Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q4
----------------------------------------
### Question IV. *Whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.*

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the proper act and object of the gift of counsel, and the question is whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. And that it is [so], seems [thus]:

1. *First,* by the Wise Man's exhortation, by which he exhorts us to do all things with counsel; but this is done by taking counsel about the things we do: since therefore he exhorts us to the act of the gift of counsel, it seems that the act of this gift is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Tully's definition in the first book of the *Rhetoric*, where, defining counsel, he says: "Counsel is the truly devised reasoning of something to be done or not to be done"; but this devising about doing or not doing is the very act of counseling: therefore the proper act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by Gregory's assignment. For Gregory says, on the first book of *Job*, where he assigns the difference of the gifts, that "counsel is against precipitation"; but the act which is directly opposed to precipitation is to take counsel — for we take counsel precisely lest we do something precipitately — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by the meaning of the name: for as *to fear* stands to *fear,* so *to take counsel* stands to *counsel;* but the proper and principal act of the gift of *fear* is *to fear:* therefore the proper act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. If you say that counsel is not named from *taking counsel* (consiliando), but rather from *advising* (consulendo), and that the act of counsel itself is rather *to advise* than *to take counsel*; it is objected against this: that *to advise* is said in two ways: in one way to *seek* counsel from someone, in another way to *give* counsel; but the act of the gift of counsel is not *to seek counsel* — for he who seeks counsel is in need of counsel, and he who is in need of counsel does not yet have the gift of counsel — therefore the act of this gift is not *to advise,* according as *to advise* is the same as *to seek counsel.* Again, *to give counsel* is not of great utility nor even of great virtue, since many know how to advise others who govern themselves very wretchedly; if therefore the gift of counsel is ordered to one's own utility, it seems that its act is not *to give* counsel to another nor to *receive* counsel from another, as was shown before: therefore it seems that the act of this gift is directly *to take counsel* itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm: *Thy justifications are my counsel;* there the Gloss [says]: "Counsel is to keep the justifications"; but concerning what we keep, we do not take counsel: therefore if the act of the gift of counsel is to observe the justifications, it does not seem that its act is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, as Damascene says: "Counsel belongs to one ignorant and doubting," whence also "it is not fitting for Christ to take counsel": if therefore the gift of counsel was in Christ and in any other [person] perfect in the gift of wisdom and knowledge, it seems that the act of this gift is not to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by *reason.* As *to learn* stands to *to know,* so *to take counsel* stands to *to choose,* because each is a way to the other; but as by knowledge we are enabled for knowing, so by the gift of counsel we are enabled for choosing: since therefore the act of knowledge itself is not *to learn,* but rather *to know;* it seems that the act of this gift is not *to take counsel,* but rather *to choose.*

4. Likewise, counsel orders and directs toward those things which are of supererogation; but concerning these no one doubts that they are manifestly good; but concerning those things about which there is no doubt, no taking of counsel is necessary: since therefore the gift of counsel directs toward such things, it seems that its act is not to take counsel.

5. Likewise, *to take counsel* belongs to providence itself, which

is a part of prudence: therefore either the gift of counsel is not opportune for us, or it is for another act; but it is established that it is opportune for us: it seems therefore that to take counsel is not its proper act.

### Conclusion.

> The proper act of the gift of counsel is to direct in the choice of those things which are of difficulty, according to the dictate of divine law, and thus to take counsel.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as *intellect* is sometimes taken for the *act of understanding,* sometimes for the very thing *understood* or intelligible, sometimes for the very *habit* which directs the intellect in judging concerning things true and false; so too *counsel* is wont to be taken in three ways: sometimes for the very *act of taking counsel;* sometimes for that at which that act *terminates,* as when it is said: this is my counsel; sometimes indeed for the very *habit* which expedites and directs the soul to choosing things to be pursued and to fleeing things to be avoided. — But this *habit* directing toward such choice is twofold according to the diversity of *the things to be chosen* and according to the diversity of *modes* or *grounds* of choosing. For some things to be chosen are *of necessity,* but some are *of difficulty.* In the first *prudence* directs, but in the second the *gift of counsel* directs, on account of the more excellent and greater difficulty which is found in those things which are of difficulty. — Again, one can be directed in choosing either according to the rule of *natural* law, or according to the rule of *divine* law; and the first indeed belongs to *political virtue*, but the second regards the *gift of counsel.* — From these things one can elicit, by a certain circumlocution, what is the *proper act* of the gift of counsel: namely that its act is to direct in the choice of things to be done, to be pursued, or to be fled, which are of special difficulty, and this according to the rule of *divine* law; and in this its act is distinguished from the act of *prudence-as-virtue* and of *knowledge-as-gift*. — If therefore you ask whether the act of the gift of counsel is *to take counsel;* it must be said that if by the word *taking counsel* there is understood the direction according to the rule and light of counsel, then it can well be conceded that its act is to take counsel. — But it must be observed that, according as Damascene holds, counsel regards a certain act *preceding* and a certain act *following.* For he says that "first a man inquires and takes counsel, then he disposes and orders, afterwards he chooses and consents." And according to this it must be understood that to be directed according to the rule of counsel can be in two ways: either by *inquiring* counsel, or by *disposing* and *choosing* according to counsel. In the first way indeed it is not the principal and universal act of counsel itself, but as it were its *initial* act, and in him who is in the state of imperfection; but in the second way its act is universal and principal. Whence whether by the word *taking counsel,* or by the word *advising,* or by whatever other word that is signified which is to be directed in the choice of those things which are of difficulty according to the gift of counsel, which governs according to the dictate of *divine* law; it must be said that this is the principal and proper act of the gift of counsel. — Whence it can be conceded that to take counsel according to that acceptation is its proper act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

But as to that which is lastly objected concerning the act of advising, how it regards the gift of counsel; it must be said that *to advise,* insofar as it regards another, befalls the gift of counsel [accidentally]; for the gift of counsel properly regards the direction of its own proper act; whence although the act of the gift of counsel is attended to in the disposition and ordering of *difficult things* to be pursued; yet because that gift is sometimes in abundance, sometimes in defect, and when it is in abundance, it has [the office of] helping others, but when it is in defect, it has [the office of] being helped by others: hence it is that the act of advising another, or of advising for another, can be attributed to the gift of counsel; yet neither is its principal act. Whence between these two falls in the middle the act of taking counsel, by reason of which the others too come to be of the gift of counsel. On account of which it can not absurdly be said that the act of the gift of counsel is to govern oneself, and further, when it abounds, to know how in a like case to help and direct another.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that counsel is to observe the justifications; it must be said that there the principal act of counsel is not touched, but a consequent one. For it belongs to the gift of counsel *to direct,* but to another gift [it belongs] to execute and to do; therefore the *observation* of the justifications is not attributed to counsel itself of itself and primarily, but to the observing of the justifications the *direction* is properly to be attributed to the gift of counsel. — Nevertheless, that which it says, that no one takes counsel concerning what he observes, is not true: because no one rightly observes unless rectitude in taking counsel precede his observation either as to the *inquiry* of counsel, or at least as to the *disposition* of counsel.

2. To that which is objected, that to take counsel belongs to one ignorant, as Damascene says; it must be said that this is true insofar as *to take counsel* is the same as *to inquire* counsel, but not insofar as *to take counsel* is the same as *to direct* in choosing difficult things. And in this way *to take counsel* is the act of counsel itself and was in Christ; and according to this mode the divine disposition in those things which are secret is called *counsel*.

3. To that which is objected, that as *to learn* stands to *to know,* so *to take counsel* [stands] to *to choose;* it must be said that it is true, according as *taking counsel* is the same as the *inquiry* of counsel; but according as *taking counsel* is the same as the *discreet* and *right disposition* and *ordering,* it does not stand in that way, because such disposition is the rule and principle of choosing rightly, and therefore it is an act of a perfect gift; and taking [it] in this way, there is no likeness between *to take counsel* and *to learn.*

4. To that which is objected, that counsel orders toward those things which are of supererogation; it must be said that although those things which are of supererogation are in themselves *good* and *more good;* yet in them our infirmity more easily fails, unless it be helped by divine grace both in *expediting* and in *choosing* and also in *executing;* whence many shrink from and abhor the very counsels of Jesus Christ, who nevertheless can be in the state of justice. And therefore with respect to such things the gift of counsel is opportune beyond the gift of knowledge and the virtue of prudence and the rule of faith.

5. But to that which is lastly objected, that to take counsel is the act of prudence itself; the response is already clear. For it belongs to prudence otherwise both by reason of the object and also by reason of the mode than it belongs to the gift of counsel. For it is in a much more excellent mode, both because the things about which it is occupied are more difficult and excellent, and also because it has [the office of] governing according to higher principles; and therefore that gift is very properly reckoned under the name of *counsel.* — From these things, therefore, it is manifest what is the *act* of this gift, and what its *object,* and what is its *difference* with respect to the other habits, and why also it is so *named*.

---