Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in speculation.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of knowledge, and the question is whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in consideration.

And that it consists in action seems [so]:

1. *First,* by the authority of Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity,* which is had in the [Master's] text; for distinguishing between *wisdom* and *knowledge,* he says that wisdom regards contemplation, and knowledge action.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher, "to know what is not conjoined to operation profits little or nothing toward virtue": if therefore knowledge, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, profits much toward merit, it seems that its act is chiefly constituted concerning things to be done.

3. Likewise, faith without works is dead, therefore by parity of reasoning so too is knowledge; but knowledge itself, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is not dead, but gratuitous: therefore it seems that its chief act consists concerning things to be done.

4. Likewise, the gift of knowledge is compared to piety as the directing to the executing; but it belongs to piety, according as Gregory says in the *Morals*, to exhibit works of mercy: therefore the act of knowledge is to direct concerning such works: therefore its act consists in things to be done.

5. Likewise, the act of the gift of knowledge, according as the Master says in the [his] text, "is to converse *in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation*"; but good conversation regards exterior actions: therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is occupied chiefly concerning things to be done.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the fourteenth book of *On the Trinity*: "To this knowledge I attribute not whatever is of human curiosity and vanity, but that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, and strengthened": if therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is for generating faith, it seems that it is concerned rather with faith than with morals.

2. Likewise, in the same book it is said, and the Master says in his text, that the cognition of the divinity in Christ regards *wisdom,* but the cognition of [his] humanity in the same regards *knowledge;* but the cognition of Christ's humanity is not an operative cognition, but rather a contemplative one: if therefore this belongs to the gift of knowledge, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, in things to be done we are sufficiently directed by the virtue of prudence: therefore either the gift of knowledge is superfluous, or its chief act is not ordered to this but to something else.

4. Likewise, the understanding of Scripture regards the gift of knowledge, according as Augustine intimates in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, where he shows that through piety and meekness one comes to the understanding of sacred Scripture: if therefore such understanding consists not in action but in speculation; it seems that its act consists rather in contemplation than in action.

Likewise, according to this it is asked: since of one habit there is one act, how can acts so diverse be assigned to the gift of knowledge? For the Master intimates in his text that the act of the gift of knowledge is to nourish and defend faith; and further, that of the same [gift] the act is to converse *in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation;* and lastly, that its act is to know Christ.

### Conclusion.

> The chief act of the gift of knowledge is to direct concerning action, but consequently also to know the things which are of faith, and the humanity of Christ.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a fourfold difference of knowledge. There is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the *purely speculative* intellect; and this is founded upon the principles of reason, and this is the knowledge acquired about any creature whatsoever, as the knowledge of human philosophy. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect *inclined by affect*; and this is founded upon the principles of faith, which indeed are the articles, and is nonetheless acquired; and this is the knowledge of sacred Scripture, which no one can have unless he have at least unformed faith. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect or reason, insofar as it *inclines the affect to operation;* and this is founded upon the principles of natural law, which is ordered to the rectitude and honesty of life; and of this kind is the knowledge of prudence-as-virtue. — But there is a certain knowledge which consists in the intellect, according as it is *inclined* and *inclining: inclined,* I say, by faith, and *inclining* to good operation: and this is founded upon the principles of faith and has its origin from the gift of grace; and such is the knowledge which is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

And from this it is clear what is the proper act of this gift. For its act is *to direct toward things to be done* according to the prerequisite of the rule of faith itself, whose [office] is to direct toward works of mercy, so that one render not only good for good, according as the law of nature dictates, but also good for evil, according as the law of grace dictates, after the exemplar of Jesus Christ himself, in whom was the abundance of grace. And therefore to this knowledge it pertains not only *to direct in things to be done;* but also consequently it pertains *to know the things which are of faith* as the foundation of its direction; and further *to know the humanity of Christ* as the exemplar of its governance; so that here a threefold act belongs to it according to a threefold respect: one namely with respect to the *motive object,* another with respect to its *foundation,* and the third is with respect to the *exciting exemplar.* And because the principal act is taken on the side of the *object,* hence it is that the chief act of the gift of knowledge is *to direct concerning action,* according as Augustine says, and as the reasons adduced for this show; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to knowledge to beget and strengthen faith; it must be said that this is not its *principal* act, but one *ordered to the principal* for this reason, that the direction of the gift of knowledge in things to be done follows upon and is founded upon the principles of faith itself.

2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the gift of knowledge to know the humanity and grace of Christ; the response is already clear: because neither is this the principal act of knowledge, but one that has to be ordered to the principal; just as the cognition of an example is useful for the more evident cognition of the thing which ought to be done according to that exemplar.

3. To that which is objected, that man is sufficiently directed in things to be done by prudence; the response is already clear: because prudence directs according to the principles of natural law toward those things which are *honorable;* but knowledge-as-gift directs through the principles of faith and divine law toward those things which are *holy*; whence the act of the gift of knowledge is in a certain way higher than that of the virtue of prudence, and has to be founded upon more elevated principles; and on account of this, when the virtue of prudence is had, the gift of knowledge is not superfluous.

4. To that which is objected, that the understanding of the Scriptures regards the gift of knowledge; it must be said that just as it was touched on before concerning the cognition of the things which are of faith, that they do not *principally* regard the gift of knowledge itself, but in a certain way *antecedently* and as it were *presuppositively;* so too it must be understood concerning the understanding of sacred Scripture.

To that which is lastly asked concerning the diversity of acts, the response is already clear through the things which have been said: since one is its principal act, but two are annexed; and together with this it is clear what is the object of the gift of knowledge, and how also it differs from the virtue of prudence and from the habit of any other knowledge whatsoever.

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