Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q1
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Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether a connection is to be posited among the gratuitous virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, from that which Jerome says upon that text of Isaiah, chapter sixteen: *My belly shall sound for Moab* etc.; there the Gloss says: « Just as a cithara does not emit a composed sound if one string has been broken, so the spirit, or the belly of the prophet, if one virtue is lacking, will not resound a sweet melody »; but when grace is in the soul and the Holy Spirit in the heart of man, there is in it a sweet spiritual melody: therefore it is necessary that all the virtues be there at once.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the fourth [book] of the Sentences, distinction fifteen, that « it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God »: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impious to hope for half a grace: therefore just as it is impossible that one mortal sin be remitted without another, so it seems that it is impossible that one virtue be given to us without another.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. No one can have a gratuitous virtue unless he has grace; no one has grace who is not a temple of God; but no one can be a temple of God unless he be a temple of Him according to the whole, because there is no agreement of Christ with Belial, nor of the temple of God with idols: if therefore, for the soul to be consecrated into a temple of God, it is necessary that it have all the virtues directing and rectifying its powers; it seems to be necessary that, if it has one virtue, it have the rest.

4. Likewise, whoever has a single gratuitous virtue, it is necessary that he have charity — for no gratuitous virtue remains when charity is excluded — but he who has charity has the *bond of perfection* and the fullness of the Law, and through this can attain to salvation: if therefore no one has perfection in the genus of morals, nor is able to fulfill all the commandments of the Law, unless he have the totality of the virtues; it seems necessarily to follow that he who has one gratuitous virtue lacks none.

1. But against this, first an instance is brought forward in *Christ* and in *the Blessed*; for Christ and the Blessed have charity, and yet in them there is neither faith nor hope, as appears from what precedes: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

2. Likewise, secondly an instance is brought forward in *the innocent* and *the married*; for the innocent do not have the virtue of penance, the married do not have virginity; and yet these are gratuitous virtues: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

3. Likewise, thirdly an instance is brought forward in *the foreknown* and *the reprobate*, who, when they are in grace, have certain virtues, and yet never have perseverance, since, if they had it, they would be saved, as the Lord says: *He who shall persevere unto the end* etc.: if therefore perseverance is a virtue, according as Tullius and Bernard hold, it seems that there is no connection of the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason*. The habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally, like the diverse species of one genus, so that they are divided by opposition, and one is not the principle of another; but when certain properties are distinguished from one another, so that one is divided from the other, nor is the one caused by the other; it is possible for one to be had without the rest: if therefore the gratuitous virtues are of this sort, it seems that it is not necessary that they be connected.

5. Likewise, the habits of the virtues come to be made known and distinguished through their acts: therefore, as is the comparison of act to act, the same is the comparison of habit to habit; but it is not necessary that the acts of the virtues be connected, nay rather one can be exercised without another: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if the habits of the virtues are connected, this is either by reason of the *principle*, or by reason of the *subject*, or by reason of the *object*. If by reason of the *principle*, because they are from God; then, since every property is from God, the connection would be in all properties. If by reason of the *subject*, because they are in the same [subject]: therefore since all the sciences are in the same soul, he who had one science would have the rest; which is manifestly false. If by reason of the *object*; *on the contrary*: they are distinguished according to objects: therefore they are not connected according to those [objects], since the principle of distinction and of connection is not the same.

### Conclusion.

> It is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of the gratuitous virtues in three ways, namely as regards the *underlying habit*, and as regards the *superadded state*, and as regards the *defect of imperfection annexed* [to them].

If we speak of the virtues under the aspect of annexed imperfection, it is not necessary that there be a connection absolutely, for the reason that it is not necessary that a man having grace have an imperfection adjoined. — Similarly, if we speak of the virtues as regards the *superadded state*, which is not of the necessity of the virtue, as is found in virginal and widowed continence; so still it is not necessary that the virtues be connected. — But if we speak of the virtues as regards the *underlying habits*, then a distinction must be made: for either those habits *have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, or *not*. If they *have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, as the habit of faith and of hope has; so they are not necessarily connected with the other virtues except for that time during which one is in the state of the wayfarer. But if they *do not have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, then they have a connection absolutely, whether in the state of the wayfarer or in the state of the homeland. Hence according to every state it is true that it is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them, just as in place of faith in the homeland we shall have vision, and in place of hope, perfect holding.

Now the ground of this connection can be taken in a fourfold manner, according to the fourfold genus of cause: first indeed on the part of the *material* cause, which namely is our necessity; secondly on the part of the *efficient* cause, which is God's largesse; thirdly on the part of the *formal* cause, which is the conformity of the virtues; fourthly on the part of the *final* cause, which is the dignity of the reward. — For the *material* cause of the virtues can be assigned not as that *from which*, but as that *in which*. And this indeed is the rational soul according to its powers, according to which the soul itself can be bent crooked and directed [straight]. And since those powers of the soul cannot be rectified through one habit of virtue, but through diverse [habits]; it is necessary, for the soul to be perfected in gratuitous *being* and made pleasing to God and just, that it be rectified according to the diverse habits of virtue, in itself and in each of its powers. Therefore, on account of the necessity on the part of that which is susceptible [of perfection], it is necessary that the gratuitous virtues be connected.

But the *efficient* cause of the virtues is the divine liberality, whose property it is in no way to be deficient in things necessary, but to administer all things abundantly and in plenty. Hence just as the divine liberality, perfecting a thing in *being*, first gives it the whole by which it can be conserved in *being*;

so, perfecting it in the second *being*, gives it the entire perfection by which it can both remain in that *being* and resist individual vices. Therefore it is fitting to the divine largesse, when it makes a man graced, to bestow upon the same the diversity of virtues, in which the rectitude of life consists.

Now the *formal* cause of the gratuitous virtues themselves is the very grace of God, which perfects and informs the other virtues as regards the habits underlying them, and this through its *presidency* and *influence*, through which it makes the soul graced both as regards itself and as regards its powers. Hence, since that grace holds itself conformably to all the virtues; from the fact that it is had, either *each and every* virtue is had, or *none*; and therefore it is necessary that the virtues be connected.

Now the *final* cause of the virtues is glory itself, which, coming into the soul, perfects it on every side and fully; and therefore it is necessary that through grace it be *disposed* on every side. For unless a sufficient *disposition* precede, perfection is not induced. It is necessary therefore, by the necessity of the *end*, that all the powers of the soul be perfected through the gratuitous virtues, that they may be fit and disposed for the reception of glory. — And thus it is clear that the ground of the connection of the gratuitous virtues is taken from the fourfold genus of cause; whence also the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning *Christ* and *the Blessed*, in whom the virtue of hope nor of faith is not to be found; the response is now clear from what has been said: since these virtues, on account of the imperfection annexed to them, are not compatible with the state of glory. Nevertheless from this the connection of the virtues is not undone, for the reason that they themselves are connected with the other virtues in the state of the *wayfarer*; but in the state of the *homeland*, in place of them the endowments corresponding to them, together with the other virtues which there remain, have connection.

2. To that which is objected concerning *the innocent* and *the married*, the response is now clear: since penance and virginity name not only *habits* of virtue, but also *states*, by reason of which, as has been said, a connection of the gratuitous virtues is not necessary, for the reason that in diverse states the essence of grace and of the virtues can be preserved.

3. To that which is objected concerning perseverance, which is not in *the foreknown*; it must be said that perseverance is spoken of in three ways. In one way perseverance is said [to be] the will of enduring sufferings without failing; and so it is a species of fortitude. In another way perseverance is said [to be] the purpose of persevering in the good unto the end; and so it is a condition annexed to every virtue. In a third way perseverance is said [to be] the continuation of the good unto the end; and in this way it is not the name of a *virtue*, but rather of a *state* consequent upon all the virtues. And in the first two ways indeed it has [the property of] being connected with the other virtues and is found in the just foreknown; but in this third way it is not found in the foreknown, nor is it necessarily linked to the others, because it does not name the habit of virtue, but rather a consequent state.

4. To that which is objected, that the habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally; it must be said that, although they are formally divided as regards the underlying habits, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are gratuitous, they communicate in grace itself, which is perfective of all the gratuitous virtues in gratuitous *being*. And therefore that reason does not compel: since, even if in their proper formal characters they are distinguished, nevertheless in the *common* formal character, by reason of which they have gratuitous being, they are united.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of habits and acts; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the going-forth of *acts* is voluntary and from the freedom of choice, but the introduction of *habits* into the soul itself is from the divine largesse; the will moreover applies itself specially to one good, but the divine largesse completes the whole: therefore it does not follow that, although the act of one gratuitous virtue is separated from another, on this account the habit is likewise [separated] from the habit.

6. To that which is objected last, whence the connection of the habits comes; the response is now clear: for it comes from the fourfold genus of cause, as has been said before; nor is it similar concerning those in which the [objection] presses, as is clear of itself.