Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked concerning the act and object of the gift of wisdom itself — namely whether the act of this gift is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good. And that its act is reckoned in knowing seems [the case]:

1. *First*, by the word of the Wise Man, Proverbs, chapter one: *A wise man hearing will be wiser;* but hearing is for us a way to acquiring the habit of cognition: if therefore through hearing wisdom grows in us, according to what is said in the proposed word and in many other authorities of the same book; it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is *cognitive.*

2. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown through Augustine in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*, where, defining wisdom, he says that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human," approving the philosophers' notification in that part concerning wisdom itself: if therefore he defines wisdom rightly and through its proper act, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is to know things divine and human.

3. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals*, treating that [text] of Job, chapter one: *A vehement wind* etc.; says that the gift of wisdom was given as a remedy against folly: therefore the defect of folly and the gift of wisdom are directly opposed; "but opposites are by nature apt to arise about the same thing," according to what the Philosopher holds: since therefore folly bespeaks a defect in the act of knowing, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom belongs to the cognitive power.

4. *Likewise*, this seems [so] by reason, since wisdom is appropriated to the Son; but since in the created image some things are to be found on the side of intellect, and some on the side of affect; those which are of affection are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who is love, while those of cognition are appropriated to the Son: since therefore wisdom is appropriated to him, it seems [that its act is cognitive] etc.

5. *Likewise*, no one loving anything, however much he is affected toward it, is called wise on that account, unless he knows it: therefore the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned chiefly in making [one] know.

**On the contrary**, the following is objected:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Wise Man, Ecclesiasticus, chapter six: *The wisdom of doctrine is according to its name, and is not manifest to many:* if therefore wisdom is named from taste (*sapor*), and taste regards the interior affection; it seems that the proper act of the gift of wisdom is *affective.*

2. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals* on the first [chapter] of Job says that wisdom is a gift "refreshing the mind with the hope and certitude of eternal things"; but refreshment pertains to taste and affect: therefore the chief act of this gift of wisdom is affective.

3. *Likewise*, Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*, in the chapter *on wisdom*: "This foolish and senseless wisdom, therefore, we praise" etc.; and another reading: "This irrational and demented and foolish wisdom, therefore, we excellently praising do declare" etc. If therefore he speaks there of the wisdom which is a gift of God, as is clear, and calls this foolish and senseless: it seems that the act of this gift holds itself on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of reason.

4. *Likewise*, Bernard in the book *On the Love of God*, chapter two, says that "love grows into charity, charity into wisdom": therefore since charity and love and the act of charity itself belong to the affective part, it seems that the act of wisdom too is affective, since the principal act is not varied by reason of [its] advance.

5. *Likewise*, neither in the gift of wisdom nor in its act is excess to be found — for no one is too wise — but in the act of cognition concerning divine things it happens very easily to exceed: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of wisdom holds itself wholly on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of cognition. — But if perhaps you say that its act is at once on the side of cognition and of affection; *against* this is: that there is greater diversity in habits than there is in powers; but by reason of those acts, which are to know and to be affected, the powers of the soul are diversified, such that they are never acts of the same power: therefore by parity of reason it seems that they are never acts of the same habit. If you say that they cannot be *principal* acts of the same habit; then it is asked which is its principal and chief act, whether cognitive or affective; and by the first reasons it seems [to be] cognitive, by the second, affective: and thus the same question returns as before.

### Conclusion.

> The chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of the affective [power], such that it is begun in cognition and consummated in affection.

**I respond:** It must be said that wisdom has customarily been taken in four ways both by the philosophers and by the Saints, namely *commonly* and *less commonly* and *properly* and *more properly.* — Taking wisdom *commonly,* wisdom thus bespeaks a general cognition of things, according as Augustine and the Philosopher define it, that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human"; and the Philosopher in the *First Philosophy* says that "the wise man is he who knows all things, according as is fitting."

In another way wisdom is called [such] *less commonly;* and thus wisdom bespeaks not just any cognition, but a sublime cognition, namely the cognition of eternal things. And thus the Apostle takes it in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter twelve: *To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge;* according as Augustine expounds it, saying that "wisdom is the cognition of eternal things, but knowledge is the cognition of created things"; and thus too the Philosopher says that wisdom is "the cognition of the highest causes."

In the third way wisdom is taken *properly;* and thus it names the cognition of God according to piety: and this cognition indeed is the one reckoned in the worship of latria, which we render to God through faith, hope, and charity, according to which mode Augustine takes it in the fourteenth [book] *On the Trinity*, expounding that [text] of Job: *Behold, piety itself is wisdom,* — saying in the same place that piety and wisdom are the same as *theosebia,* and theosebia is the same as divine worship, which consists in the three virtues, according to what he himself says at the beginning of the *Enchiridion* to Laurentius.

In the fourth way wisdom is called [such] *more properly,* and thus it names the experiential cognition of God; and in this way it is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, whose act consists in tasting the divine sweetness. And since for the interior taste, in which there is delight, there is necessarily required an act of *affection* for conjoining and an act of *cognition* for apprehending, according to that [saying] of the Philosopher, who says that "delight is the conjunction of the suitable with the suitable with the sense of the same"; hence it is that the act of the gift of wisdom is partly cognitive and partly affective: such that it is *begun in cognition* and *consummated in affection,* according as the taste or savoring itself is an experiential cognition of the good and the sweet. And therefore the chief act of the gift of wisdom, most properly so called, is on the side of the affective [power], by reason of which Ecclesiasticus says that *wisdom is according to its name;* and Gregory says that its act is to refresh; and Dionysius says that it belongs to this wisdom to be senseless, on account of this, that we are better affected toward God by a prior cognition which is through removal and negation than by affirmation, as he teaches in the book *On Mystical Theology.* By reason also of this same cause Bernard says that charity advances into wisdom. — And from this same cause it happens that wisdom cannot be excessive, because excess in the experience of divine sweetness is rather laudable than blameworthy, according as is clear in holy and contemplative men, who from too much sweetness are now raised into ecstasy, now lifted up even to rapture, though this happens to very few. — It must therefore be conceded that the chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of affection. The reasons showing this are also to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that wisdom grows through hearing; it must be said that wisdom is there taken commonly for the general cognition which is indeed of things divine and human, which receives increase through study and hearing; and therefore it has no place here.

2. To that likewise which objects from the authority of Augustine, the response is clear, because Augustine takes it in that way.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Gregory, that wisdom is against folly; it can be said that he says this not as to the *ultimate* act of wisdom, which is reckoned in affection, but as to the *first* or prior act, which consists in cognition; for the gift of wisdom embraces both in itself.

4. To that which is objected, that wisdom is appropriated to the Son; it must be said that this is so insofar as it bespeaks the light of cognition, not insofar as it bespeaks the savor of affection. For since it encloses both in itself, it can be appropriated to either person, namely to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; and since it is not appropriated to the Son alone, but rather also to the person of the Holy Spirit: hence it is that that reasoning is not compelling.

5. To that which is further objected, that no one is wise from this alone, that he loves, unless he also further knows; it must be said that this is true; yet in the love of God cognition is conjoined to the taste itself. For the best mode of knowing God is through the experience of sweetness; it is also far more excellent and nobler and more delightful than through the argument of inquiry. Hence from this it is not had that *to know* is the chief act of the gift of wisdom, but that in a certain way it concurs toward its chief act; and this indeed is true, because, as has been touched on, wisdom encloses both acts in itself; whence in a certain way it regards the intellect, in a certain way it regards the affect.

To that which is objected last, that one habit cannot be with respect to those two acts, since the powers are diversified by reason of them; it must be said that it is true that these acts cannot be of the same habit such that each is principal; nevertheless nothing prevents there being two, such that one is the *first,* the other the *chief;* one as *disposing,* the other as *completing,* as in the foregoing it was held concerning faith. — Whence by the same reasons and responses one can, as to this, treat of the gift of wisdom as those were explained above concerning the virtue of faith; and therefore let these things suffice for the present, since it is not necessary to repeat them here again.