Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of understanding itself, and the question is whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature. And that it does [seem] so [is shown]:

1. *First,* by the authority of the Master in the [his] text: "But *intelligence* is not only of eternal things, but also of invisible and spiritual things temporally arisen."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through Dionysius to Titus, who says that "it is impossible, so long as we are on the way, for the divine ray to shine forth to us except veiled about": if therefore that is the veil of the creature, it seems that the intellect cannot know God except in the creature: therefore if it is for the cognition of the Creator, it is necessary that it be at the same time for the cognition of the creature.

3. Likewise, the habit of love is not perfect unless God be loved both in himself and in his image: therefore likewise the gift of understanding will not be perfect unless God be known through it both as to his own conditions and as to the conditions of the creatures which are like him: therefore it seems that the gift of understanding is for contemplating things temporal and eternal.

4. Likewise, understanding is concerned with the same things as faith is concerned with, according as Gregory says, that "God gives understanding when he illumines the mind concerning the things heard"; but faith regards not only the divine essence in itself, but also in comparison to the creature: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of understanding is ordered to contemplating those two.

**On the contrary:** 1. By the gift of *wisdom* eternal things are known, by the gift of *knowledge* temporal things are known, as Augustine says, and as is had in the [Master's] text: therefore either the gift of *understanding* is superfluous, when the two gifts are had, or its chief act does not consist concerning those two.

2. Likewise, *wisdom* and *knowledge* differ and are diverse gifts by this, that one of them is concerned with temporal things, the other with eternal: therefore if the gift of *understanding* is one, it seems that it cannot be concerned with those two.

3. Likewise, either the gift of understanding consists *in knowing only,* or *in knowing and affecting.* If it consists *in knowing only:* then it does not seem to be a gratuitous gift, since a purely cognitive act is not meritorious. If *in knowing and affecting:* then it belongs to the gift of *understanding* to know eternal things and to be affected concerning them; but this is the act of the gift of *wisdom:* therefore either the gift of *understanding* is not concerned with eternal things, or, if it is, it does not differ from *wisdom* itself.

4. Likewise, just as it happens that God is known and contemplated in the image, so it happens that God is known and contemplated in his vestige: therefore just as the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of the spiritual creature itself, so [it would be ordered] to the cognition of the corporeal creature; but it does not direct toward the cognition of the corporeal creature: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not seem that the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of any creature.

5. Likewise, gifts which correspond to one another and are combined together are occupied with the same thing and concerning the same thing; but the gift of *understanding* and [the gift] of *wisdom* are combined with one another: therefore since the gift of wisdom is concerned with eternal things, and not with created things, it seems that the gift of understanding is too.

6. Likewise, if it is at once concerned with the Creator and the creature: then it seems that the gift of understanding understands and knows God through a mirror: therefore it does not seem to differ from the cognition of faith.

### Conclusion.

> The gift of understanding is regarded in the contemplation both of the Creator and of the spiritual creature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the cognition of God under the formal character of the true can be had according to a threefold mode: in one mode the cognition of God is had through *simple assent;* in another mode through the *support of reason;* in a third mode through *simple intuition.* The first belongs to the virtue of faith, whose [office] is to assent; the second belongs to the gift of understanding, whose [office] is to understand by reason the things believed; the third belongs to the beatitude of cleanness of heart, whose [office] is to see God. Since therefore the reasons by which we are aided to understand the things believed are taken not only from the conditions of the Creator, but also from the conditions of the spiritual creature, which among creatures has the closer assimilation to the Creator; hence it is that the gift of understanding — whose act is to elevate into the contemplation of the highest True by a light which not only makes [one] assent, but also through fitting reasons [makes one] understand the things believed — is regarded not only in the contemplation of the creating essence, but also of the spiritual creature.

And from this it is clear what is the proper act and object of the gift of understanding itself: since its object is the eternal True itself, insofar as intelligible, not only according to its own conditions, but also according to the properties of the creatures like it, according as the Master says in the [his] text. But its act is to contemplate the believed truth itself, that it may be more devoutly believed and more ardently loved. And so the gift of understanding consists in the rational contemplation of the Creator and of the spiritual creature, as the reasons which have been adduced for this part show.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the gift of *wisdom* is ordered to the cognition of the Creator, and the gift of *knowledge* to the cognition of the creature; it must be said that those two gifts are [ordered] otherwise and otherwise to the cognition of those two than the gift of understanding [is]: because the gift of *wisdom* is for the cognition of eternal things, yet according as those eternal reasons are a way to the *taste* and experimental cognition of the divine sweetness, so that that cognition is annexed to the taste; but the gift of *understanding* is occupied concerning eternal things according to the eternal reasons, which are a way to the *cognition of the truth.* And hence it is that Bernard appropriates the gift of *understanding* to faith, which assents to the highest Truth for its own sake; but he appropriates the gift of *wisdom* to charity, whose [office] is to dispose toward tasting God. — In this mode too the differences are to be found between *understanding* and *knowledge:* because *knowledge* is occupied concerning creatures according to created reasons; whence it has to be occupied not only concerning spiritual creatures, which have the character of the *image,* but also concerning sensible and corporeal ones, which have the character of the *vestige.* But the gift of *understanding,* although it is occupied concerning creatures, this is nonetheless according to the eternal reasons; and therefore it is only concerned with spiritual creatures, in which the eternal reasons shine forth more expressly. — And thus it is clear that because the *intellect* is concerned with the Creator and the creature in one mode and another than *wisdom* and *knowledge;* hence it is that, when these are had, it is not superfluous.

2. To that which is objected, that the gift of *wisdom* and [the gift] of *knowledge* are distinguished because this is concerned with temporal things, and that with eternal things, etc.; the response is already clear, because it is not alike. For *wisdom* is occupied concerning eternal things according to eternal reasons; but *knowledge* concerning created things according to created reasons; and because they have diverse objects even according to the character of moving and directing: hence it is that they are diverse gifts. But the *intellect,* whether it be occupied concerning the creature or concerning the Creator, is always referred to the eternal reasons, to the contemplation of which it elevates [us] even through creatures; and therefore it is only one gift, although those things [contemplated] be many. And from this it can be gathered that the gift of understanding is below *wisdom* and above *knowledge.*

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding either is in simply speculating, or in speculating and affecting; it must be said that there is a cognition of *experience,* which is regarded according to taste, and this belongs to the gift of *acquired wisdom;* and there is a cognition of *extended speculation,* which is in a certain way a *way* to the taste, as the cognition of faith [is a way] to the delight of charity; and this belongs to the gift of *understanding,* which indeed furnishes the way to the use of the gift of *wisdom;* which therefore is *gratuitous,* because it is founded upon the assent of faith and further orders [it] toward the taste of wisdom. Nevertheless in the very act of *understanding* there is a certain delight, but far inferior to that in the gift of *wisdom.* For one is delighted in the cognition of truth, but not so as in the taste of the highest sweetness.

4. To that which is objected, that just as it happens that God is known in the image, so also in the vestige; it must be said that there is not an altogether [equal] likeness. For in the *image,* because it approaches more nearly, [God] has to be known more clearly; but in the *vestige,* because it stands far off, under greater obscurity and enigma. And because to the gift of understanding there belongs a clearer and more excellent contemplation than the cognition of faith is; hence it is that to that gift it does not belong to know God in any creature whatsoever, but in that which is his *image* and express likeness, as was said above.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding is combined with the gift of wisdom; it must be said that since the gift of *wisdom* consists in taste, but the gift of *understanding* consists in the light of reason; and affection ascends higher than reason, and union [higher] than cognition, according as Dionysius wills: hence it is that the gift of *wisdom* in its act does not so need the support of the creature, as does the gift of *understanding.* And therefore the gift of *wisdom* in its act is occupied only concerning eternal things, but the gift of *understanding* not only concerning eternal things, but also concerning created things. When therefore he says that gifts which are combined with one another ought to have the same object; this is true of the *principal* object, but not of that which has the character of *supporting.*

6. To that which is lastly objected, that understanding sees through a mirror, as does faith also; it must be said that in vision through a mirror there are many grades according to the greater and lesser purgation from the obscurity of enigma; and according to this it has to be illumined and enabled in one mode and another. Whence *faith* enables [one] to assent to God in the articles, which, even though it does not see them in themselves, it nonetheless sees in the creature, knowing "*what is that* which is signified by the name"; for one who believes never knows what the Trinity is, except because he sees what a ternary is in the creature. But further the gift of *understanding* illumines [one] to understand not only "what is that which is signified by the name," but also to see the *reason* why the Trinity must be in God, by this, that he sees in the image itself the going-forth of the word from the mind by way of generation, and of love from both by way of connection. From these things it is clear that, even though *faith* and *understanding* are [both] through a mirror, nonetheless they differ in the mode of speculating, and therefore are diverse habits; it is likewise clear together with this what is the *act* of the gift of understanding, and what the *object,* and what is its *difference* with respect to the other habits.