Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/36/q/bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had.*

Thirdly it is asked whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had. And that there is, it seems:

1. *First*, by philosophical authority. For Seneca says: « Everything that is done well is done justly, bravely, and temperately »; but the work of any virtue is done well: therefore it is necessary that it be done justly and bravely and temperately: therefore to any work of virtue four virtues concur. But this could not be, unless they were connected: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome to Pammachius: « The Stoics describe the four virtues as so connected and mutually cohering, that whoever does not have one lacks them all, and whoever has one has them all »: therefore it seems, by the authority of the philosophers, that the political virtues are connected.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by the authority of the *Saints*, and first by the authority of Augustine, in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*. For in defining virtue he says that « virtue is an equality of life consenting on every side to reason »; but life does not accord on every side with reason except through the totality of the virtues: therefore, in order that someone have one virtue purely, it is necessary that he have the rest.

4. Likewise, Bernard, in the first book *to Eugenius*: « It is also most delightful to observe a certain harmony and interweaving

of the virtues, and that one depends on another, as you see that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that whatever boldness prudence has not given birth to is not fortitude but rashness ». And a little after: « Justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude avenges, temperance possesses »: therefore if these are required for the act of any virtue, it seems that all the virtues necessarily concur in one act.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] *by reason*: for as chastity is related to being chaste, so virtue is related to being virtuous; but whoever has chastity is chaste: therefore whoever has virtue is virtuous. But no one is virtuous who has a vice: therefore if someone has virtue, he has no vice. But vices are not expelled except by the virtues opposed to them: therefore he who has one virtue has the rest.

6. Likewise, it belongs to any virtue to discern what is to be chosen, and to hold the mean, and to tend rightly toward the end, and to deal with what is arduous and difficult; but the first belongs to prudence, the second to temperance, the third to justice, the fourth to fortitude: therefore it seems that to any virtuous act these four virtues necessarily concur. But this would not be, unless they had a connection with one another: therefore it seems that the political virtues are connected.

**On the contrary:**

1. the authority of Augustine to Jerome. For he says that « it is not a divine pronouncement by which it is said that he who has one has all; but this has seemed so to men who are studious and ingenious »; but if this were true, it would be a divine pronouncement, because every truth proceeds from the first Truth: therefore, since this is understood of the political virtues, the political virtues are not connected.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher the habits of the political and customary virtues come from acts: but acts are not connected — for it happens that a man is exercised in the act of one virtue in such a way that he is not exercised in the act of another — therefore it seems that not all the virtues are necessarily connected.

3. Likewise, just as the sciences are had by acquisition, so are the political virtues; and as one virtue assists another, so it is in the habit of one science with respect to another; but the sciences that are by acquisition are not had at once, but one earlier and another later, and one can be had without another: therefore one political virtue does not seem to be necessarily connected to another.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by sensible experience: for many are strong in the virtue of prudence who nevertheless do not have generosity or the virtue of patience; many also keep justice toward their neighbor who nevertheless do not have continence in themselves; and yet they do those things through the political virtues: therefore it seems that among virtues of this kind there is no necessary connection.

> **Conclusion.** Simply speaking, the political virtues do not have a connection; they do, however, according to the state of perfection and according to certain common conditions.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this question there was a controversy among the philosophers themselves, as Augustine and Jerome indicate. — *Opinion 1.* « For certain of the philosophers, who were called Stoics, said that the virtues are necessarily connected, such that he who lacks one lacks the rest ». Of whose position Seneca seems to have been. For he speaks thus: « If you let go one of your Corinthian vessels, you can say that your furnishing is safe for you. But if you lose one of the virtues, you must confess that you will have none ». — *Opinion 2.* The position of others was that one can be had without another, just as someone can have chastity in such a way that he does not have justice.

*Reasoning 1, according to the Stoics.* Now the reason for this diversity was this, that the Stoics held that virtue was not in anyone except in the wise man, because the governance of a man's whole life according to the rule of conduct depends on the rectitude of reason. And they called wise, as Augustine says *On the City of God*, the one into whom no disturbance falls. For according to them he was called wise who masters all the passions of the soul. —

*Reasoning 2.* Besides this they also held that since virtue is

about the mean, and the mean is in one way and indivisible, no one has virtue unless he has it in the highest degree and perfectly. But virtue is not had perfectly where some vice reigns, and where the other virtues are lacking. — And on account of these two reasons the Stoics said that the political virtues are connected, namely because they are not possessed except by the wise man, over whom no vice has dominion, and they are about the indivisible mean, from which by any vice there is a falling away.

*A twofold error is rebutted.* But in the foundation of this position of theirs they went too far as to each of the aforesaid points, both because they did not place wisdom in those who are progressing, but only in the *perfect*; and also because they said that, as to the loss of virtue, it makes no difference whether one falls away from the precise mean a little or much. And therefore Augustine rebukes them, to Jerome, speaking thus: « The Stoics seem to me to be in error, who do not wish a man *progressing* in wisdom to have wisdom at all, but only then, when he is *perfect*. For they say that just as it makes no difference for drowning a man whether he has water many furlongs above him or one palm; so it is with those who are in the gulf of error, with respect to wisdom ». And quite reasonably does Augustine rebuke them, because of *Corollary.* this — that they greatly narrow the way of salvation in what is *good*, when they say that virtue and wisdom are in the perfect alone; and greatly widen it in *malice*, when they say that it makes no difference whether one falls away more or less from the mean of virtue.

*The opinion contrary to this is approved.* And therefore the position of the other philosophers was more reasonable, who held that wisdom is not only in the perfect, but also in those who are *progressing*. They also held that the *mean* of virtue has a *latitude*, just as the mean of health has a latitude. Since therefore, according to the political life, the virtues are acquired little by little in those who are progressing toward wisdom; therefore they held that one virtue can be had in a greater and a lesser perfection according to different times; and one can also be separated from another. And the opinion of these is, according to the sayings of Augustine, the more to be approved.

*General conclusion.* It must therefore be answered to the proposed question that, simply speaking — namely as to all time and as to the very habits of the virtues — there is no connection among the political virtues, although some connection can be found among them by reason of some determinate *state* and of certain *common conditions*. — *A distinction.* On account of which it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of virtues of this kind, the political ones, as to their *proper [features]* and as to their *appropriated [features]*. *Conclusion 2.* If as to the *appropriated*; then there is a connection in them, because those four conditions previously mentioned, which are *to discern* and *to hold the mean* and the like, are appropriated singly to these four virtues, and yet are required together for any virtue. — *A subdistinction.* But if we speak as to the *proper*, this can be in two ways: either *simply* or *according to the state of perfection*. *Conclusion 3.* If *according to the state of perfection*; then there is still a necessary connection in them, because one virtue is never had perfectly unless the rest are had. And as to this the Stoics spoke well, although they were not founded throughout upon the truth. — *Conclusion 4.* If *simply*, or according to *every state*; then it is not necessary that there be a connection in virtues of this kind, since they are from acquisition; as the arguments brought forward for this part show, and therefore they are to be granted.

*The solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. Therefore to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of Seneca, that *everything that is done well etc.*; it must be said that this is understood of the virtues themselves as to their *appropriated [features]*, not as to their *proper [features]*. For if we wish to speak as to the *proper*, the acts of those virtues are diverse and do not deal with the same thing, but with diverse things.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Stoics, which Jerome introduces; the response is already clear: because the Stoics are not to be believed throughout in this matter. *Moreover*, the Stoics, as was touched on before, always spoke of the virtues according to the *summit of perfection*, and as to that state they spoke truly, because the connection is in the virtues not because of the *essence* of the virtue itself, but because of the *superadded perfection*, which one virtue does not confer unless it is associated with the others.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Augustine, that *virtue is an equality of life etc.*; it must be said that by that adverb *on every side* there is not made a *Note.* distribution for everything that pertains to the rectitude of the *whole life*, but for those things that pertain to the rectitude of the *act* of the virtue itself; but it is possible that someone be rectified in the act of one virtue, according to

what the civil virtue requires, in such a way nevertheless that he does not have rectification in the act of another virtue, as can be manifestly seen through examples.

4. To that which is objected from the authority of Bernard, the response is already clear: because Bernard speaks of the virtues themselves as to their *appropriated [features]*, not as to their *proper [features]*. And *moreover*, he speaks of the cardinal virtues, not insofar as they are *political*, but insofar as they are *gratuitous* and by infusion rather than by acquisition. And thus it can be granted that they are connected; but this does not bear on the proposed question.

5. To that which is objected, that chastity denominates someone chaste: therefore similarly virtue [denominates someone] virtuous; *Note.* it must be said that it is not alike: because names ending in *-osus* signify *fullness*. Hence more is said when I say that someone is *virtuous* than when I say that he *has virtue*. Hence the Philosopher also says « that from virtue someone is not denominated *virtuous*, but rather *zealous* »; whereas *chaste* imports no more than *having chastity*. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions, according to which the virtues are distinguished, that they are found in each one; the response is already clear. For that must be understood by *appropriation*, not by *property*, as was said before.