Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/34/q/bon-sent-III-d34-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether gratuitous fear remains in the fatherland, or is done away.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning gratuitous fear as to its being done away, and it is asked whether it remains in the fatherland or is done away. And that it remains is shown thus:

1. By that of the Psalm: *The holy fear of the Lord remains for ever and ever:* if therefore it remains for ever and ever, it is not then done away when blessedness comes.

2. Likewise, in Isaiah eleven it is said of Christ:

*The spirit of the fear of the Lord shall rest upon him:* if therefore Christ was the most perfect comprehender, and in him there was fear; it seems that the gift of fear is not done away.

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus: *There is nothing better than to fear God;* and in the first [chapter] of the same: *The fullness of wisdom is to fear the Lord:* if therefore every perfect good, and most of all the fullness of wisdom, will be in supreme blessedness; it seems that the gift of fear is in no way to be done away.

4. Likewise, just as to the supreme Goodness supreme love is owed, so to the supreme Majesty supreme fear is owed, according to that of Malachi one: *If I am Lord, where is my fear?* but in the fatherland we shall render to God all that we owe: if therefore there will be love of the supreme Goodness there, it seems also that there is fear of the supreme Majesty there.

**On the contrary:** 1. As great, or greater, is the perfection in hope as is in fear; but hope will be done away in the fatherland, as was said above: therefore fear also.

2. Likewise, just as hope is in respect of a future good, so fear is in respect of a future evil; but in the fatherland there neither will be any future evil nor can there be: therefore there will be no fear there.

3. Likewise, as Augustine says upon that of John ten: *The hireling flees* etc.: « Fear is a flight of the soul, lest it lose what it loves »; but in the fatherland there will in no way be such a flight nor a possibility of the loss of the good: therefore there will be no fear there.

4. Likewise, just as disquiet is opposed to peace, so fear is opposed to security: therefore just as where there is supreme peace, there is no disquiet, so where there will be supreme security, there is no fear; but this will be in the fatherland: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, since there is a threefold distinction of the fear that is a gift, namely servile, initial, and filial; the servile does not remain, because it is driven out by grace; the initial does not, because it is driven out by perfect charity; the filial does not, because it fears lest it offend the eyes of the Father: therefore it does not seem that fear remains in the fatherland according to any of its distinctions.

6. Likewise, the perfection of glory exceeds filial fear itself more than the perfection of charity exceeds initial fear itself; but initial fear does not stand with perfect charity, as was shown above: therefore neither does filial fear with glory. Nor is there any other distinction of fear that remains there: therefore the gift of fear will simply be done away in the fatherland.

> **Conclusion.** The gift of fear, as to one act alone, is not done away in the fatherland, but is preserved and perfected.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched on in what precedes, it belongs to fear to regard three things, namely punishment, that it may flee it; the offense, that it may guard against it; the supreme Majesty, that it may submit itself to it by showing reverence. And accordingly there is a threefold distinction of the gift of fear: one, which principally looks to punishment, and this is servile; another, which has one eye to punishment, but yet holds the more principal one to the avoiding of the offense, and this is initial; the third, which has one eye to the avoiding of the offense, but the other to the showing of reverence, and this is filial; of which, although one use is in fleeing, lest one be separated from God, the other, more excellent and more principal, is in revering God, recoiling from the supreme Majesty into one's own littleness. And this use indeed was in Christ and is in the holy Angels and will be in all the Blessed. — And as to that eye and use the gift of fear remains in the fatherland; but as to the other, lower ones it is taken away, because these belong to it according to the state of imperfection. But because the principal use remains to it, hence it is that it is not said to be done away, but rather perfected and preserved. — Whence also the reasons that prove this can be conceded.

**To the arguments for the negative side (Solution of the contraries):**
*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that hope is as noble as fear; it must be said that this is true of fear as to a certain use of it, which indeed consists in the flight from evil, according to which mode fear and hope have to be divided from one another; and as to this use it is

true that it will not remain in the fatherland, just as neither will hope. There is also another use of it, which is to revere the supreme Majesty by recoiling into one's own littleness; and as to this fear is not so opposed to the state of glory as hope is; and therefore it is not necessary that it be done away in the fatherland. For as to this use a greater excellence is found in fear than in hope, because it is less dissonant from the state of glory.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that just as hope is in respect of a future good, so fear is in respect of a future evil; the response is already plain: because that argument does not proceed concerning fear generally, which is in respect of the supreme arduous thing, but as to that use which it has in the present in respect of evil.

*To 3.* To that which is objected from the authority of Augustine, it must be said similarly that that is not a general definition of fear, but is given only of fear according to the use and state of the wayfarer, and this not according to every [fear], as was touched on before.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that just as disquiet is opposed to peace, so fear to security; it must be said that, if this be understood of the fear of separation, it has truth; but if it be understood of the fear of reverence, it does not have truth, because reverence and security are in no way opposed.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that no distinction of fear will remain in the fatherland; I respond briefly that on the contrary filial fear will remain. Nor is it valid what it objects, that there will not be there the fear of separation or of offense. For even though filial fear regards this in some way, yet it regards something else more principally.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the perfection of glory exceeds filial fear more than perfect charity [exceeds] the initial; it must be said that a greater and a lesser excess does not make a habit to be done away, but rather to be perfected and consummated, but rather some opposition, which is found between that which does away and drives out, and that which is done away and driven out. Therefore that argument is not valid, since, even though the perfection of glory exceeds filial fear more than the charity of the way [exceeds] the initial: nevertheless initial fear, by reason of that which has an eye to punishment, is more opposed to the perfection of charity, than the fear of reverence is opposed to the perfection of blessedness.