Dist. 34, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/34/q/bon-sent-III-d34-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *On the comparison of the gifts to the virtues, as to pre-eminence.*
#### *Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the gifts to the virtues as to pre-eminence, and the question is whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts, or the reverse. And that the habits of the virtues are more excellent, it seems:

1. *First*, through the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter twelve: *And yet I show you a more excellent way*; there the Gloss: « I show you the way of going to God, that is, charity, because it is the greatest gift of all ». If therefore charity is a virtue, it seems that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher, defining virtue, says that « virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best »; and elsewhere he says that « the perfect is that to which no addition can be made »; but if any habits were more perfect beyond the habits of the virtues, there would be an addition to the perfect: it remains, therefore, that the gifts are not more perfect than the virtues.

3. Likewise, elsewhere the Philosopher says that « virtue is the utmost of a power »; but than that which is the utmost in a power, nothing is greater or more excellent: therefore it does not seem that beyond the habits of the virtues there can be any habits in the soul of greater perfection and dignity.

4. Likewise, a habit is the more excellent and more perfect, the more its act approaches the mean; but the habits of the virtues consist most of all in the mean as regards their acts: therefore it does not seem that beyond the virtues there are any more excellent habits.

5. Likewise, the nobility of habits is reckoned according to the character of the gratuitous and the meritorious; but the habits of the virtues approach grace most of all, because they flow immediately from it, and about the acts of the virtues merit is most of all reckoned, whence also charity is said to be the principle of meriting: therefore it seems that the habits of the virtues are more excellent than all other habits.

6. Likewise, as the image of creation stands to the *being* of the soul's own nature, so the image of recreation stands to the *being* of grace; but the image of creation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the *being* of nature: therefore the image of recreation is reckoned according to that which is most excellent in the soul in the *being* of grace; but the image of recreation is reckoned according to the habits of the theological virtues: it seems therefore that no habits are more excellent than those habits.

**On the contrary:**
1. Bernard in the book *On the Love of God*, chapter two: « Love advances into charity, charity advances into wisdom »; but there is no advance except by progress toward something more excellent: therefore the gift of wisdom is more excellent than charity: therefore the gifts are simply more excellent than the virtues, by the consideration of the Philosopher, because, « if the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is simply better than it ».

2. Likewise, the nobility and dignity of habits is recognized through their acts; but the acts of the gifts are more excellent than the acts of the virtues, as is plain from what precedes, because the virtues are for first acts, the gifts for intermediate acts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, what is constituted by addition to another in the genus of good is more excellent than it, as « to live well is better than to live »: since therefore the gifts are constituted by addition to the virtues, because they are posterior to the virtues and are for acting readily; therefore the gifts are more perfect and more excellent than the virtues.

4. Likewise, those habits are more excellent which make a man more like the state of glory and the perfection that was in Christ; but the gifts are of this kind, because they all were in Christ and are in the state of glory, which cannot be said of the virtues: therefore it seems that the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

> **Conclusion.** The gifts and the virtues, as regards the grace informing them, are of equal dignity; as regards their acts going forth, one habit is nobler than another; as regards the states following upon them, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning the habits of the virtues and of the gifts under the character of dignity one must speak in three ways, according to the threefold comparison of these habits: either in comparison to the *grace* informing the habits themselves and making them gratuitous, or in comparison to the *acts going forth*, or in comparison to the *states following upon them*. If in comparison to the *grace* informing the habits themselves; since it is one, rendering equally the soul acceptable to God and its power and habits and works; thus the other habits existing in the same soul are of equal dignity and merit. — But if we speak of them in comparison to the *acts going forth*; thus one habit is nobler than another, as the theological virtues are more excellent than the cardinal, since their acts tend immediately into God, and among the theological [virtues] charity is the most excellent. — But if we speak as regards the *states following upon them*; since the uses of the virtues are had in the state of imperfection, but the uses of the gifts promote a man to the state of perfection; thus the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, as the state of those advancing is more perfect than the state of those beginning; and this is because that second state presupposes the preceding state. Whence, as well-being is better than being, because well-being states being and still something more; so the habits rendering the powers ready for intermediate acts are more excellent than the habits rendering them ready for first acts, not by reason of that which they add alone, but by reason of that which they add and presuppose. — Whence it must be conceded that in this manner the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that charity is more excellent than all the gifts; it must be said that the Apostle compares charity to those things which can be had without charity, such as faith and hope and the other virtues, which can be had without charity. But because the gifts of the Holy Spirit presuppose charity and add something beyond the habit of charity, as the habit of wisdom adds an aptitude and promptitude for tasting readily *how sweet the Lord is*; hence it is that that comparison has no place here, for the reason that the one is enclosed in the other.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; it must be said that there is a perfection of *sufficiency* and a perfection of *excellence* and a perfection of *superabundance*. The first is a perfection in a genus and *in a certain respect*; but the last is a perfection simply.

To this perfection, namely the first, something can be added, because beyond the sufficiency of necessity there is the excellence of supererogation, which can be superadded to it. When therefore it is said that no addition can be made to the perfect: this is not understood of the perfect said in the first manner, but in the last. But when it is said that virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best; this is understood in the first manner, but not in the last; because it so perfects that it disposes toward the best.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that virtue is the utmost of a power; it must be said that that definition is given of natural virtue; and therefore it has no place here. — It can also be said otherwise, that as the habit of the virtues is said to consist in the mean, not because it is a punctual mean, but because it approaches the punctual mean; so too virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, not because it places the power itself at the summit, but because it makes it approach the summit. And therefore from this it cannot be had that beyond the habit of virtue there is no positing of another, more excellent habit.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the act of virtue consists most of all in the mean; it must be said that this is true in those habits in whose acts there can be excess; but this is not true in all acts nor in all virtues, as is plain in the theological virtues; and therefore that reason does not compel, as is plain: for it is better to keep virginal continence, which seems altogether to incline toward the extreme, than conjugal continence;

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that that habit is worthier which has more of the gratuitous and the meritorious; the answer is to be made by destroying the minor [premise]: for charity, which is in the soul with respect to the habits existing in the same, equally influences and equally renders them gracious and meritorious in their acts. And if it be objected that merit is first attributed to charity; it must be said that this is no obstacle, because, as has been said, the gifts in their acts presuppose charity and its act, and through this also the completion of merit.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the image of recreation, which is the noblest in the *being* of grace, is reckoned in the virtues; it must be said that this is true as regards the first being of grace; nevertheless as regards the greater advance in good the image of recreation consists not only in the soul in the habits of the virtues, but also as regards the habits of the gifts and the beatitudes; which is plain, because our cognitive [power] is first repaired unto the habit of faith, and then further repaired through the gift of understanding, and afterward through cleanness of heart, which disposes one toward contemplating God.

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