Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-a1-q5
----------------------------------------
### Question V. *Whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires.*

Fifthly there is inquiry as to what is the proper act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object; and the question is whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires. And that it is principally about enduring passions, seems [thus]:

1. *First,* by Gregory, who says, on the beginning of *Job,* that it belongs to the gift of fortitude to give confidence to the trembling; but trembling is greatest when the danger of passions threatens: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists chiefly about such [dangers].

2. Likewise, fortitude, whether it be called a gift or a virtue, regards the irascible power as its proper subject; but the irascible power more properly regards the enduring of passions than the repression and abstinence from desires: it seems therefore that the principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to its opposite: for, as liberality is opposed to avarice and desire, so fortitude is opposed to pusillanimity; but pusillanimity is attended to about the flight from passions: therefore it seems conversely that the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the habit of fortitude-as-virtue: for the gift of fortitude ought to have its act and object in a greater, or at least in as great, excellence and difficulty as is to be found about fortitude-as-virtue; but the greatest difficulty consists about the passions: therefore since fortitude-as-virtue consists about them, it seems much more strongly that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to, or consists, in the attacking and endurance of passions.

5. Likewise, among all meritorious acts the greatest difficulty is about enduring passions, and toward this we are more unfit and infirm: therefore if gifts are given to us for our expediting and against the infirmities

holding us back from the good, it seems that some gift ought to be given to us for the endurance of passions. But there is no other to assign than the gift of fortitude: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *On the Soul and the Spirit*: "It belongs to fortitude not only to repress earthly desires, but to forget them utterly"; but this does not belong to fortitude-as-virtue: therefore it belongs to fortitude-as-gift: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of fortitude consists in the repression of desires.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Christian Doctrine*, where he speaks of the gifts, says that "it belongs to fortitude to sequester oneself from all the deadly delight of transient things": therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in the repression of delights.

3. Likewise, Augustine adapts the seven gifts to the seven beatitudes, so that fortitude and the hunger and thirst for justice correspond to each other; but the hunger and desire for justice does not arise in us except through the mortification of desires and pleasures: therefore it seems that the act of fortitude consists principally about such [mortification].

4. Likewise, the gift of fortitude corresponds to the gift of counsel, as the one executing to the one regulating; but the gift of counsel directs chiefly to the fulfillment of the divine counsels; and the divine counsels consist principally about the repression of desires and of the occasions adhering to them, as is plain in chastity, obedience, and poverty: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally about the repression of such desires.

5. Likewise, the gift of fortitude either has an act of another genus than fortitude-as-virtue, or, if it has [one] in the same genus, it is necessary that it have a more excellent one; but in the same genus it cannot have a more excellent one, since fortitude-as-virtue consists about terrible things which bring on death, as the Philosopher says: therefore it is necessary that it have an act of another genus. Since therefore the act of fortitude-as-virtue consists about enduring passions, it seems that the act of fortitude-as-gift consists not about passions, but about restraining delights.

There is therefore the question, what is the act, and what the object, of the gift of fortitude, and why it is named by the same name as the habit of virtue, which indeed is found in none of the other gifts.

### Conclusion.

> The principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the prompt endurance of passions according to the liberty of counsel and the imitation of Christ.

**I respond:** It must be said that fortitude, as far as concerns its first ground, is attended to with respect to the difficult. But something is called difficult in two ways: either because it is laborious and difficult, in a certain manner exceeding and burdening the faculty of the power itself; or because it is beyond necessity and exceeds the common state. And fortitude has to be attended to with respect to each, but with respect to the first it is attended to and ordered according to the necessity of the precept, with respect to the second according to the liberty of counsel. And the first pertains to fortitude-as-virtue, but the second to fortitude-as-gift. — But since difficulty is most of all attended to about the excellence of the passions; hence it is that it belongs to the gift of fortitude as much as to fortitude-as-virtue to enable [the soul], according to its principal ordering, for the suffering of passions, but in one way and another: for someone can endure and attack passions either for the conservation of justice and honor, or for the perfect imitation of Christ; so that the first pertains to the dictate of natural law and of moral honor, but the second pertains to the counsel of God. And since the imitation of Christ is attended to in the crucifixion of oneself, according as he himself says in Matthew 16: *Whoever wishes to come after me, let him deny himself* etc.; hence it is that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to about the prompt and expedited endurance of passions, through this, that in a certain manner it crucifies us to the world and the world to us, according to that which the Apostle says to the Galatians, in the last [chapter]: *The world is crucified to me, and I to the world.* And this is what Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*: "Let them rise up thereafter to fortitude, so that the world may be crucified to them, and they to the world, and that in the perversity of this life and the abundance of iniquity charity may not grow cold." — And so it is plain that the act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ; and this is its principal act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show, which conclude the truth, and therefore are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. But to that which is objected, that it is about the repression of delights, by the authorities of Augustine; it must be said that Augustine, in those authorities, does not assign the proper and principal act of the gift of fortitude itself, but as it were a preamble. For no one is prompt and expedited for the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ, except him who has crucified his flesh with its vices and concupiscences.

4. To that which is objected, that fortitude executes those things to which counsel directs; it must be said that, although the gift of counsel directs to the fulfilling of the divine counsels, in which the perfection of religion consists, yet with a more principal intention it directs to those things in which there is more of the character of difficulty; but it is of greater difficulty to imitate Christ in passions than in actions: and therefore about such [passions] both counsel and the gift of fortitude have principally to consist.

5. To that which is further objected, that the gift of fortitude cannot be in a more excellent mode about passions than the virtue of fortitude; it must be said that this is false, because he endures passions in a more excellent mode and by a more excellent habit who endures according to the imitation of Christ, than [he who endures] for the conservation of justice, and he who endures according to the supererogation of counsel, than [he who endures] according to the obligation of the precept. For in one of these he is set right, namely in the act of the virtue of fortitude; but in the other he is not only set right, but is also more highly elevated and expedited, namely in the act of the gift of fortitude.

And through this is made plain that which was lastly asked, namely concerning the real difference of the gift of fortitude and fortitude-as-virtue, and concerning their agreement in name. For in reality they differ on account of the diversity of the modes of enabling and ordering toward the endurance of passions; but in name they agree, for this reason, that they order toward the same kinds of passions. For the virtue of fortitude orders toward enduring whatever and however great torments, before it would abandon the good of virtue and honor, yet not so excellently and promptly as the gift of fortitude. Whence among all the virtues, on account of excellence and difficulty on the part of the object, the virtue of fortitude approaches the gifts; and therefore the habit of virtue and of gift, more than the other gifts, are reckoned under the same name, although they differ by a real difference, because there is less difference between those habits. — From these things it is plain what is the act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object, and what is its difference with respect to the other habits.