Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/34/q/bon-sent-III-d34-p2-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On gratuitous fear.*

It is next asked concerning gratuitous fear; and concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked about that fear itself with respect to its division.

Second it is asked about the same with respect to its diminution.

Third and last it is asked with respect to its evacuation.

### Question I. *Whether initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is a question about gratuitous fear with respect to its division, by which it is divided into initial and filial, whether these are diverse species of fear. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, by the Master's division, by which he divides fear into four differences; and all the other differences are formally differing: it seems therefore that the like is to be found regarding initial and filial fear.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason: because initial and filial fear are either distinguished with respect to an *essential difference*, or only with respect to *status*. If in the first way: hence I have my thesis. If in the second way; on the contrary: because fear has being in a threefold status, according as the status of the just man is threefold, namely in the status of one beginning, of one progressing, and of one perfected: since therefore the Master does not posit that difference, it seems that either it is insufficient, or he does not assign those differences of fear solely with respect to status. Nor only the Master's division seems to be insufficient, but rather also the division of Augustine and of others who speak about this matter, who divide gratuitous fear only into these species.

3. Likewise, diversity of habits comes from diversity of objects; but as the Master suggests, and as is also commonly held, that initial fear has its eye on punishment, while filial fear has its eye on offense: therefore it seems that this fear and that are diverse species of fear.

4. Likewise, initial fear holds a middle place between servile and filial both with respect to the *ground of arriving* — because through servile [fear] one arrives at filial by the mediation of initial — and also with respect to the *mode of fearing*: since therefore initial fear is a diverse species from servile fear, it seems therefore that it is also a diverse species from filial.

**On the contrary:**

1. « If one of opposites is said in many ways, so also the other; and if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other »; but hope cannot be multiplied through species and differences: therefore neither can fear.

2. Likewise, the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing with respect to species; but initial and filial fear differ as the more perfect and the less perfect: therefore they are not distinguished according to species.

3. Likewise, just as it happens that one posits initial and filial fear, which is of the perfected, so too it happens that one posits initial and consummated and perfect love: since therefore love is not to be diversified according to species through these differences, it seems likewise that neither is fear.

4. Likewise, things that have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species, because, if the cause is univocal, so is the effect univocal; but initial and chaste fear have their origin from gratuitous love, according as Augustine holds, and this is one love only according to species: therefore it seems that it is likewise also in fear.

5. Likewise, if there are several gratuitous fears diverse according to species; since each of them is a gift of the Holy Spirit, then it seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are more than seven.

6. Likewise, if initial and gratuitous fear differ, this is not except because the one has its eye on punishment, the other on offense, as the Master touches on in the letter. But on the contrary: it is one and the same species of fear by which one fears to offend God and to be separated from God: since therefore these are diverse, and yet fear is not diversified with respect to them; it seems likewise that it need not be diversified with respect to punishment and offense, especially since we see that initial fear has regard to both.

> **Conclusion.** Initial and filial fear do not differ in species, yet they are diverse fears by reason of their statuses, of the modes of fearing, and of the principal motives.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For *certain men* wished to say [*opinion 1*] that initial and filial fear differ only with respect to status, just as does love also, from which fear under these differences draws its origin. Hence just as beginning and perfecting love is essentially the same, although the status be diverse here and there; so they wished to hold it to be in initial and filial fear. — But that does not seem to suffice [*it does not suffice*], for the reason that a third fear could be assigned between these two, namely progressing fear. And again, we do not see such a mode of distinguishing or dividing to exist in the other gratuitous gifts, although in them too these two statuses are to be found.

And therefore there is *another manner of speaking* [*opinion 2*], that initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear, and the mode of fearing is diverse in each, and a man looks to diverse things according to those two fears. And a sign of this is that the one is evacuated, and the other remains in the fatherland, according as the Master says in the letter; which indeed would not be, if they were the same in essence. — Yet still this seems very difficult to understand well [*it is not proved*], namely how according to the progress of a man in the status of grace there should be in him diverse habits of fear formally differing. — And therefore neither of these manners seems plainly to satisfy the intellect itself.

We can therefore choose a *middle way* [*opinion 3 and the middle way*], so that we say that filial and initial fear do not differ so much as two species formally differing, since the one is in a certain way material with respect to the other and in a certain way is enclosed in the other. For initial fear fears punishment and offense; but filial fear indeed fears offense and attends to the reverence of the most high Father. And thus the one in a certain way is related by an addition to the other. And therefore they do not differ [*conclusion 1*] as two species dividing one genus from opposite sides. Nor yet is there a difference there only with respect to status, for the reason that initial fear principally regards offense; while filial fear, even if it have one eye on offense, nevertheless has its more principal eye on the reverence of God. And because they have diverse principal motives; hence it is that they are diverse modes of fearing. But because the one is enclosed in the other and is laid under the other; hence it is that, properly speaking, they are not of one and another species. Yet they can be called diverse fears [*conclusion 2*], both by reason of status, by reason of the modes of fearing, and also by reason of the principal motives; as the reasons adduced for the first part show, and therefore they can be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary [*solution of the opposing arguments*], that hope cannot be divided, therefore neither can fear; it must be said that that reasoning is not valid: because that is understood not of the division of what is univocal, but of the division of what is manifold, as is plain from the understanding of that consideration which the Philosopher sets down. — But if you should ask [*an incidental question is solved*]: why does fear have being divided more than hope? it must be said that hope always principally looks to one sole and highest good; but fear according to diverse statuses now principally looks to punishment, now principally to the offense of God, now principally to the reverence of God; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.

2. To that which is objected, that the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing; it must be said that, properly speaking, there is not there a difference according to species, according as has been said. Yet that reasoning is not valid, because they differ not only [*note*] in respect of the perfect and the imperfect, but also in respect of one and another principal motive; although the one in a certain way presupposes the other, and what was formal with respect to the one becomes material with respect to the other.

3. To that which is objected concerning love, the response is already plain, because it is not alike: because love does not have its difference in respect of motive, but only in respect of status; and therefore it is not distinguished as fear is.

4. To that which is objected, that those things which have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species: it must be said that that holds true in those things which are generated according to univocal generation [*note*]; but since fear is generated from love, the generation is not univocal: and therefore from one love according to species not only can diverse fears be generated, but rather four genera of affections can be generated, according to Augustine, which are formally distinguished.

5. To that which is objected, that then there would be diverse gifts; it must be said that one of those fears, with respect to that which it has of nobility and completion, is enclosed in the other: and therefore under one gift they all have to be comprehended, namely under the spirit of the fear of the Lord.

6. To that which is objected last, that if they are diversified by reason of diverse motives, then initial and filial fear would be distinguished into two; it must be said that it is not alike: because, even though initial fear has its eyes on two things, it has them principally on one [*note*], on the other consequently, and likewise filial fear: and therefore by reason of that motive to which it principally looks, each of them has simply a unity. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because initial fear principally regards one thing, namely lest it offend justice, while filial fear principally regards another, namely the reverence of the Father; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.