Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/34/q/bon-sent-III-d34-p2-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the use of servile fear is good or evil.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning servile fear in comparison to its use, and the question is whether the use of servile fear is good or evil. And that it is good seems [so]:

1. Because as the habits are, so are the acts; but servile fear, since it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is good: therefore by the teaching of moral philosophy its act is good.

2. Likewise, it is a maxim of the Philosopher, that «that whose use is good is itself good also», and «that whose use is evil is itself evil»: therefore if the use of servile fear is evil, servile fear itself would be evil; but it is not evil, since it is given divinely: therefore its act is good.

3. Likewise, every habit whose use prepares a man for the reception of grace is good with respect to use; but servile fear is of this sort, because through its use charity is introduced, as Augustine says, and it is had in the text: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no act by which one avoids sin is a sin; but by the act of servile fear a man withdraws from sin: therefore the act of servile fear is not a sin: therefore it is not evil. And it is either evil or good: therefore it is good.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm: *Pierce my flesh with thy fear;* the Gloss: «Servile fear does not crucify the flesh, because in it the will to sin lives, and the work would follow, if impunity were hoped for: for it would prefer that [sin] were allowed, and it grieves that it is not allowed, what the law forbids»; but every such motion is directly against justice, because it would wish justice not to be: but every motion against justice is evil: therefore the act and use of servile fear is evil.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the *Morals*: «When punishment is feared, and the face of God is not loved, fear is from swelling [pride], not from love»; but every act which proceeds from the root of swelling and pride is an evil and damnable act: therefore the use of servile fear is not good, but culpable.

3. Likewise, no act incompatible with charity is good: but to fear servilely is an act incompatible with charity: therefore to fear servilely is not good. The major is manifest, because charity is not repugnant to the good, but to the evil. But the minor is manifest according to the words of Augustine and the Apostle, because the spirit of servitude does not stand with the spirit of adoption.

4. Likewise, every fear takes its origin from love: therefore servile fear has its origin from love; but every love is either natural, or lustful, or gratuitous: since therefore servile fear cannot have its origin from gratuitous love, because it is in a sinner; nor can it from natural love — it is established, because then it would be natural fear — it remains therefore that [it is] from lustful love. But every act which issues from lustful love is evil and culpable: therefore the act of servile fear is evil.

5. Likewise, to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin and evil, therefore likewise to fear God on account of punishments principally is evil; but this is to fear servilely: therefore it seems that the act of servile fear is always culpable.

6. Likewise, servile fear is not called servile except from the servitude of sin: therefore by parity of reasoning no one is said to fear servilely, unless about that act there is annexed a circumstance of sin; but a circumstance of sin annexed to an act makes the whole act deformed: therefore it seems that the act and use of servile fear is always culpable and deformed.

### Conclusion.
> Servile fear, when servility does not accompany the act, but only the habit, can be good, although it is not meritorious.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that when I say "servile fear," I say two things, namely the habit itself, by which the soul is disposed to fear God as punishing those who transgress; and further, by the name of servility is imported the deformity of sin, which is annexed to that habit in the same man, by reason of which that man is said to be a slave of sin, and the fear existing in him is said to be servile fear. In this same way, when I say that someone "fears servilely," I say two things, namely the act issuing from that habit and the servility or deformity of the will accompanying [it]. — But it is to be attended to, that this can be in two ways: either so that that deformity of the will accompanies with respect to the habit, or with respect to the act. If it accompanies only with respect to the habit; thus it can be that someone fears servilely, and yet by that motion will not sin; for, if from a recollection of punishments someone shrinks from offending God, this can be apart from all sin. — But if it accompanies in the act, although the fearing itself is not in itself evil, nevertheless by reason of the deformity actually annexed it is depraved; as someone who fears punishments and in fearing grieves that such punishments are inflicted for fault, and in act even covets to sin, if that punishment were not [there]; and in this way to fear servilely is sin and evil. But this is not always [the case], when one is moved by servile fear, otherwise through the use of that gift a man would estrange himself from grace more than prepare [himself]; which is plainly false.

And therefore it is to be conceded that the use of servile fear can be good, although it is not good with the goodness of merit, but rather with a goodness preparing or ordering toward merit, which stands together with sin. Hence also the reasons which show this are to be conceded, although the last reason is sophistical, because it proceeds from a false supposition.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that in servile fear the will to sin lives, and that it grieves over what the law forbids; it must be said that that saying of Augustine is not understood [to mean] that always, when one fears, one grieves in act, and likewise that the will to sin is always in act; but he says this because it remains in the habit and root. But although the will is deformed by sin, and an evil love reigns in it, it can nevertheless sometimes be moved to some good works in their kind or from a circumstance by some grace freely given, not committing fault, as is evident through many examples; and thus it can be in this case.

2. To that which is objected, that to fear servilely is from swelling, as Gregory says, not from love; it must be said that *from* does not there state a cause, but an accompaniment; and when it states an accompaniment in the act, then it deforms the act of servile fear; when it states an accompaniment in the habit, it does not necessarily deform [it], but nevertheless makes it fall short of the perfection of merit.

3. To that which is objected, that an act incompatible with charity is evil; it must be said that an act can be incompatible with something by reason of a proper circumstance, which it has from its proper habit, or by reason of something annexed. When therefore it is said that the act of servile fear is incompatible with charity, this is not by reason of the act itself per se and in itself, because one having charity can well fear God by reason of punishment; but this is understood by reason of something annexed, which makes it fall short of the merit of charity. And therefore from this it does not follow that the act of servile fear is evil, but it is either evil, or it is in a man according to an evil state; and the conclusion is true by reason of the other part.

4. To that which is objected, that servile fear has its origin from love; it must be said that it does not have its origin from lustful love, but it can have its origin from natural love. For natural love is spoken of in two ways: in one way, that which is planted with nature itself; in another way, that which is acquired by natural affect and voluntary exercise without the gift of grace; and from such love a sinful man can even love himself without sin and flee his evils, whether present or future; and from such love servile fear has [its power] to proceed. For if a man loves himself to this [end], that he may acquire salvation, and from this fears to incur eternal torments; such an affection of love, although it is not from charity, can be without lust. — Otherwise it can be said that just as worldly fear, by which one fears to lose worldly things, is from love of the world, and human fear from love of temporal welfare; so servile fear, when one fears to incur eternal torments, is from love of eternal welfare and blessedness; and this love, as far as it is of itself, is not culpable, but is either natural, or gratuitous from grace freely given, or gratuitous from grace making [one] pleasing; and servile fear can well be from love of welfare in the first or middle mode stated. And therefore he supposes falsely, when he says that it is from lustful love.

5. To that which is objected, that to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin; it must be said that it is not alike concerning love and fear: because

love is that which makes [one] enjoy, because it belongs to it to bring to rest, or to incline toward another [thing]; and therefore he sins who loves God on account of temporal things principally, because he makes of the way an end and of the end a way; but it is not so on the part of fear. — There is another reason: because, when one loves God on account of temporal things, there are two things loved there; but when one fears God on account of the punishments which He inflicts, there is one only, which he fears — for he who fears one holding a knife by one and the same fear fears the knife or the blow of the knife and the action of the one striking — and therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is lastly objected, that to fear servilely is to fear with a circumstance of sin; it must be said that that circumstance or deformity of sin can be placed about the act of fearing by reason of the act itself, or by reason of the one fearing. And if it is placed by reason of the act itself, then indeed the act is deformed and is made evil by reason of the annexed [thing], as was earlier expounded. But if it be so, that it is placed by reason of the one fearing; thus it can be that the act is not a deformed act, but [it is so] because the deformity is about the one fearing, although according to that deformity he is not actually moved. And therefore it is not fitting that to fear servilely should always be a sin, nay rather this can be useful and preparatory with respect to grace.

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