Dist. 34, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/34/q/bon-sent-III-d34-p2-dubia
----------------------------------------
# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says at the beginning: *And because the place for treating of fear now occurs to us, it must be known that there are four fears.* It seems that he proceeds inordinately in his treatment, since the way of definition precedes that of division: therefore one ought first to *define* fear rather than to *divide* it. If you say that one cannot assign a single common definition of fear itself; against this it is objected: that, since fear has its origin from love, and one can assign a definition of love — as Dionysius defines love by the *uniting power* — it seems that it is likewise on the side of fear. — But against this it is objected: that, when something in one of its acceptations is a *passion*, and in another is a *habit*, it is said equivocally; but the fear which is a gift is a *habit*; whereas natural fear is a *passion*: therefore one cannot assign a single common account of fear. — Likewise, Augustine and Damascene define fear; Augustine on the tenth [chapter] of John thus: « Fear is a flight of the soul, lest it lose what it has »; Damascene thus: « Fear is the expectation of a future evil »: but neither of these is fitting to fear in the state of the heavenly fatherland, as is clear: therefore it does not seem that one can find a general account of fear itself.

In connection with this it is asked about those two definitions just touched upon, since they seem to be contrary to one another. For if *flight* and *expectation* are opposed; and fear is *flight*, according to Augustine: then it is not *expectation*, as Damascene says.

Further, in connection with this it is asked whether fear according to its general acceptation has one common object. That it does, seems clear: because natural fear is conformed to gratuitous [fear], and gratuitous to glorious [fear]; otherwise neither would natural fear be perfected by the gratuitous, nor the gratuitous by the glorious; but this could not be, unless they had one common object: therefore etc. — Likewise, love is of as great a generality as fear is; but all love is with respect to its object under one account, namely under the ac-

count of the good: therefore it seems likewise concerning fear. — But on the contrary: the fear of the way is with respect to evil, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to evil, since there is no evil there: therefore it does not seem that there can be one common object of the fear of the way and the fear of the fatherland, and through this neither one common account assigned. — Likewise, the fear of the way is with respect to the future, but the fear of the fatherland cannot be with respect to the future: therefore they cannot share in the account of one object.

**I respond:** It must be said that fear, since it has many differences, is said of them neither altogether univocally nor equivocally, but according to a certain *analogy*. But where there is analogy, there is a comparison to some one thing according to prior and posterior, especially where one may speak of analogy in the proper sense; and therefore fear according to all its differences has some one object or one account of an object, about which its act consists according to prior and posterior. Now the object of fear under its general account is the *arduous*; and the common act is *recoiling* from that arduous thing; and this is to be found in every fear. Hence one common account can be assigned of every fear, so that it be said that fear is *a recoiling from something arduous or excellent*, whether that arduous thing be in the genus of good, or be in the genus of evil. But when it is in the genus of good, it is *a recoiling with reverence*; but when it is in the genus of evil, it is *a recoiling with flight*.

But because along with analogy a certain equivocation frequently lies hidden, according to the Philosopher: in order to remove the ambiguity, the Master preferred first to *divide* rather than to *define*; because in things manifold one must first divide and afterwards define. — And hence it is that Augustine and Damascene define fear not indeed in its generality, but with respect to evil. And because fear with respect to evil has a twofold act — one antecedent, which is an estimation or suspicion, by which one believes that an evil will come upon him; another consequent, which is the flight from that estimated evil — hence it is that one of them defines [it] by *expectation*, the other by *flight*, so that there is no controversy there. For *expectation* is taken there broadly for any estimation or belief concerning the coming of evil. — And through this is clear the response to the first [question], which was asked concerning the notification of fear.

But to that which was further asked concerning the object of fear; it must be said that its object is the *arduous* under the account of the arduous and the excellent and in a certain way the *superexcellent*. — Hence what is objected concerning evil and concerning the future is of no force, because that account regards fear only as to the state of the way, and not even then generally; for in the state of the way there is the fear of reverence, as has been established from what precedes.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *It must be known that there are four fears, namely the worldly and the human* etc. And it is objected against this, first, that the Master seems to be *insufficient*; for he omits natural fear. — Likewise, it is objected that he seems to contradict himself: for first he says that there are *four* fears, and afterwards subjoins *five*. But if you say that he reckons the worldly and the human as one; on the contrary: worldly fear arises from *the concupiscence of the eyes*, human fear from *the concupiscence of the flesh*; but these concupiscences are diverse: therefore also those fears.

In connection with this it is asked, since six differences are assigned — namely *natural*, *worldly* and *human*, *servile*, *initial* and *filial* — on what basis they are taken and how they are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that the six differences of fear are to be distinguished according to the difference of their origins. For fear is either from *nature*, or from *lust* or *concupiscence*, or from *grace*. — If it is from nature, then it is *natural* fear. — If it is from concupiscence, this is twofold: either it is from excessive love of self, or from excessive love of one's own. If from excessive love of self, thus it is *human*; if from excessive love of one's own, thus it is *worldly*. — But if from grace: either from grace freely given, and thus it is *servile*; or from grace making pleasing, but inchoate, and thus it is *initial*; or it is from perfect grace, and thus it is *filial*. — And thus it is clear that there are six differences of fear according to its general division on the side of its origin.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that the Master is *insufficient*, because he posits only four; it must be said that the Master, since he intends here to treat of fear-as-gift, does not divide fear except in so far as it pertains to his purpose. Now fear-as-gift may be considered in fourfold manner: either by comparison to its *opposite*, which it expels; and this is *evil* fear, which is opposed to the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the *worldly* and the *human*, which the Master does not divide, although they are diverse fears, because he considers them under one account, namely inasmuch as they have opposition to the gift of fear. — Or by comparison to a *less principal* object, and this indeed is the evil of punishment; and thus it is *servile* fear. — Or by comparison to a *more principal* object, which indeed is the evil of fault or of offense; and thus it is *initial* fear. — Or by comparison to the *most principal* object, which indeed is the excellence of the divine Majesty; and as to this it is *filial* fear. — And thus it is clear that according to a fourfold comparison of fear-as-gift four differences of fear are assigned; and the Master divides fear sufficiently, as far as pertains to his purpose.

Otherwise it can be said that fear under the account of a gift can, according to another consideration, be divided fourfold: because fear is either simply *opposed* to a gift, and thus it is one difference, namely the *worldly* and the *human*; or it is *a gift*, yet with the opposite of a gift, and thus it is *servile* fear; or it is *a gift not with [its] opposite*, yet with a certain approximation to the opposite, and thus it is *initial* fear; or it is a perfect gift, and thus it is *filial* fear. — And thus is clear the sufficiency of these members and the resolution of the objections.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Note that here four fears are distinguished*, whereas above Beda had said that there are two; for from this it seems that either the Master is *superfluous*, or Beda *deficient*. — Likewise, in connection with this it is asked about the division which Damascene posits, where he divides fear into six differences, of which neither the Master nor Beda posits any; for he says that « there are six kinds of fears, namely *sluggishness*, *bashfulness*, *shame*, *wonder*, *astonishment* and *agony* ». For it seems, according to this, that either Damascene himself, or the Master, does not proceed rightly in dividing. — In connection with this it is also asked about the sufficiency of the members which Damascene posits.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of fear according as it is a gift precisely; or according as it is a gift and an opposite of a gift; or according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift and the passion of nature; or specially of it, according as fear is a passion. — If according as it is a gift; thus it is divided into two members, and thus Beda takes it, dividing fear into *servile* and *chaste*, because it can be a gratuitous gift, or [a gift] freely given. — If according as it comprehends a gift and an opposite of a gift; thus it is the Master's division into four members, according to what was said above; and because the Master takes [it] more broadly, therefore he posits more members. — But if it is taken as comprehending a gift and an opposite of a gift and also the passion of nature; thus it is divided into the six members posited before. — But if it is taken specially for the passion of nature; thus it is Damascene's division, which is as it were a subdivision with respect to the preceding.

Now the sufficiency and number of these members is thus clear: because fear-as-passion is either with respect to *evil*, or with respect to the *arduous*. If with respect to evil, this is twofold: either with respect to the evil of *punishment*, or with respect to the evil of *fault*. — If with respect to the evil of punishment, this is twofold: because it is either with respect to the evil of punishment *in itself*, or with respect to the evil of punishment *in its order to fault*. — If with respect to the evil of punishment in itself, this is twofold: either inasmuch as one fears a *difficulty* in a work exceeding our powers; and thus it is *sluggishness*, of which Damascene himself says that « sluggishness is fear of a future operation ». — Or inasmuch as one fears the evil of punishment, yet [one] not from ourselves, but rather from fortune and by accident; and thus it is *agony* itself, of which Damascene himself says that « agony is fear by chance or misfortune ». — But if it is fear with respect to the evil of punishment in comparison to fault, this can be twofold: either with respect to fault *which already is*; and thus it is *shame*, of which Damascene says that « shame is fear in a base act »; or with respect to fault *which is not yet*, but can be; and thus it is *bashfulness*, of which Damascene says that « bashfulness is fear in the ex-

pectation of reproach ». — But if it is with respect to the *arduous* or *great*, either it is something great, into which we cannot [enter] by knowing and operating on account of a defect of knowledge; then it is *wonder*, of which Damascene says that « wonder is fear in a great imagining of the fancy »; or it is something arduous, to which we are unaccustomed; and thus it is *astonishment*, of which he says that « astonishment is fear from an unaccustomed imagining ».

Or otherwise: by fear-as-passion either one fears what is truly to be feared, or one fears what of itself is not to be feared, but on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing. If one fears what is to be feared of itself, this can be threefold: since it is either *present*, and thus it is *shame*; or *certainly future*, and thus it is *bashfulness*; or *doubtfully future*, and thus it is *agony*. But if one fears something on account of a defect on the part of the one fearing, this can be threefold: either on account of a defect of *virtue*, and thus it is *sluggishness*; or on account of a defect of *knowledge*, and thus it is *wonder*; or on account of a defect of *custom*, and thus it is *astonishment*. — And thus is clear the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid; and through this also is clear the response to the objections.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which Beda calls *chaste* fear *amicable*. For it seems that *chaste* fear is one thing, and *amicable* fear another, and *filial* fear another. For the bride fears one thing, the friend another, and the son another. For the son fears the father's *indignation*, the friend the *dissension* of wills, the bride the *separation* of embraces: therefore it seems that those are diverse fears. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account does perfect fear obtain those three appellations; and why is it called *amicable* rather than *social*?

**I respond:** It must be said that, although these fears have a difference in these sensible things, nevertheless with respect to God one and the same fear is reckoned under this threefold name. For just as there is one grace, which makes [one] to be a son of God by adoption, makes [one] also a friend and espouses the soul into matrimony; so also in the matter at hand it must be understood, since it is one and the same fear by which one fears to lose God or to be separated from God under this threefold account. — And from this it is clear why this fear is named by this threefold name; the response to the objections is also clear.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that each fear, namely the *initial* and the *servile*, is called *the beginning of wisdom*. For if *initial* fear is so called because in it wisdom and grace are begun; and *servile* fear is of this kind: it seems therefore that servile fear is *initial*; which is false. — In connection with this it is asked: on what account is fear in sacred Scripture called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than another gift; and why is it called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than of any other gift, or virtue, or grace?

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the beginning is twofold, namely *within*, or *without*; the *initial* is denominated from a beginning *within*, which is the intrinsic beginning of nature; whereas the *servile* has the account of a beginning *without*, and therefore neither is nor ought to be called *initial*.

To that which is asked: why is it called *the beginning of wisdom* rather than another gift, and why rather of *wisdom* than of another gift? it must be said that, in progressing toward the good, the gift of fear is first among all the gifts, and the gift of wisdom is supreme. Since therefore the account of beginning and of principle ought to be attributed to the first; hence it is that the account of beginning ought to be attributed to fear. — But because the [final] state is in the highest; hence it is that fear is rather called the beginning of wisdom than of any other gift. — But the other things which are said in the letter are sufficiently plain.

Now from these things which have been said in the letter, six problems concerning fear could be formed: the first being concerning the *definition* of fear; the second concerning its *object*; the third concerning the *division of the Master*; the fourth concerning the *division of Damascene*; the fifth concerning the *naming of the gratuitous gift*; the sixth and last concerning *its comparison to the gift of wisdom*.