Dist. 35, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/35/q/bon-sent-III-d35-dubia
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# DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the letter, and first it is asked about that which he says, namely that *wisdom is the knowledge of human and divine things*; for, as the Philosopher says, « the sciences are cut up according to things », that is, they are divided according to the diversity of their subjects; but divine and human things, created and uncreated, differ by the greatest diversity: therefore there can be no science, no wisdom, at once concerning both. — Likewise, human things in comparison to divine things are as it were nothing, just as the finite is in no way comparable to the infinite: therefore, just as a point adds nothing to a line, so the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things: therefore it seems that the knowledge of human things does not belong to the integrity of wisdom itself: therefore it ought not to be placed in its definition.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name of *wisdom*, insofar as it is taken for knowledge, has customarily been taken in two ways by the philosophers, just as the name of *justice* too is taken in two ways. For there is *special* justice and *general* justice; *special* justice is a cardinal virtue, distinct from the others; but *general* justice embraces generally all the virtues. So too wisdom, in its proper sense, is called « the knowledge of the highest causes », but wisdom in its common sense comprehends and includes the knowledge of all things. — And in this way the Philosopher says that the wise man seeks to know the account of any thing whatever, as it is; and in this way wisdom includes within itself the diverse sciences, and not only those which are concerning creatures, but also those which are concerning the Creator and creatures. And since « by the name of *man* every creature can be understood », since he shares in common with all things, as Gregory says; hence it is that, in defining wisdom, he says that it is the knowledge of divine and human things, that is, of the other created things, in which the supreme wisdom of God is manifested. — And by this the explanation of the description and the resolution of the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that the knowledge of human things adds nothing to the knowledge of divine things; it must be said that, although divine things exceed human things infinitely, because the former are infinite and the latter finite; yet the knowledge does not exceed the knowledge infinitely, for the reason that each knowledge is finite, both that by which we know divine things and that by which we know human things. For we do not know divine things according to their immensity; nor, so long as we are on the way, do we attain to beholding Truth itself in itself; and therefore it is necessary to know it in its effects. And therefore the knowledge of human things is a great part of our cognizance, so long as we are in the state of the way; and to that extent it is placed in the definition of wisdom.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *To this knowledge I attribute only that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.* For he seems to say something false, since, when he says that faith is generated from knowledge, he understands it either as to *habit* or as to *act*. As to *habit* it does not hold true, because the habit of faith is not generated from the habit of knowledge: as to *act* not either, because the act of faith precedes the act of knowledge: therefore in no way does it hold true. — Likewise, knowledge is occupied about temporal things; but faith is concerning eternal things: therefore it seems that the gift of knowledge does nothing toward faith itself.

Alongside this it is also asked about the diversity of those four acts which he enumerates.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although faith has supreme Truth itself for its principal object, to which it believes and assents; yet that which it believes, it sees through the mirror of the creature; and therefore, even though the mirror of the creature is not its principal object, nevertheless the knowledge of eternal things in the subject creature and of the worldly creature, and the understanding of Scripture, contributes very much to the promotion of faith itself, whether in another or

in oneself: in oneself indeed as to progress; but in others not only as to progress, but also as to inception; for a man of great knowledge and learning more easily persuades and better instructs those coming to the faith than one who is ignorant, as is evident from blessed Paul. — Whence, because this knowledge avails for the *introduction* of faith, and for the *advancement* of faith once introduced, and for the *defense* of faith once advanced, and for the *confirmation* of faith once defended; hence it is that Augustine assigns to it four acts with respect to faith itself, saying that through the « gift of knowledge the most salutary faith is *begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened* »; so that the first act regards *beginners*, the two intermediate ones the *proficient* according to progress in good and the fight against evil, and the fourth and last the now *perfect*.

To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that knowledge does not generate faith, neither as to habit nor as to act; it must be said that on the contrary it does; but for some habit to be generated by another can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the same subject, or with respect to another; and with respect to another in two ways: either *effectively* or *dispositively*. When, therefore, it is said that knowledge generates faith; this is not understood with respect to the same subject, but with respect to another; nor is it understood *effectively*, but only *dispositively*.

To that which is objected, that faith is concerning eternal things, knowledge concerning temporal things; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion], because temporal things lead well by the hand to eternal things, so long as we are on the way.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Knowledge is to abstain from evils.* For he seems to say something false, because the acts of diverse gifts are diverse: since, then, this belongs to fear itself, it does not seem that it belongs to knowledge itself. — Likewise, to abstain from evils regards the affection; but knowledge regards the intellect: therefore to abstain from evils is not its act.

Alongside this it is asked: since knowledge is not only for turning away from evil, but also for doing good, why is it described rather by the act of turning away from evils than by the act of being engaged in good things?

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as the Master expounds below, *to abstain from evils* is not understood only privatively: not to do evil, but *to abstain from evils*, that is, « to conduct oneself prudently in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation ». Whence to abstain from evils belongs in one way and another to fear itself and to knowledge itself. For fear represses the inner incitements, but knowledge teaches one to guard against outward dangers and occasions and those things which incline toward evil, in which [matters] there is great difficulty.

And by this the response to the objections is clear, since *to abstain from evils* belongs in one way to fear; moreover, it does not belong to knowledge as carrying out, but only as directing; lastly, it does not belong to knowledge itself only privatively, but also positively, as was touched on above. Thus those three objections are clear, which proceed according to these [points].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *It has been openly shown in what the spirit of wisdom and the spirit of knowledge differ, since wisdom is attributed to divine things, and knowledge to human things.* For it seems that there is no difference here, for the reason that the same virtue, namely charity, has at once to be occupied about God and neighbor; and likewise the same faith: therefore no difference of gifts seems to be assigned by this. — Likewise, understanding, which is one gift, as he says below, is at once concerning eternal and temporal things: therefore it seems that the Master contradicts himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that to be engaged about temporal and eternal things can be in two ways: either according to the same accounts, or according to differing accounts. When it is according to the same accounts; then there is only material diversity, and one formal habit can be with respect to both. But when it is according to differing accounts; then there is not only material diversity, but rather also formal diversity; and so it is to be found in the matter at hand, as can be gathered from those things which were said in the determination of the questions previously treated: and therefore the Master assigns the difference quite rightly. And let these things said concerning the gifts suffice.

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