself a suffering, nevertheless signifies action more than passion. For he is said to endure troubles who bears them perfectly, that is, who does not succumb in them, but who is carried above them; and such a one is truly called brave, because he is not only not led off, but even acts more than he is acted upon; and this is proper to fortitude itself. Although every virtue concerned with pleasures and sorrows consists in the mode of choice and flight, nevertheless fortitude alone consists in the mode of support and toleration. — And thus those two things which he objects are made manifest.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about the fourth definition which he assigns, that *temperance consists in restraining depraved pleasures.* But on the contrary: Christ pre-eminently had temperance, and Adam in the first state; yet neither this one nor that one for that time was restraining depraved pleasures: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid description is rightly assigned. — Likewise, to restrain depraved pleasures perfectly is not to feel them; but this is a privation, not a positing: therefore since any virtue has a positive act through which it is described; it seems that temperance is ill-defined.

**I respond:** It must be said that temperance is here defined according to the state of fallen nature, in which depraved pleasures arise and are restrained through the virtue of temperance; and about this consists the greatest difficulty of temperance in wayfarers; and in this we are conformed to Christ, although not entirely, because Christ neither felt such pleasures nor consented to them; we, however, if we do not consent, although we feel them, are in some way conformed to him, and then we restrain such pleasures. Hence "to restrain" can signify a certain resistance with respect to such pleasures, which consists in the repression of them; or it can signify the absence and privation of every disordered pleasure. And the first belongs to man in the state of fallen nature, the second can belong to Christ and to man as constituted.

Therefore to that which is objected, that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that one may speak of an interior act and of an exterior act. When therefore it is said that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that this is true of the interior act, but of the exterior act it is not generally true. For to will to lack something which is not fitting belongs to virtue, and to will to abstain from something which is not lawful; and thus silence and fasting pertain to virtue. For although not to speak and not to eat are privations, nevertheless to will not to speak and not to eat belongs to positing and is an act of virtue.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that reason which Jerome assigns in the text, saying that these are called cardinal virtues, by which in this mortal life one lives well and afterward attains to eternal life; because it does not seem that a right reason is assigned. For by this reason it seems that every virtue is cardinal, because by every virtue one lives rightly, and every virtue is a way of arriving in the kingdom. — Likewise, since they are called cardinal because they are principal and the principle of moving; since charity is more the principal principle of moving, it seems that charity ought to be called a cardinal virtue. — Likewise, since prudence is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues and the director of the others; it seems that it can be called more cardinal than the others.

Adjoining this it is asked: *why are virtues of this kind called political rather than theological?*

**I respond:** It must be said that virtues of this kind are called customary, political, and cardinal. They are called customary by reason of their original principle, according to which they are acquired from frequently acting well. They are called political by reason of the operation and exercise owed to them, because, just as the theological virtues are so called because they order man to divine things and as it were make man divine, so these virtues are called political because they render man well ordered for living among men; hence a political virtue is named from *polis*, which is a plurality. But they are called cardinal by reason of the ultimate end, because through them is the entry to the heavenly kingdoms. For there is a twofold gate of entering into heaven, namely through the observance of the commandments, according to that of Matthew nineteen: *If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments*; and through the toleration of tribulations, according to that of Acts fourteen: *Through many tribulations it behooves us* etc. Inasmuch as these four virtues principally order toward these two things; therefore they are called principal and cardinal. And these virtues principally order for this reason, because they are taken from the chief grounds according to which a man ought to be engaged in things to be done and suffered. For in all things to be done and suffered a man must attend to the arduousness, according to which condition fortitude is attended to; and the equity, according to which justice is attended to; and the honorableness, according to which temperance is attended to; and the usefulness, according to which prudence is attended to. And because these four grounds are as it were four hinges, to which all the virtues are reduced which move toward acting rightly, or suffering; therefore these four virtues are called cardinal and principal. And thus it is clear why these virtues are so named, and that the reason of Jerome, which is set down in the text, is very good.

Nor does that avail which he objects concerning the theological virtues and concerning charity; since the theological virtues themselves, as more excellent, obtain a nobler name. Moreover, they are not taken according to those four principal conditions which are required for virtue, by reason of which these are called cardinal. And through this is clear that which was objected first and second.

To that, however, which was objected in the third place, the reply is likewise clear; because all these virtues are equally called cardinal, for the reason that all these grounds, according to which they are taken, are equally necessary for virtue, namely the ground of the arduous and of the due and of the honorable or beautiful and choiceworthy.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says there that *justice in that beatitude does not fail*, nor the other three virtues, namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance; and by reason of this it is asked about the order of these four virtues, because the Master here always puts justice first and second subjoins prudence, third fortitude and fourth temperance. But on the contrary to this is, that the Philosopher in his treatment of these virtues first orders fortitude and second temperance. — Likewise, it seems that prudence ought to be put before all the others, because it shows the way to the others: therefore just as the eyelids ought to precede the steps, so it seems that prudence ought to be ordered before the others. — Likewise, in the book of Wisdom, the eighth, continence is put first and prudence is subjoined, and third justice and fourth fortitude. For it speaks thus: *It teaches sobriety and wisdom and justice and virtue.*

**I respond:** It must be said that these virtues can be considered in four ways, according as they are four, and according to a fourfold consideration any one of them can be ordered in the first place. For virtue has being compared to the subject and has being compared to the object. To the subject, moreover, it is compared in two ways: either according to the order in acquiring; and thus it is necessary to begin from continence, because, just as a pure color is laid under the other colors, so cleanness of the flesh ought to be put before the other virtues; and this order is considered in the book of Wisdom, where it is put before the others. — In another way the virtues are compared to the subject according to the order in perfecting; and because in the perfect exercise of virtue cognition precedes, thus prudence has to be set before all the others. And thus Bernard to Eugenius puts it first, saying that it is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues.

If, however, the virtues are considered by comparison to the object, this likewise can be in two ways: because the object of virtue is the good and the difficult, according to what the Philosopher says. If they are compared to the object under the account of the difficult, thus the first is fortitude, which considers the difficult more; and in this way the Philosopher orders them in the Ethics, putting fortitude before the others, and then gradually descending, according as they have more and less the account of the difficult. — But if they are compared under the account of the good, thus the first of all the virtues is justice itself, whose office it most of all is to consider order and to communicate its good to others; and in this way Augustine and the Master order them in the text. — And through this the reply to the objections is clear, and also clear are the things which are said in the text.

And from these things which have been inquired into, six problems could be formed besides those which have been inquired into, namely four concerning the definitions of these four virtues, and two following concerning the name and order of these virtues. And let these things suffice concerning the cardinal virtues in their generality.